THE first round of the much anticipated Geneva 2 negotiations on Syria was an utter and complete failure despite attempts by UN-Arab League Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to make it appear less so. He told reporters that he had “observed a little bit of common ground; perhaps more than the two sides realize or recognize.” But in reality the two sides had agreed on nothing of substance and Damascus is yet to confirm its participation in a second round of talks in Geneva on Feb. 10. So what went wrong?
From the onset it was clear that the regime’s delegation was going to Switzerland with specific orders not to engage the opposition on crucial points; primarily the issue of creating a transitional body in Syria with full powers. Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moallem’s long-winded speech said nothing about the struggle of the Syrian people to achieve change. It was a defiant speech that blamed neighbors and others for attempting to destroy the Syrian state. It totally ignored the requirements of the Geneva I communiqué of June 2012 or relevant UN Security Council resolution number 2118.
Observers were also critical of the weak performance of the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and its president Ahmad Al-Jarba. Overall the government delegation appeared confident and resolute, while the opposition was still reeling from a wave of withdrawals that took place few days before the convening of the conference. The government delegation raised valid questions about the credentials of the opposition who claim to represent the Syrian people and the armed rebels.
Perhaps it was a miscalculation by Brahimi that he swiftly moved to the most cumbersome point in the negotiations; the formation of a transitional body. Instead he should have concentrated his efforts on confidence building measures; most importantly achieving a cease-fire in certain areas, opening up humanitarian corridors and ending the siege of old Homs and the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus. The two sides reached a provisional understanding on relieving stranded civilians in Homs but failed to agree on steps to carry out such an agreement.
What the first round of Geneva 2 had proved, if anything, was how complex the Syrian crisis has become. The regime, while accepting to discuss each point in the Geneva I communiqué, was obviously not going to agree to the formation of a transitional body or government with full powers. It reiterated time and again that the fate of President Bashar Assad was not an issue on any agenda. So now what? There are no guarantees that the second round of talks will be any better. In fact the regime now wants a more inclusive opposition delegation and to move the talks to Damascus at a later stage. There are a number of possible scenarios that present themselves.
One, the talks will continue but achieve nothing, while fighting on the ground intensifies. In fact the regime has amplified its attacks on Aleppo during and after the first round of talks and appears to be making headway in some neighborhoods. The fighting will also continue between so-called moderate Islamist fighters, in addition to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and the radical Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in the east and northeast. The latter has been reclaiming areas that it had lost few weeks ago. The internecine faceoff will not end anytime soon. It is depleting the resources of the anti-Assad opposition.
Second, the US and its allies will change their position and re-arm the moderate opposition in order to put pressure on the Assad regime. Regardless of what happens in Geneva, a new onslaught by the opposition will take place. This time the opposition will have superior weapons such as anti-tank missiles but not the lethal Stingers to neutralize Assad’s air force. This new round of fighting will be used to put pressure on Moscow and Tehran to convince Damascus to take the Geneva talks more seriously. It is meant to dampen the regime’s recent successes.
Third, the talks will collapse and fighting will go on unabated for few more months. This will confirm fears that Syria will remain divided and at war with the humanitarian crisis reaching unprecedented levels. Only then Washington and Moscow might agree on a new political course. A cease-fire will be enforced but the status quo will linger on for some time.
Fourth, the US will use any violation by Damascus of the chemical weapons agreement to reactivate the military option. It sounds far-fetched now but this remains a possibility in light of recent statements by US Secretary of State John Kerry calling for Syria’s immediate compliance with the agreement’s deadlines and reminding Damascus that all options remain on the table.
Without a solid US-Russian understanding on the need to implement Geneva I in its entirety, including the creation of a transitional government with full powers, negotiations will go nowhere. But one immediate step that the two can force on parties is to achieve a temporary cease-fire, allowing for humanitarian relief, while talks continue. Syria has become one of many crucial files on the table now. For millions of hapless Syrians the political process is no more than a zero-sum game, just like the military path. After more than 130,000 documented deaths so far, there is little hope for a quick end to this ruthless conflict.
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