Challenging times for Saudi foreign policy
This in turn required a more activist position rather than the behind-the-scenes role played by the Kingdom for so long. Such a shift should not have come as a surprise given the tremendous changes in the region. From Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to Mubarak’s Egypt to Qaddafi’s Libya and Saleh’s Yemen, Riyadh has had to adjust to the new realities in the rest of the Middle East, and this had to be done in an incredibly short period.
The manner in which Saudi Arabia has approached the new strategic landscape which has presented itself has led, on the one hand, to a great deal of speculation that suggests the Kingdom is abandoning its alliance with the US; that it is pursuing a purely sectarian agenda in an all-or-nothing ideological confrontation with Iran; and that it is trying to build a club of monarchies that can ultimately withstand the contagion of the Arab uprisings. Such characterization, however, misunderstands and misinterprets what Saudi foreign policy is all about. On the other hand, the lack of decisiveness by a key power such as the United States, as in the case of Syria, has underlined the notion that a quiet low-key role was insufficient and no longer effective. Instead a more visibly active role by Saudi Arabia was required in order to safeguard its interests. The realization that the local interests of the US were clearly overpowering the broader external role that it had played until that time further cemented this view. As a result, Saudi Arabia was pushed reluctantly and unwittingly into a role that it did not aspire for even as it abandoned a role that had served it well for long.
Within the new environment as seen from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s policy continues to be driven by the prerogatives of regional stability. In Syria, the major concern is to put an end to the continued humanitarian suffering. Riyadh is convinced, however, that the onslaught against the civilian population will continue as long as Bashar Assad remains in power. There simply is no solution if Assad stays. At the same time, a political solution without military pressure is seen as a dead-end. Saudi Arabian support for the Syrian opposition, including rebel fighters, is therefore seen as legitimate as far as Riyadh is concerned.
There exists a similar concern regarding Lebanon, which in no way can delink itself from the consequences of the conflict in Syria. The Saudi assistance of $3 billion in support of the Lebanese army has two purposes. The first is to help sustain a national institution that the Lebanese state desperately needs in order to protect its integrity and ultimately, its stability. The second is to defeat the assumption that the Hezbollah has, and will continue to have better lines of support from Iran. The multi-confessional character of the Lebanese state cannot be subject to the manipulation of an armed force within the country.
The Saudi view on Iraq is largely pessimistic given that the US withdrew its forces before ensuring that the gaps in terms of lack of governance and institution building were sufficiently filled. If one goes back to 2002 and 2003, prior to the US-led invasion and subsequent occupation of the country, it was Saudi Arabia that warned about the need for a post-invasion political plan to prevent Iraq from sliding into chaos and slow disintegration. None of those concerns were taken seriously. Yet, even given recent developments, Saudi Arabia will in no way support any militia inside Iraq no matter what belief they might hold as it is well aware of the consequences of such a support.
The view is more optimistic when it comes to Iran where the assessment is that a rapprochement between the US and Iran is in fact positive for the entire Gulf region, as long as both parties are sincere in the implementation of the agreement. For the Kingdom, the concern over legal and legitimate enrichment activities was never an issue given the NPT agreement. Rather, the problem came about because of the Iranian violation of the NPT and the suspicion this raised about the possible militarization of the state’s nuclear program. If the current agreement in place between the P5+1 and Iran can ensure the necessary transparency, no one in Saudi Arabia will oppose the path chosen by the international community.
Given the regional turmoil, it is clear for the Kingdom and for the rest of the GCC states that strong and constructive relations with the power centers in the region, including Egypt and Turkey as well as Iran, are essential. For Saudi Arabia, there is no doubt that the military government currently in control of Egypt is seen as a better and more stable alternative to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. This alone, however, does not solve the challenge of the future direction of the Egyptian state. As such, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states are important as they can provide economic opportunities not only to Egypt but the region as a whole given the Gulf’s strategic location and its abundance of natural resources. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s multiple and effective soft power tools as a leading Gulf, Arab, and Muslim country that promotes a moderate version of Islam can play a huge role in terms of stability.
It has to be understood that while Saudi Arabia will certainly go through a series of internal changes in the near future, the basic principles of Saudi policy will remain the same. Within those parameters, Saudi officials need to look at the domestic, regional and global developments, given the responsibility of the Kingdom to play a role on all these levels. If this demands a more activist role, the policymakers in the Kingdom are ready to respond. Saudi Arabia, however, would much prefer to return to its traditional softer and quiet foreign policy.
- Dr. Abdulaziz Sager is the Chairman and Founder of the Gulf Research Center.
Email: [email protected]
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point-of-view
