The Caucasus is among the world’s most divided and incoherent regions. Its three republics — Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia — failed to learn from similarly linked groups of countries, such as the Benelux countries and the Baltic states, which, despite their historical grievances and political differences, united to achieve their common goals of stability, prosperity, and democracy. Is it too late for the Caucasus to change course?

In 1991, when all three became independent again, similar proposals of confederation and union were floated. Nothing of the sort was realized. What divides these countries today is not religion, ethnicity, culture, history, or traditions; it is the differing visions, prospects, ambitions, convictions, and aspirations that they espouse and pursue.

Of the three, Georgia is the most democratic. The fact that its people have twice forced a change of government — first through the 2003 Rose Revolution, which imposed the popular will on an unelected government, and then again last year through the ballot box — has given them a sense of empowerment. For their part, Armenians came close to forcing a change of government through street protests on three occasions — but failed each time. No election since independence has brought a change of government.

And, in Azerbaijan, no serious attempt to change the government has been made. Indeed, power has simply been transferred, from Heydar Aliyev to his son, Ilham Aliyev.

These contrasting experiences have led to starkly different — and dangerously divisive — foreign-policy approaches. In terms of security, Georgia aspires to NATO membership; Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization; and Azerbaijan maintains strong security arrangements with Turkey and Israel, while purchasing modern military hardware from Russia.

Regardless of the nature of its formal relations with each of the three republics, Russia casts a long shadow over the Caucasus.

Georgia views Russia as its main adversary. But its leaders should recognize that eventual integration into European security and economic structures cannot fully compensate for the absence of any relations with Russia. If Georgia is to prosper in a sustainable way, it must build normal bilateral ties. Until then, Armenia’s options will remain limited. For Armenia, Russia is a strategic partner by choice, while Georgia is a geopolitical partner by default. Russia is a hugely important country for Armenia; Georgia is slightly more important. When bad weather shuts down the Lars passage between Georgia and Russia — which is also Armenia’s land link to Russia — Armenia suffers. If the Georgia-Armenia border closes down, Armenia chokes. That is why Armenia’s key geopolitical challenge is not so much normalizing relations with its neighbors as preventing those neighbors from ganging up against it. Here, Georgia’s rejection of the highly lucrative economic, energy, and financial incentives offered by Turkey and Azerbaijan to isolate Armenia is crucially important.

Azerbaijan views Russia as a partner with which it can bargain, particularly in the strategic energy games being played by Russia and Europe. What the Aliyev government has not recognized is that, by signing off on several gas pipelines to Europe, Azerbaijan has largely relinquished its bargaining chips. Stability and prosperity in Azerbaijan will require Aliyev to stop depending exclusively on energy exports — and to help bring an end to the longstanding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azeris and Armenians.

In the Caucasus, nostalgia for the security, predictability, and economic benefits of the Cold War era is not a guide to wise policy. But blind belief in western alternatives, which sometimes seem like a panacea for the region’s security and economic challenges offers no solution, either. If all three countries considered realistically what is possible under the current circumstances, they would recognize that a cooperative, unified approach would be best for everyone.

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The writer is a member of Armenia’s National Assembly and a former foreign minister. ©Project Syndicate