It is too soon for the streets to erupt in cheers and for protest leaders to take victory laps in Sudan, despite having engineered an end to Omar Al-Bashir’s 30-year rule. Instead, a pervasive unease has settled in the country and the flurry of activity and change of personnel in the transitional military council has not persuaded protest leaders that their “revolution” is complete.
A day after Bashir was forced to step down by the four heads of his state security apparatus, his successor, Awad Ibn Auf, announced his resignation following intense protests demanding a civilian transitional council. It is likely that Sudan’s military elite were trying to replicate systems in which civilian control of government is in all but name. This was evident when the military council initially proposed handing over control of government to civilians except for the Interior Ministry (state security) and Defense Ministry (military control). This time, however, the Sudanese categorically rejected these maneuvers by persisting in sit-ins near army headquarters.
The justification is simple. If it worked the first time, it will work again — and it has. In fact, protest leaders went as far as threatening to establish their own transitional council if the military failed to acquiesce to civilian demands. In response, many Bashir loyalists and senior officials who were part of the former regime have either been sacked or voluntarily resigned, in deference to protesters’ demands. As a result, there is a lot of confidence among the Forces for the Declaration of Freedom and Change (FDFC), an opposition coalition led by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), going into negotiations with the military council. The head of the military council, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, is determined to merge protest demands with the military’s mandate during this transitional phase. He refers to the council as “complementary to the revolution” and appeared to make a commitment to shifting power into civilian hands. The protesters alleged that the military council was not serious about a speedy transition of power to civilians and decided the only remedy for this deadlock was to intensify protests, which have so far remained an acceptable expression of Sudanese will.
Unfortunately, the path forward for Sudan is likely to be a rocky one. It will take a lot more than personnel changes in the military council and brinksmanship between protest leaders and army chiefs for the situation to normalize.
Hafed Al-Ghwell
Unfortunately, the path forward for Sudan is likely to be a rocky one. It will take a lot more than personnel changes in the military council and brinksmanship between protest leaders and army chiefs for the situation to normalize. Just last week, three more members of the transitional military council, Lt. Gen. Al-Tayeb Babakr Ali Fadee, Lt. Gen. Jalal Al-Deen Al-Sheikh and Omar Zain Al-Abideen, resigned because of their uncomfortably close ties to Bashir. A fourth member, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, has also been targeted for removal because of the role of his paramilitary forces in the Darfur genocide. His removal has been demanded by the Sudanese Communist Party, a member of the opposition coalition.
The transitional military council has agreed to recognize the SPA-led FDFC as the only legitimate representative of the protesters, a crucial victory for an opposition wary of the council’s initial plans to include the Islamist Popular Congress party, and other factions close to the deposed Bashir, in transition consultations. The controversial leader of the Popular Congress party, Hassan Al-Turabi, had a key role in Bashir’s ascent to power in 1989. He also once hosted Osama bin Laden when he was the leader of Al-Qaeda, along with his deputy and successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Sudan.
Currently, the transitional military council and opposition groups speak of each other in terms that are full of praise but light on substance. It is likely that major announcements will be made in the coming weeks concerning the fate of the country. It would be a welcome change, because while the protests may have scored an important victory, it has come at a cost. Landlocked South Sudan’s crude exports must pass through Port Sudan, but shipments have been delayed because Sudanese oil company staff have joined the protests. The FDFC vows to continue protesting until the military agrees to its demands for full civilian control of government, which does not inspire confidence that shipments will resume any time soon. South Sudan, meanwhile, will have to delay expanding its oil production capacity until after the situation improves in its northern neighbor.
It can only be hoped that protest passions will cool and that Sudan’s need for a peaceful and orderly transition will be a factor in the considerations of all sides, rather than pushing matters toward chaos and violence.
- Hafed Al-Ghwell is a non-resident senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Institute at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is also senior adviser at the international economic consultancy Maxwell Stamp and at the geopolitical risk advisory firm Oxford Analytica, a member of the Strategic Advisory Solutions International Group in Washington DC and a former adviser to the board of the World Bank Group. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell
