The landslide victory of Arvind Kejriwal’s Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in Delhi assembly election proves that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) cannot always rely on the much-trumpeted Modi wave. Interestingly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attempt to attract voters by projecting Kiran Bedi as BJP’s chief ministerial candidate also failed.
Bedi even failed to win from Krishnanagar, which was seen as a BJP bastion. Thrusting Bedi on senior BJP leaders did not go down well with the party stalwarts. Intra-party dissidence may also be one of the major reasons for BJP’s poor performance.
Congress dismal performance, however, did not surprise anyone. What is astonishing is the stunning victory of the AAP. These results have defied even exit poll predictions, which had indicated at most a marginal victory for AAP and at least 17 seats for the BJP.
The massive mandate in favor of AAP suggests that within less than a year there has been a major shift in the BJP’s position among voters. The previous Delhi assembly elections were viewed as a key fight between BJP led by Modi, Congress headed by Rahul Gandhi and AAP with Kejriwal on the top. Observers may recall that earlier Delhi assembly polls were primarily contested between two key parties, the Congress and the BJP. The sudden entry of AAP on the political stage ahead of last Delhi assembly polls changed the bilateral fight into a trilateral contest. The recent polls, however, were once again primarily a bilateral battle. The key battle was fought between the BJP and AAP, with Congress hardly figuring in this contest. Though BJP continued campaigning in name of Modi, some political and media space was taken over by Bedi. Kejriwal surfaced more prominently than he did earlier and Rahul along with his party was practically sidelined.
Should this be viewed as a sign of Congress facing political death? Though Congress failed to win a single seat, nearly 10 percent votes were cast in its favor. There is yet another aspect to political strategy worked out in Delhi by voters and politicians. The Congress has apparently accepted that it needs a little more time to revive its political strength and gain back the support it has lost. Under these circumstances, the Congress and its supporters counted on AAP winning Delhi assembly and BJP being the loser. For the Congress, BJP’s defeat was politically necessary.
Congress apparently preferred a political shock for Modi and the BJP than a similar shock for AAP. Unlike the BJP, AAP’s political presence is primarily confined to Delhi. AAP has yet to register its presence in other parts of country. Thus AAP’s victory in Delhi spells little danger for Congress in other states. From this angle, Congress and its supporters probably viewed AAP’s success in Delhi as a part of their anti-BJP campaign. The same strategy guided a considerable number of diehard Congress supporters to vote for AAP. They sensed that if they voted for Congress, a party that had minimal chances of winning, their votes might go waste. They also feared that voting for Congress could create a dent in electoral support for AAP and help BJP emerge as the winner.
Muslim voters and secular Indians went overboard during these elections to vote against BJP. It was not surprising to see an aggressively frenzied campaign indulged in by them in Muslim- dominated areas in favor of AAP. Their attitude might have been different if in recent past several Muslim-populated areas of Delhi had not witnessed communal tensions targeting Muslims. Communal venom spread by several extremists linked with the BJP has apparently proved politically damaging for this party. With Muslims forming less than 15 percent of Delhi’s population, the BJP and its extremist associates did not assume that their vote for AAP could prove politically costly for them. What the BJP did not foresee was that voting pattern could turn against it if the average secular voter, including Muslims and old Congress supporters, opted voting for AAP as their vote was decided by their anti-BJP electoral strategy.
