It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the objective of having a meaningful transitional government in Syria is far-fetched. Actually, the possibility of starting a process in Geneva to set up a transitional government should be measured against the conflict of interests of the warring parties and the impossibility of finding a middle-of-the-road solution. If anything, the conflict is a zero-sum game.
It is highly unlikely Assad will send a delegation to negotiate his removal from power. Backed by Russia, Assad has been trying to reposition himself within the anti-terror camp. For him, the priority is to liberate Syria from radicals affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Commenting on the situation in Syria, Assad stressed that the problem in Syria is merely between terrorists and the Syrian state.
It is not as if Assad is in self-denial. He knows that radicals would not have been in Syrian right now had his regime responded positively to the peaceful Syrians’ demands for freedom. Evidently, Assad is happy to see radicals fighting his troops in Syria, as he thinks this would validate his argument. In fact, Assad is waging a misleading campaign to force his opponents within and without Syria to rethink their interests.
Assad knows very well that Geneva I conference stipulates setting up a transitional government. And yet, he accepts to participate in Geneva 2. But, his calculations now are different. He hopes to call the bluff of the opposition. Given the fragmentation of the opposition, Assad hopes that soon the international community will discover that the segment of the opposition who agreed to participate in Geneva talks have no influence on the ground. For this reason, Assad and his allies in Geneva will put the issue of fighting terrorism at the forefront, a move that is poised to play off the opposition groups against each other.
Interestingly enough, Washington has pushed the opposition to participate in the conference to pave the way for a transitional government. Early on, US Secretary of State John Kerry argued that the conditions on the ground should be changed to force Assad to accept the idea of a transitional government. Kerry’s logic could not have been more accurate. But, had the American administration put its money where its mouth was, the opposition forces would have the upper hand in the ongoing conflict on the ground. What happened was the other way round. After Kerry clarified the rules of the game he failed to back up his ideas with substantive measures.
Unlike the American side, which never provided the opposition with effective weapons lest they fall in the hands of the radicals, the Russian stepped up shipments of arms. Additionally, Iran and Hezbollah have their boots on the ground fighting shoulder to shoulder with Assad forces. To be sure, Assad and his allies believe that they could win the battle militarily. The outcome is the opposite of what Kerry had hoped for.
Let us get to the bottom of the issue. The purpose of this long awaited conference is to negotiate an agreement whereby the warring parties agreed on a transitional government. This is the practical meaning of implementing Geneva I. The question in this case is the following: Why would Assad and his patrons in Moscow and Tehran accept to discuss a transitional government when it means starting a process that lead to ousting Assad?
Three years into the Syrian conflict, it does not seem that fighting parties are ready for peace. Perhaps, we should examine the interest of not the proxies in the Syrian civil war but their patrons in the region. Though all regional parties accept Geneva still they are deeply divided and seek to realize different and contradicting things. Therefore, it seems that the conference will be an exercise of apathy. While protagonists to the conflict may not be able to agree on what to implement, the conference will only drag the conflict for some time to come. Meanwhile, there is no hope that the suffering of people would be less let alone stop.
I believe that the US has committed a mistake when it pushed for a conference when the balance of power has shifted over the last few months favoring the regime and its allies. The most the conference can achieve is to allow for some humanitarian assistance to the besieged. But if the US is serious about transitional government whereby Assad would pack and leave, it should have acted differently. The perception in the region is that the US has no longer the stomach to decide matters in the Middle East. For good or for worse, the US did little to change this new perception. Therefore, I suspect that the dialogue will be only for buying time and it will be a futile exercise.
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