Tehran believes the Strait of Hormuz is its strongest weapon in this war. The US is making it increasingly expensive to use.
Iran says it struck two American vessels and eight oil tankers in the Gulf this week. The US says the claim that Iran hit American warships is false, and separate reports of merchant ships being struck do not confirm Iran’s account of the tankers.
Whatever the real scale, the attacks came after the US destroyed five Iranian oil tankers on Tuesday, 10 in a week by Central Command’s count, following Iranian missile launches at an American warship.
Brent crude crossed $100 on Wednesday for the first time since late July. This is day 194 of the war against the Iranian regime, and in those 194 days Brent has closed above $100 on only about 40 trading days, almost all of them in one concentrated stretch from mid-March to late May.
Since May 22 it has closed above $100 only once before today, on July 23, and fell back below $100 the following day. Over the summer, the market learned to live with a mostly closed Hormuz, and Brent spent July and August between $70 and $95.
I have always believed the strait was Iran’s principal leverage point. I also know from my own sources that the Iranian leadership sees Hormuz as its most important weapon. That does not mean they have lost interest in a nuclear weapon. They have not. It does not mean they no longer want to destabilize the Middle East. They most certainly do. But they firmly believe their ability to threaten passage through Hormuz is their best chance to keep the regime alive, threaten their neighbors and eventually regain the power they have lost during this war.
While Iran can make commercial shipping through Hormuz dangerous, the US can make it harder for Iran to sell and move its own oil.
Jason D. Greenblatt
Iran does not need to keep every ship out to make that weapon work. It needs to make passage dangerous and expensive enough that oil prices rise, insurance costs soar and governments feel pressure to make concessions to get traffic moving again. It continues to work hard at exactly that, and the cost lands first on the Gulf’s own exporters, ports and shippers. Before the war, more than 100 ships a day passed through the Strait. Lloyd’s List Intelligence counted about 12 per day in the last week of August, and war-risk premiums have run as high as 7.5 to 10 percent of a ship’s hull value, according to Marsh.
President Trump is responding by materially increasing the cost to Iran. The pressure now reaches Iran’s oil exports and tankers, its access to banks and financial networks and, as of this week, its airlines and the foreign companies helping keep them flying. On Tuesday, the Treasury Department sanctioned 27 Iranian airlines and the intermediaries supplying Mahan Air with aircraft. On Friday, it sanctioned a Turkish bank set up to move Iran’s oil revenue from China into Turkiye and convert it to cash and gold. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said more banks will follow, week by week.
The destruction of five Iranian tankers takes that pressure beyond sanctions. While Iran can make commercial shipping through Hormuz dangerous, the US can make it harder for Iran to sell and move its own oil.
Hormuz works as leverage only as long as Iran can impose more pain than it absorbs. President Trump is steadily reducing the economic value Iran gets from its oil trade while attacking the networks that sustain the regime. Tehran’s strongest card is becoming much more expensive to play.
Iran is showing no sign that it is ready to negotiate in good faith. On the contrary, Tehran talks about an understanding with Oman while firing missiles at Jordan, claiming attacks on American warships, announcing an exclusion zone at the mouth of the Gulf and sending the Houthis after Saudi airports and Aramco facilities. The regime has chosen to fight its way out of the pressure rather than negotiate its way out.
Economic pressure takes time, especially against a regime that has spent decades learning how to survive sanctions, so the question is: Whose clock is running? The midterm elections in the US are on Nov. 3, 55 days from today. Inside Iran there is a real focus on exerting enough pressure on oil prices and Gulf shipping before then to force President Trump to change course.
I think Tehran is reading the wrong clock. Whatever happens on Nov. 3, President Trump is still president on Nov. 4, and his term runs to Jan. 20, 2029. Part of Iran’s equation is those 55 days.
What should concern Tehran more is that President Trump has those 55 days and 809 more after them. Even if the Democrats do exceptionally well on Nov. 3 and make Washington far more difficult for the administration, President Trump has spent a career operating on many fronts at once. He can deal with his opponents in Congress and with the Iranian regime at the same time. If Tehran assumes otherwise, it has badly misread the man it is dealing with.
Iran is betting that Hormuz can carry the regime through this war and outlast the pressure. The US is making that bet more expensive every week, and the American political calendar may not offer Tehran the exit it appears to be counting on.
Jason D. Greenblatt was the White House Middle East envoy in the first Trump administration. He is the author of “In the Path of Abraham: How Donald Trump Made Peace in the Middle East.” X: @GreenblattJD
