Observers suspect that the July 15 failed coup attempt in Turkey may lay the groundwork for a turnabout in Turkey’s position on the Syrian issue. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Moscow and reports about the planned visit to Tehran have fueled speculations that Turkey’s objectives could by aligned with those of Iran and Russia.
At the heart of Erdogan’s approach toward both Iran and Russia is his conviction that the United States may help the Kurds establish an independent Kurdish entity in Syria. Just a few days ago, American combat planes rushed to defend Kurds in Hassakah, a clear message that Washington would not allow targeting the Kurds. The American support for the Kurds irks Ankara, as it is struggling with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) for decades and foreign support to Kurds in Syria is only emboldening the PKK. This major policy shift may prove to be difficult and controversial. Turkey would stand to lose much of the sympathy and support it enjoys in the Arab world. Needless to say, the Arabs on the whole stood by Erdogan during the failed coup attempt hoping that he would continue his support for the Syrian revolution. A move to the contrary will for sure create different sentiments among the Arabs.
At home, too, the pro-Erdogan masses still support the anti-Assad forces in Syria. There are more than two million Syrian refugees in Turkey who commend President Erdogan for supporting them and the Syrian revolution. It is difficult to imagine their reaction in case Turkey changes its policies on Syrian crisis. Seen from this perspective, Turkey may face a security challenge in the months to come.
And yet, Erdogan feels that a shift in his policy toward Syria is warranted. Personally, he feels that the West has betrayed him. His relations with the European Union and with Washington have soured. It is due to this reason that he is trying to strengthen his relations with Iran and Russia. Both Putin and Iranian leaders supported Erdogan in the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt. Unlike Russia and Iran, western allies of Turkey waited until the failure of the coup to express support for Erdogan. To be sure, the West has been very critical of the post-coup measures taken by the Turkish government. Sources closer to Erdogan cite economic and political benefits behind his recalculations.
It doesn’t take a genius to figure out why Erdogan is not satisfied with the West. Against this backdrop, President Erdogan may be thinking that he needs to strategize in a different fashion. His country’s anti-Kurds position is aligned with that of Iran and indeed Russia can cut a deal with him over this issue. President Putin knows very well that if the choice for Erdogan is between keeping Assad in place or granting the Kurds autonomy he would chose the former. It remains to be seen whether Erdogan is willing to accept this trade-off. The American new red-lines (no to targeting Kurds) may trigger different alliances in the months to come.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ankara places the Kurdish issue at the heart of its new policy shift. The tension with the Untied States stems mainly from the American support for the Syrian Kurds’ People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which Erdogan views as an extension of the terrorist PKK. It all depends on how good Erdogan is in balancing the conflicting pressures.
At the heart of Erdogan’s approach toward both Iran and Russia is his conviction that the United States may help the Kurds establish an independent Kurdish entity in Syria. Just a few days ago, American combat planes rushed to defend Kurds in Hassakah, a clear message that Washington would not allow targeting the Kurds. The American support for the Kurds irks Ankara, as it is struggling with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) for decades and foreign support to Kurds in Syria is only emboldening the PKK. This major policy shift may prove to be difficult and controversial. Turkey would stand to lose much of the sympathy and support it enjoys in the Arab world. Needless to say, the Arabs on the whole stood by Erdogan during the failed coup attempt hoping that he would continue his support for the Syrian revolution. A move to the contrary will for sure create different sentiments among the Arabs.
At home, too, the pro-Erdogan masses still support the anti-Assad forces in Syria. There are more than two million Syrian refugees in Turkey who commend President Erdogan for supporting them and the Syrian revolution. It is difficult to imagine their reaction in case Turkey changes its policies on Syrian crisis. Seen from this perspective, Turkey may face a security challenge in the months to come.
And yet, Erdogan feels that a shift in his policy toward Syria is warranted. Personally, he feels that the West has betrayed him. His relations with the European Union and with Washington have soured. It is due to this reason that he is trying to strengthen his relations with Iran and Russia. Both Putin and Iranian leaders supported Erdogan in the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt. Unlike Russia and Iran, western allies of Turkey waited until the failure of the coup to express support for Erdogan. To be sure, the West has been very critical of the post-coup measures taken by the Turkish government. Sources closer to Erdogan cite economic and political benefits behind his recalculations.
It doesn’t take a genius to figure out why Erdogan is not satisfied with the West. Against this backdrop, President Erdogan may be thinking that he needs to strategize in a different fashion. His country’s anti-Kurds position is aligned with that of Iran and indeed Russia can cut a deal with him over this issue. President Putin knows very well that if the choice for Erdogan is between keeping Assad in place or granting the Kurds autonomy he would chose the former. It remains to be seen whether Erdogan is willing to accept this trade-off. The American new red-lines (no to targeting Kurds) may trigger different alliances in the months to come.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ankara places the Kurdish issue at the heart of its new policy shift. The tension with the Untied States stems mainly from the American support for the Syrian Kurds’ People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which Erdogan views as an extension of the terrorist PKK. It all depends on how good Erdogan is in balancing the conflicting pressures.
