
I write this week from Berlin, where I came to take part in efforts to strengthen GCC-German relations and explore new avenues for cooperation, as Germany seeks to assert its international role and the GCC seeks to expand its strategic horizons. I will write more on this next week. Today, I will explore Germany’s preoccupation with Ukraine and the beginnings of a new Cold War.
Germany has the most extensive trade relationship with Moscow of all 28 nations in the EU, and as such the most to lose economically from a confrontation with Russia. That, plus its dependence on Russian gas, has limited its options. A German (unofficial) interlocutor told me wistfully: “If only we could import gas from GCC countries instead of Russia, perhaps we could take a different approach to Ukraine’s crisis. Can you supply us with gas?”
Germany has been seen as playing “good cop” with Russia, especially at the beginning of the crisis, emphasizing dialogue and trying to find a face-saving way out of it. Chancellor Merkel has reportedly spoken with Russian President Vladimir Putin several times to try to find such a way, but later reportedly described him after one such conversation as “living in a different world!” The harsh characterization, if accurately reported, was an expression of her growing exasperation with the futility of the exchanges.
But other EU nations, especially East European and former Soviet republics, have taken a strong stance against Russia’s acts in Ukraine. They fear that they would be next if Russia succeeds in Ukraine. For those reasons, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk, for one, has been quite critical of Germany’s conciliatory approach. He put it starkly: “German dependence on Russian gas could effectively limit European sovereignty.” Tusk warned that its dependence could blunt Germany’s, and the EU’s, response to threats from Russia, saying that Germany had to find a way to “correct its economic behavior so that dependence on Russian gas does not paralyze Europe when it needs to act quickly and unambiguously... at a time when we must protect Europe’s fundamental interests.”
In February, German officials indicated that Germany was going to assume a greater international role. At the Munich Security Conference, they predicted the end of an era of restraint, with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier saying, “Germany is too big to just sit on the sidelines and comment on world politics.” Perhaps part of that new approach, Steinmeier played a critical part in February in brokering a rare agreement in Kiev between the Ukrainian bickering parties.
Some western officials and experts, however, have raised doubts as to whether Germany can successfully fulfil such a leadership role; one was quoted as saying, “The EU is dysfunctional, but Berlin is the real problem.”
Initially, Germany was not only opposed to sanctions against Russia, but was also hesitant to go along with lesser measures, such as excluding Russia from the G8. However, after several futile attempts to mediate the crisis, attempts that were rebuffed by Russia, it appeared that Germany for now has decided to join other western nations in taking punitive measures against Russia.
On March 13, Chancellor Angela Merkel warned that Russia risked “massive political and economic consequences” if it did not change its policies. For the first time, she said that Germany, with her EU and western counterparts, supported imposing sanctions.
Speaking before Germany’s parliament, Merkel said emphatically, “We, as neighbors of Russia, would not see only as a threat. And it would not only change the European Union’s relationship with Russia,” Angela Merkel said. “No, this would also cause massive damage to Russia, economically and politically.” She added that EU members and other western nations, if necessary, were prepared to freeze bank accounts and impose travel restrictions on people and firms suspected of being involved in violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity. She told the parliament: “The territorial integrity of Ukraine cannot be called into question.”
Thus ended of Germany’s short-lived neutrality. Part of what has led to the stiffening Germany’s resolve was the ominous actions taken by Russia and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, as well as Ukrainian extremists. The dangers facing minorities, whether Tatar, Russian or Ukrainian were heightened by pro-Russian secessionism.
Attempts to reach a diplomatic solution failed over the weekend. On March 15, at the United Nations Security Council, Russia vetoed a draft resolution affirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity and declaring illegal the Russian-supported referendum on Crimea’s future. It was interesting that only Russia voted against the draft, affirming its isolation on this issue. It was noteworthy that China, torn between its friendship with Russia and its traditional support for the principle of territorial integrity of countries, merely abstained.
As diplomats were debating the draft resolution at the UNSC, Russian troops stationed in Crimea attacked and occupied a gas terminal just outside Crimea. While Russians justified their incursion by referring to the use of the terminal to supply Crimean homes with gas, others saw it as another sign that Russia may have designs on Ukrainian territories outside Crimea.
There is little doubt that a second Cold War is back, involving some of the same actors in the first Cold War. GCC countries professed neutrality during the first war and stayed active in the Non-Aligned Movement, although some tilted slightly westwards.
In the new Cold War, the bets are off on where the GCC as a group, or its constituent member states, will stand. While neutrality should be the guiding principle, GCC countries will be called upon to take sides. When their values and interests counsel taking sides, some will do. However, where interests and values do not converge with those of either side, they will probably sit out this conflict as some western countries have refrained from taking sides in the Syrian conflict because they had no “dog in that fight.”
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