
Iran’s new supreme leader wants out of limbo — but on his own terms. Mojtaba Khamenei has called for an end to the state of “no war, no peace” and tied it to the seven conditions Tehran has set out. Senior figures such as Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, have echoed those conditions.
Khamenei has handed the task to President Masoud Pezeshkian. It demands a road map that ties together security, politics, the economy and what Iranian discourse calls the “culture of resistance.” The supreme leader’s aim is not to escape the deadlock by conceding to the US. It is to escape it with gains Iran considers its national rights.
The directive names no single route out of an impasse that has exhausted Iran’s economy. It simply orders the system to break the stalemate and ease American pressure, without a decisive military showdown that the Islamic Republic knows it could not fully win.
In practice, Khamenei wants to push US President Donald Trump toward a settlement that steadies the Iranian economy. That means lifting the sanctions and the naval blockade and releasing Iran’s frozen funds. It also means preserving, at least on paper, the right to enrich uranium at levels allowed under international law.
Khamenei wants to push US President Donald Trump toward a settlement that steadies the Iranian economy
Hassan Al-Mustafa
What Tehran will not do is make concessions on its nuclear or ballistic missile programs that it sees as endangering itself. Its fear is that each concession would invite Washington to demand another, without end.
The job falls to the Supreme National Security Council, chaired by Pezeshkian. That matters for what it reveals about how power is shared in Tehran, particularly now, with the new supreme leader still out of public view.
Under Article 176 of the Iranian constitution, the president heads the council, which coordinates defense and security policy with political and economic activity. Its decisions take effect only with the supreme leader’s approval.
The council must therefore produce a position the government can carry out and the security establishment, above all the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, can live with. Khamenei will then approve it or send it back.
The instructions aired by Iranian media were brief and vague. The biggest gap is the benchmark: How will the leadership know it has succeeded?
A halt to US-Israeli military operations without a final agreement would not remove a threat Iran regards as existential. Easing some economic restrictions might bring modest relief to daily life. It would not fix the problems that have deepened since the war began in February.
The directive is also open to competing readings. Some officials may hear a call to arms. Others may hear permission to strike a deal with Washington.
A halt to US-Israeli military operations without a final agreement would not remove a threat Iran regards as existential
Hassan Al-Mustafa
Pezeshkian took the directive as room to keep negotiating “with dignity,” so long as talks with Washington deliver Iran’s “rights” without a return to war. That suits a president whose government must deal with oil production and exports, rising prices, inflation and scarce foreign investment. Investors will stay away while Iran remains unstable and the blockade and uncertainty make every one of these problems harder to manage.
Parliament Speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf sees it differently. Ending “no war, no peace,” he argues, does not mean negotiating at any price. “Sustainable deterrence” could keep Washington and Tel Aviv from attacking again. On Sunday, he reaffirmed the seven conditions and urged state institutions to tackle inflation and the cost of living.
The two positions look like diverging strategies but the gap is one of tools, methods and perhaps priorities, not of purpose. They are better understood as complementary tracks running in parallel. Both seek better negotiating terms through stronger deterrence and both keep the military ready in case contacts fail. Neither shuts the door on dialogue and both work with Qatari mediation and the regional states involved.
Khamenei’s message also set out a “stronger Iran” strategy as the road to what he called “absolute deterrence.” Notably, he counted social cohesion and citizens’ livelihoods among the country’s sources of strength.
The implication is that the state’s ability to endure economic and security attrition depends directly on its relationship with Iranian society. Domestic stability thus becomes part of the deterrence calculation and of unifying the home front.
Seen this way, the directive is an attempt to seize back the initiative. It does not mean Khamenei has chosen either war or a settlement with the US. Two things will decide the outcome. One is whether the Supreme National Security Council can turn his words into workable political, diplomatic, military and security arrangements. The other is whether Washington is prepared to offer something in return.
Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse, and relations between Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran.
X: @Halmustafa













