The last week’s recapture of the historic city of Palmyra by the Syrian regime’s forces marked an important turning point in the five-year conflict that has destroyed much of the country, killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions.
It was the first major battle between regime forces, backed by Russian air cover, and Daesh militants who had taken the city almost a year ago. Almost a week later the regime forces declared victory over Daesh in the neighboring town of Qaryatain, enabling the regime to retake control of oil and gas supplies in the area and give it a foothold near the Iraqi borders for the first time in years. Next stop for government forces will be Deir El Zor in eastern Syria and from there hopefully to Raqqa, the self-proclaimed capital of Daesh.
These recent victories have bolstered the regime’s position. It, along with forces of the Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD), will eventually cut off Raqqa from all sides before storming it. Such developments have altered the strategic views of many players in the Syrian conflict.
The Syrian opposition has expressed concern over the ambiguity of the American position on the future of Assad, whose departure remains a key demand. The Russians, who yield major influence over the regime and appear to have convinced the Americans of their own version of a political solution in Syria, insist that the fate of the Syrian president can only be decided by the Syrian people. Assad, who rejects the formation of a transitional ruling body opting instead for a national unity government, now appears ready to hold early presidential elections. With the opposition in exile and in the absence of a unifying political figure inside, his chances of winning will be huge. This is one scenario that the opposition, and its allies, will reject.
While the Geneva process stalls, developments on the ground will determine the final outcome of negotiations. The opposition was handed a 12-point document by United Nations special envoy Steffan De Mistura last month, none of which mentions the future of Assad. Important as it is, since it refers to the Geneva communiqué and Security Council resolution 2254, the document provides the basis for possible face-to-face negotiations later this month. No wonder that the opposition is suspicious and pessimistic about the outcome of the Geneva process.
Moscow has managed to convince the Americans that defeating Daesh and not replacing Assad should be the number one priority in Syria for now. It also was able to cast doubts over the credentials of the Syrian opposition. It now wants Syria’s Kurds to be included in the Geneva talks and it suggested that a federal system might be the best arrangement for a united and stable Syria for all of its components.
There is no doubt that the coalition of opposition groups has some fundamental issues that need to be addressed at the earliest. These problems will emerge if and when the negotiators begin to write a new constitution for Syria as a democratic and secular state. It is not far-fetched that some opposition groups, with Islamist affiliations, will have issues with such definitions.
It is likely that the Russians will pressure Assad to give the local opposition, which the regime describes as nationalist, more leeway to move and become active. The end game will be to arrange for free legislative and presidential elections, under the UN and international supervision.
Meanwhile, the United Nations will focus its efforts on extending the shaky truce for as long as possible. That is a tall order since the regime has violated it a number of times recently. But with little military support from its allies coming through, the opposition is in no mood to engage in new fighting.
