The leaders of South Korea, China and Japan announced on Tuesday that they will meet on May 9 for their first trilateral talks since 2015. The session is only the latest example of the changing geopolitical chessboard in the region, following the mini-rapprochement between North and South Korea. Yet it is not just the implications of warming ties between Pyongyang and Seoul that is driving the trilateral session. 

Another key driver behind the May 9 meeting is uncertainty evoked by US President Donald Trump’s agenda, including the trade tariff measures against Japan and China in recent weeks that give both nations greater incentive to engage, despite the fact that relations have been at a relative historical low point in recent years over claims both have made to islands in the China Sea.

To this end, Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a full diplomatic visit to Japan, as part of the trilateral dialogue, from May 8-11. His trip represents the latest salvo by both Beijing and Tokyo to enhance relations in advance of the 40th anniversary this summer of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which established the diplomatic baseline for bilateral relations.

Xi and Abe will also be keen to use the trilateral dialogue to get insights from South Korea President Moon Jae-in about last week’s inter-Korean summit. Given the deep interests of both Beijing and Tokyo here, neither wants to watch this dialogue completely from the sidelines. Hence why North Korea’s leader Kim Jung Un was summoned to Beijing in March — his first foreign trip since taking power in 2011.

Both Xi and Abe are acutely aware that plans appear to be advancing fast for the proposed Trump-Kim meeting in May or June, with the US president saying this week he is looking at Singapore and the demilitarized zone in Korea as possible locations. 

This follows new US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statement on Sunday that there is a “real opportunity” for a nuclear deal, especially following Kim’s announcement that North Korea’s main nuclear testing site, Punggye-ri, is to close this month.

President Xi Jinping’s trip to Japan represents the latest salvo by both Beijing and Tokyo to enhance relations.

Andrew Hammond

All these developments underline the potential extent of the changing geopolitical chessboard in the region. Even hawkish new US National Security Advisor John Bolton contributed to the positive mood music by suggesting on Sunday that a US-Korean agreement could be modelled on that agreed by Libya on eliminating its weapons of mass destruction program in 2003 in return for the lifting of sanctions.

Following spiraling tensions in 2017 over the North’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, the remarkable diplomatic respite that 2018 has brought has so far been remarkable. Characteristically, Trump has taken much credit for this, and his hardline policies may indeed have been part of the mix of events that have brought Kim to the negotiating table.

Yet as much as US pressure may well have been important in creating this diplomatic window of opportunity, Beijing’s role has also been key given its own increasing support for international sanctions against Pyongyang. Traditionally, China has been reluctant to take too sweeping measures against its communist neighbor for fear of squeezing it so hard that it becomes significantly destabilized.

Xi believes that this is probably not in Chinese interests for at least two reasons. Firstly, if the communist regime in the North falls, it could undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party too. He also fears that the collapse of order in the North could lead to instability on the border, a potentially large influx of refugees that China would need to manage, and ultimately the potential emergence of a pro-US successor state.

As positive as the atmospherics currently appear to be around the planned Trump-Kim meeting, all sides will know that there remain significant risks as well as opportunities in play. While Trump appears keen to meet Kim, he has previously said: “Talk of appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only understand one thing!”

This commentary reflects not just Trump’s volatility, but also the political pressure he is personally under on this issue, having drawn a political red line previously on Pyongyang possessing a nuclear warhead capable of being fitted onto an intercontinental ballistic missile that could strike the US homeland. 
Strikingly, the US Union of Concerned Scientists calculated that if the last missile launched by the North — in November — had flown on a standard trajectory rather than a lofted one, it would have had a range of 13,000 km — enough to strike Europe, Australia, or any part of the continental US. This is why Trump will continue to keep all options on the table.
Taken overall, the Japan-China-South Korea announcement is only the latest indicator that the geopolitical chessboard is changing in Asia. Yet while the mood music is presently mostly positive, significant risks remain. And if the North-South dialogue ultimately proves to be a mirage, Trump will seek to pile the pressure on Pyongyang again given the pressure he is under on this issue.
  • Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.