DUBAI: The consequences of the war with the US and Israel are becoming increasingly difficult for Iran to contain, reaching far beyond the damage to its military infrastructure and oil revenues.

When the fighting erupted on Feb. 28 this year, Tehran was already contending with years of sanctions, economic problems and growing public discontent. The war has compounded these problems, with the damage extending to its diplomatic relationships with neighboring countries.

The regional fallout has been particularly significant. Iranian attacks on Gulf states have deepened mistrust and set back years of efforts to rebuild diplomatic ties. The extent of opposition to Tehran’s actions was reflected in a UN Security Council resolution condemning the attacks, adopted in March with 13 votes in favor and abstentions from Russia and China. Although Oman and Qatar have continued to provide diplomatic channels, their mediation efforts have not translated into political support for Iran.

The military losses have also left Tehran with a difficult task ahead. A June assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that US and Israeli strikes since February had destroyed around 70 percent of Iran’s pre-war missile stockpile. Satellite imagery also indicated that nearly all of the country’s conventional surface fleet had been lost. Replacing that equipment will be a considerable undertaking, particularly as sanctions continue to restrict Iran’s access to foreign components and technology.

Iran’s partnerships with Russia and China have not offered the kind of backing that might help offset those losses. Both countries have criticized the US and Israeli campaign, but neither has shown an appetite for direct military involvement or for assuming the costs of defending Tehran. Moscow has remained engaged diplomatically, while Beijing has its own substantial economic and strategic interests across the Gulf. For Iran, this has exposed the limits of partnerships it has long regarded as central to its international standing.

The economic consequences are likely to be harder to contain. Iran’s oil exports, one of its main sources of foreign currency, have come under further pressure from the US naval blockade. With the economy already weakened by years of sanctions and structural problems, the government has limited room to absorb the additional strain. A prolonged disruption to oil revenues would leave even fewer resources available for reconstruction and economic recovery.

There is also the question of who will be left to rebuild. Iran’s loss of skilled professionals has been a growing concern, particularly in sectors such as healthcare and education. Figures reported by the Commonwealth Fund show that around 6,500 doctors, including 2,300 specialists, left the country in 2022 and 2023, 30 percent more than entered the profession during the same period. Another 850 medical faculty members left their academic positions in the year to March 2024. The continued departure of experienced professionals threatens to leave gaps that will be difficult to fill, regardless of how much money is eventually available for reconstruction.

Public confidence presents another challenge. A national survey cited by Iran’s deputy interior minister found that social capital had fallen from 43.5 in 2015 to 36.6 in 2025, with 60 percent of respondents expressing little hope that conditions would improve. The findings point to a loss of trust that predates the current conflict, suggesting that the government was already facing a growing disconnect with the public before the June 2025 war. Further economic hardship and prolonged instability could make those divisions harder to address.

Could another war bring down the regime?

Whether mounting military and economic pressure will eventually threaten the survival of the Islamic Republic is far less certain. Economic hardship, public discontent and weakened military capabilities do not, on their own, mean the regime is close to collapse. The Revolutionary Guards continue to wield considerable influence and appear to have strengthened their position within the political system. Disagreements among officials over negotiations and economic priorities are evident, but they are not necessarily signs of an imminent breakdown.

Kamran Bokhari, a strategic forecaster and senior resident fellow at the Middle East Policy Council, described the Islamic Republic as undergoing a “slow meltdown” in an October interview with Iran International. “This regime cannot go back to what it was,” he said, pointing to mounting economic pressure and divisions among hardliners. Bokhari also identified public disagreements within the ruling establishment and potential fractures in the security apparatus as developments worth watching.

The longer the conflict continues without a clear timeline or a credible plan for bringing it to an end, the harder it may become for the authorities to sustain public support. Measures initially presented as necessary for security or administrative reasons could become increasingly difficult to justify as their costs mount.

For now, Tehran is still trying to keep diplomatic options open. Recent contacts with Oman, which the foreign minister described as constructive, alongside Araghchi’s regional engagements, suggest that the government has not abandoned diplomatic efforts.

The question is whether these contacts can produce anything tangible. Tehran needs more than announcements of military gains or assurances that diplomatic channels remain open; it needs results that it can present to the Iranian public as evidence that the country is moving towards a way out of the crisis.

For the moment, the government continues to project confidence and an image of control. But with mounting pressures at home and increasingly strained relations abroad, the more pressing question is how much longer it can sustain that position, and what it will have left to show for it.