The Strait of Hormuz has been closed since late February 2026. Under normal conditions about 20 million barrels of oil a day pass through the strait, close to a fifth of the total global supply, along with about a fifth of the world’s liquefied natural gas.
When the US and Israel launched their military campaign against Iran on Feb. 28, Tehran retaliated by targeting international shipping, war-risk insurance became unavailable, and traffic through the strait dropped to a trickle. By the end of March, alternative routes had restored only about a third of normal flows.
Faced with the closure of Hormuz, Gulf countries demonstrated considerable resilience in adapting their export networks. Saudi Arabia led this effort by relying more on the East-West Pipeline, which can transport up to 3.5 million barrels of crude each day to Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. From there, exports continued to reach Asian and European markets via Bab El-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.
From the start of the conflict through June, this maritime route was used to transport most of the Gulf’s maritime exports; petroleum flows through the strait reached 7.4 million barrels a day, about 7 percent of global output, compared with 4.2 million a year earlier. Loadings at Yanbu alone increased to about 4 million barrels a day, up from fewer than 1 million during the same period last year. The relief valve was holding.
On July 20, however, the Houthis declared a maritime embargo on Saudi shipping. Within days, they struck two Saudi tankers off the Yemeni coast, setting one ablaze. The US Navy-led information center in Bahrain warned that missiles and drones had been positioned near Bab El-Mandab Strait. Saudi Arabia confirmed that one ship had been hit, and the global price of oil jumped over $100 a barrel for the first time since May.
The corridor that had absorbed the closure of Hormuz was now itself under fire. For the first time, Iran was able to exert pressure on both strategic maritime chokepoints simultaneously. Both of the Gulf’s principal maritime arteries stood under threat in the same week, exposing the region’s reliance on a pair of routes that had long underpinned its energy exports.
The current crisis is accelerating long-term efforts to reduce the Gulf’s dependence on those two main maritime chokepoints. Saudi Arabia is assessing a 2 million-barrels-per-day expansion of the East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea, while holding preliminary talks with Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar to connect additional Gulf crude exports to this corridor.
For the first time, Iran was able to exert pressure on both strategic maritime chokepoints simultaneously.
Zaid M. Belbagi
At the same time, the UAE has accelerated construction of its West-East crude oil pipeline to Fujairah, which is expected to carry up to 2 million barrels per day by 2027, while also advancing a multifuel pipeline for refined products.
Iraq has approved plans to expand exports through the Kurdistan-Turkiye pipeline network, and is constructing the Basra-Haditha pipeline, which is designed to connect southern oil fields with future export routes to Turkiye, Jordan and, potentially, Syria.
Together, these projects reflect a broader regional effort to diversify export routes and reduce the dependence on vulnerable maritime corridors.
Saudi Arabia’s resilience also extends beyond its physical export infrastructure. Aramco, the Kingdom’s national oil company, already operates strategic oil-storage facilities in Japan and South Korea, allowing it to continue to fulfill contractual obligations while shipments are being rerouted during periods of disruption.
These stockpiles provide valuable time to rearrange cargoes and maintain supplies during the early stages of a disruption, reducing the immediate impact on customers while normal shipping routes are gradually restored.
At the same time, the Kingdom has demonstrated considerable logistical flexibility. Cargoes can be redirected through Egypt using the Sumed pipeline, for example, which has a capacity of 2.5 million barrels a day and in which Aramco holds a 15 percent stake.
As the largest buyer of both Saudi and Iranian oil, China has a direct economic interest in preventing disruption.
Zaid M. Belbagi
Although shipments to Asia must then sail around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to four weeks to the journey and increasing the cost of a single cargo by more than $5 million, these alternatives ensure exports can continue to reach international markets, reflecting Saudi Arabia’s ability to maintain oil exports while accelerating longer-term efforts to diversify its export infrastructure.
The challenge, therefore, is no longer whether Gulf countries can continue to supply global markets, but whether they can do so efficiently as transport costs, insurance premiums and delivery times continue to rise.
While the aforementioned projects represent an important step toward greater resilience, they are unlikely to eliminate the Gulf’s structural dependence on maritime trade. The strategic priority should therefore be to continue expanding a network of complementary export routes that reduce the reliance on any single corridor.
Only a more diversified export architecture would ensure that future crises do not leave Gulf producers dependent on a single remaining route.
Yet infrastructure alone cannot fully eliminate the risk. Lasting resilience depends on effective diplomacy. China is well placed to play a constructive role in this regard. Having brokered the 2023 rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Beijing has already demonstrated its ability to facilitate dialogue between the region’s principal rivals.
As the largest buyer of both Saudi and Iranian oil, China also has a direct economic interest in preventing any prolonged disruption to Gulf energy exports. If Beijing were able to facilitate renewed dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran, it could help create the conditions required for deescalation in the Red Sea, including measures to reduce Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in exchange for humanitarian or economic concessions.
• Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
X: @Moulay_Zaid
