Punjab: The bitter harvest of bad political strategy

Punjab, the largest province of the country, home to 56% of the population, contributing more than 60% to the national economy, fast urbanizing and industrializing region is naturally endowed with the power to act as the heartland of Pakistani politics. The ruling class of this province in alliance with members of the same class across other provinces has historically shaped the power struggles of the country. If a party or a leader dominates, Punjab exercises much deeper and greater influence over national politics than all the other provinces together.

Empirical evidence suggests that the rise of any party or a leader at the national stage took place first and foremost by capturing power in the Punjab. This is the story of the ascent of the Muslim League, the country that founded the country, birth and growth of Pakistan Peoples Party, and lately of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. In the past, the parties that had electoral swings to form governments in the Punjab, generally dominated government at the centre well. Rarely, we have seen Punjab and the centre under two different political administrations, and when so, relations between the two have been very uneasy; each trying to dislodge the other to retain the greater prize or take it away from the other. The PMLN and the PPP played this game twice for the reason that PPP at the centre saw greater political benefits of ruling Punjab for the next election.

Without this province, the federal government with every constitutional power it might have, may lose out to the Punjab-based party because of the wider political and financial resources for patronage and influence over the majority of the electoral constituencies that happen to be in this province.

In the 2018 elections, with no clear majority, both the PMLN and PTI were equally poised to form the government, depending on which party the independents would join and with whom the PMLQ, a much smaller party, but in a king-maker position throws its lot. As the political wind was blowing in favor of the PTI, it quickly got all the independents in its fold and won support of the PMLQ as a coalition partner. Imran Khan desperately wanted Punjab under his control to consolidate his power and implement his manifesto. Seeing power grab in reach in the Punjab he threw all his principles of ethical politics out the window. He made alliances with the party that he had for two decades denounced as the ‘greatest thugs’ of Punjab.

He picked up the old book of power politics, leaving his idealism for dogmatic members of his party who started parting ways with him. He knew well, and was instructed by his close associates that he could retain and expand his power at the centre only by having a PTI government in Punjab. In doing so, he surprised his party, the media and the entire political elite of the province by nominating Usman Buzdar, an obscure member of the Assembly from a remote area, as Chief Minister. Introvert, timid, inarticulate with no administrative experience beyond a local municipality, he cut a sorry figure for the most powerful position after the prime minister of the country. Mostly the political giants, wheeler-dealers, and big political names of the province have occupied this position. Khan made one of his most self-destructive political decisions by ignoring capable, committed and resourceful political leaders from his own party. Two factions of the PTI, including the one led by Jahangir Khan Tareen, the man credited with helping Khan to form the national and the Punjab governments have almost left the party.

The question is, why was Khan so much adamant in keeping Buzdar in power in the face of so much opposition from within the party and from his allies? The sad fact is power politics and personal ambition. Khan wanted to govern Punjab remotely through a nominal chief executive in the province, and there was no better candidate for a proxy role than Mr. Buzdar, a political non-entity.

In my view, Khan operated out of insecurity, and perhaps by his tendency to monopolize power. He thought a chief minister of some political stature and broad-base might one day pose a challenge to his authority, and even leadership of the party. It was in facing the real challenge of losing his own power at the centre that he asked Buzdar to leave office, offering the position to Chaudhary Pervez Ilahi, leader of the PMLQ, as a bargain for his support to survive the vote of no-confidence. With the “biggest thugs” as his allies and likely to be the power-brokers in Punjab, alienation of the party stalwarts, and a bad record of governance, Khan faces a credibility, leadership and confidence challenge, all at the same time. What a bitter harvest of a bad political strategy in Punjab.

— Rasul Bakhsh Rais is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, LUMS, Lahore. His latest book is “Islam, Ethnicity and Power Politics: Constructing Pakistan’s National Identity” (Oxford University Press, 2017).

Twitter: @RasulRais