The Gulf’s delicate, multilayered approach to Iran

Anyone observing Gulf-Iranian relations will find that, between June 25 and July 4, three significant signals emerged: the ministerial statement issued following a meeting in Manama, the technical negotiation channel in Doha, and the carefully calibrated diplomatic presence in Tehran during the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Analyzing these signals together points to a shift in Gulf positions, from managing the military and security escalation that the region witnessed to attempting to find practical negotiated solutions built on solid foundations that secure the shared interests of all parties, without allowing Iran to exercise negative external influence. This means that the Arab Gulf states have not closed their channels of communication with Iran despite its recent attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain. At the same time, they have not allowed the course of the Washington-Tehran negotiations to proceed independently on issues that directly affect Gulf security.

The June 25 ministerial meeting between the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council was held in the Bahraini capital, Manama. It concluded with a statement welcoming the US-Iran memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 and positively acknowledging the mediation role of Qatar and Pakistan.

The joint statement also stressed the need to prevent Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon and included ballistic missiles, drones and support for proxy groups among the threats that must be contained. It also emphasized the importance of ensuring free and secure navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, while rejecting any fees or attempts by Iran to assert control over the strait.

These points made the statement clear in linking the nuclear track with Iran’s regional conduct, underscoring the importance of addressing both issues without neglecting either of them. The experience of the 2015 nuclear agreement demonstrated to the Arab Gulf states that, while a limited agreement may reduce the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation, it leaves Iran’s instruments of influence active in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Syria. For this reason, the Manama statement sought to address all outstanding issues within a single framework.

Following the Manama meeting, on June 30, the Qatari Foreign Ministry clarified that the visit of US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Doha was part of a series of meetings with Qatari mediators on regional issues, including Iran and Lebanon, and that there were no direct US-Iran talks. This Qatari policy does not serve a dual function outside the broader Gulf context; rather, it keeps communication open with both Tehran and Washington, while maintaining its position within the Gulf framework established by the Manama statement.

The Gulf states have not closed their channels of communication with Iran despite its recent attacks.

Hassan Al-Mustafa

What makes this role consistent with the Manama statement is that the technical talks focused on navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s frozen assets, rather than on the structure of a final nuclear agreement. This is particularly significant because Iran is seeking to entrench the current reality in a way that grants it a recognized role in regulating maritime traffic and, perhaps later, in collecting transit fees. This explains why the Manama statement firmly rejected both such fees and unilateral Iranian control of the strait.

In a related context, US Central Command last week held a regional security dialogue in Bahrain, with the participation of defense leaders from 12 countries. The discussions focused on defense cooperation, air and missile defense, and the free flow of trade through the Strait of Hormuz. This meeting was certainly not a substitute for the ongoing negotiating track between Washington and Tehran, but rather ran parallel to it to emphasize that freedom of navigation would be supported through operational coordination, not merely through political statements of support.

Gulf diplomatic activity continued through participation in Khamenei’s funeral in Tehran, adding another indicator. Saudi Arabia was represented at the level of deputy foreign minister, Qatar by the speaker of the Shura Council and Oman by the chairman of the State Council. These were politically and diplomatically calibrated levels of representation, sufficient to demonstrate respect for the state and regional neighborliness, while also remaining limited enough to avoid elevating the political significance of the participation or giving Iran a sense of unrealistic strength or superiority.

There is, thus, a multilayered Gulf approach through which its states are pursuing a nuanced policy toward Iran. There is a measured diplomatic presence in Tehran, based on respect for diplomatic norms and the moral dimension that distinguishes these states — in that they do not gloat over death but respect its sanctity, without this implying agreement with or glorification of the positions of the deceased. There was also a detailed security statement issued in Manama that irritated Iran because of its frank approach to the disputed issues. In addition, there is a technical Qatari channel for communication and dialogue in Doha aimed at establishing diplomacy as the primary instrument instead of military confrontations and wars.

The overall picture may appear somewhat complex to those who do not read its details carefully and some may even regard these as contradictory signals. What is actually taking place, however, is an attempt to keep Iran within a framework of disciplined engagement, encouraging it to change its negative behavior and gradually improve its foreign policies so that they become positive and nonaggressive toward its neighbors, while preventing it from turning this engagement into recognition of either a unilateral role in the Strait of Hormuz or the legitimacy of its nonnuclear instruments, such as armed proxies in the countries of the region.

The ultimate objective is for all parties to share responsibility for the region’s security and stability and to engage in development rather than wars that consume wealth to no avail.

• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher specializing in Islamist movements, the evolution of religious discourse, and Gulf-Iran relations. X: @Halmustafa