EU needs to get tough to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions

Too much emphasis is often placed on US policy toward Iran and how Washington can pressure the regime into curbing its nuclear program. However, the EU’s stance toward the Islamic Republic has become just as important in changing the Iranian leaders’ calculations.

The EU has the ability to intensify or neutralize many negative effects of the US pressure on the regime. As we have seen in the last six months, the Iranian leaders are not submitting to the US sanctions, halting their nuclear program or even coming to the negotiating table. For months, the Islamic Republic has been dragging its feet over reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal with the P5+1 world powers (the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia and China) and the EU. In its latest effort to further postpone the talks, the country’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Bagheri Kani, last week wrote on Twitter: “We agree to start negotiations before the end of November.”

The regime keeps saying that it will come to the negotiating table, while at the same time it continues to advance its nuclear program and is nearing a key nuclear threshold. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken acknowledged such a threat when he told lawmakers in June: “It remains unclear whether Iran is willing and prepared to do what it needs to do to come back into compliance. Meanwhile, its program is galloping forward… The longer this goes on, the more the breakout time gets down… It’s now down, by public reports, to a few months at best. And if this continues, it will get down to a matter of weeks.”

In addition, the Iranian leaders are not cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Tehran is not allowing the IAEA to fully monitor its nuclear sites and is blocking cameras from recording its nuclear activities.

The EU has been pursuing a soft policy toward the Iranian regime since the JCPOA was reached in 2015, including after the Trump administration pulled the US out of the pact. But from the perspective of the Iranian leaders, such appeasement equals weakness and is a ripe opportunity to take advantage of.

The EU must realize that the Iranian regime could have easily returned to full compliance and immediately rejoined the nuclear agreement if it wanted to. But it keeps dragging out the talks and demanding additional concessions from the West. Last month, Tehran demanded that $10 billion of its assets be unfrozen in order for it to rejoin the nuclear talks. The Iranian leaders have also insisted that the US lift other non-nuclear sanctions that were leveled due to Iran’s human rights violations and terrorist activities. The Biden administration agreed to lift sanctions, including some that were not linked to Iran’s nuclear program, but still Tehran did not halt its nuclear efforts.

The European nations that signed up to the JCPOA — Germany, France and the UK — must show the regime they are prepared to leave the deal if Iran does not immediately stop its nuclear activities and come back to the negotiating table. They can also signal that they would trigger snapback sanctions. These are the four rounds of UN sanctions that were in place before the JCPOA came into effect. According to the agreement, any party to it can trigger a 30-day countdown to a snapback, which would restore all UN sanctions on the Iranian regime, including an arms embargo, if Tehran is found to be failing to meet its obligations. The other members cannot veto such a move.

Such a move would make the Iranian leaders think twice about playing the system, as they would be significantly isolated if the Europeans left the nuclear deal.

France, the UK and Germany must also make it clear to the Iranian regime that they will join the US in imposing sanctions on Tehran if its nuclear defiance continues. This would negatively impact the Islamic Republic’s revenues. EU countries are currently trading with Tehran in spite of the US sanctions and, from January to July this year, their trade with Iran was reportedly worth nearly $3 billion.

The EU must consider that acquiring nuclear weapons may have become more important for the Iranian regime (particularly with new President Ebrahim Raisi’s hard-line administration in power) than reaching or reviving the nuclear deal.

By taking a tougher stance, the bloc can play a critical role in pressuring the regime and preventing it from acquiring nuclear weapons.

*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political scientist. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh