How Makkah Agreement differs from Turkiye’s other pacts

With last week’s signing of the trilateral mutual defense pact known as the Makkah Agreement by Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan, a new regional security arrangement has been formed after months of consultations. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had already signed a bilateral defense pact but NATO member Turkiye’s inclusion and the timing and setting of the deal drew significant attention.

The Makkah Agreement has raised several questions regarding its intended purpose and future. Although the signatory countries have emphasized that the pact is not directed against any particular state, some have viewed it as being against Iran, Israel or US policies in the region. Others, however, interpret it as a regional security framework, supported by the US, which encourages regional states to assume more responsibility for tackling the challenges of their neighborhood.

The Middle East is no stranger to security pacts. The region has witnessed many arrangements that have been formed, reshaped and ultimately dissolved. In this context, Turkiye’s own history of pact-making is particularly important to remember, as it provides a useful basis for assessing how the Makkah Agreement both resembles and differs from Ankara’s previous regional security arrangements.

In 1937, Turkiye signed the Saadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. This was primarily a nonaggression arrangement. Turkiye participated to consolidate its regional position. In a sense, the pact strengthened Turkiye’s relations with its neighbors and reflected the approach of the Turkish political elite at the time: securing the country’s borders while avoiding engagement in any regional conflict.

The Middle East has witnessed many arrangements that have been formed, reshaped and ultimately dissolved

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

What made the Saadabad Pact particularly significant was the signatories’ efforts to establish a regional security framework without relying on external powers. In other words, the agreement reflected the approach that the region’s stability should be maintained by regional states. This is echoed by the Makkah Agreement’s emphasis on “regional ownership” and bringing the responsibility for Middle Eastern security into the hands of regional actors.

The Saadabad Pact, however, was a limited effort as it never developed into a permanent security arrangement. It was followed by the Baghdad Pact, which aimed to bring a different approach to regional security. In 1955, Turkiye signed this agreement with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the UK. Unlike the Saadabad Pact, it was closely linked to the Western security architecture of the Cold War and was strongly supported by the US. Turkiye already had a cooperation pact with Iraq and it sought to broaden that bilateral arrangement into a wider regional framework.

In this respect, there is a notable parallel with the Makkah Agreement: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had first established a bilateral security arrangement before Turkiye joined, raising the possibility of further expansion with other regional states. Just as Iraq was at the center of the Baghdad Pact, Saudi Arabia is occupying a similarly critical position in today’s emerging regional security architecture. The choice of Makkah, Islam’s holiest city, as the venue for the pact’s signing carries symbolic significance, in addition to reflecting Saudi Arabia’s broader geopolitical importance.

The Cold War security environment strongly shaped Turkiye’s foreign and security policy at the time the Baghdad Pact was sealed. The Soviet Union was viewed as the main security threat, which pushed Turkiye to increasingly align itself with the Western security architecture. Having joined NATO in 1952, Turkiye’s participation in the Baghdad Pact further aligned it with the Western-led security arrangement.

Turkiye’s participation potentially brings Western security capabilities, expertise and institutional links

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Through this grouping, which was later renamed the Central Treaty Organization following Iraq’s withdrawal, Turkiye sought to extend the Western security architecture into the Middle East. A similar dynamic can be observed in the Makkah Agreement: Turkiye is the only NATO member among the signatories and, through its participation, potentially brings Western security capabilities, expertise and institutional links into this emerging regional security arrangement.

At the time of the Baghdad Pact, the international system was defined by two blocs, so enemies and allies were relatively clear. Today, however, it is far more complex. In a multipolar international system, middle powers such as Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are less inclined to bandwagon with a single external power. Instead, they seek to balance among competing powers, pursuing pragmatic and flexible policies that preserve their strategic autonomy.

In this respect, the Makkah Agreement differs from previous security arrangements in both the regional context and Turkiye’s history of pact-making. It represents an alignment among middle powers seeking to collectively respond to the uncertainties of the international system through alignments that complement their existing security arrangements.

Unlike the other regional pacts that Turkiye has participated in, the Makkah Agreement is also in an institutionalized format that plans for the establishment of a political and military committee and a secretariat in the Kingdom. This institutional nature shows that the pact may extend beyond intelligence sharing, capacity building and defense-industrial cooperation. Although the three states have already engaged in bilateral and trilateral cooperation in these areas, there was no existing mechanism capable of coordinating and harmonizing their respective security approaches.

Whether the Makkah Agreement remains a limited security arrangement or develops into a broader regional framework will depend on how effectively its members harmonize their policies and respond to emerging security challenges. Certainly, there will be destabilizing regional actors that want to test this pact. Addressing those tests effectively will not be an easy task but, if done right, this could contribute to regional deterrence and pave the way for the expansion of the pact.

• Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East.

X: @SinemCngz