The departure of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from Turkey will indicate the end of the group as a political party. The Brotherhood is witnessing a similar situation when the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was in power; its ideology and movement are banned. Its leaders were allowed to operate in the era of his successor, President Anwar Sadat. Ironically, however, the group wanted Sadat dead.
Then came President Hosni Mubarak, who granted the Brotherhood a fair amount of freedom, allowing it to perform political, social and economic activities. In turn, it accepted to work within the agreed political framework, and was able to get 88 seats in the Parliament. The Brotherhood did not get involved at the start of Egypt’s 2011 revolution; it participated in it after making sure Mubarak was out of the picture.
It took hold of the revolution and won elections, but lost power because it rushed to control state institutions, especially the judiciary and media. It tried to draft the constitution according to its vision. During that year in power, it lost its allies, including the Nasserists and leftists. Its desire to expand its powers intimidated the army, which took the initiative to overthrow the group, taking advantage of people suffering from poor services and insecurity.
Turkey’s decision to abandon the Brotherhood means it is unlikely to be able to return to politics for a long time. Even worse than the Brotherhood’s domestic management was its provocative foreign policy. It quickly became close to Iran, which pushed away Arab countries that are at odds with Tehran, such as the Gulf states.
For instance, Saudi Arabia — despite its concerns regarding the Brotherhood — financially supported President Mursi’s government as a token of good faith. However, Riyadh was rewarded with Iranian delegations flooding Cairo at a time when Saudi-Iranian relations were very tense. Relations between Riyadh and the Brotherhood deteriorated further when Mursi invited Iran’s then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to visit him.
Thus, when angry demonstrations erupted on July 3, 2013, exceeding those of the Jan. 25 revolution, the army considered it a mandate to intervene. The intervention was a relief for neighboring capitals. The Brotherhood did not stop making mistakes; instead of understanding the new situation after its departure and dealing with it realistically, it fought a losing battle.
According to a close associate of the group, it accepted to take part in regional battles to get safe havens, and needed support in order to topple the new government in Egypt. The Brotherhood’s belief in this illogical strategy shows they had nothing to lose after losing the presidency.
Western governments kept talking of Mursi’s legitimacy and the illegality of what it called a coup, taking punitive measures against Cairo. However, any expert in international relations knows that countries change positions according to their interests. Western governments did so, and this is what Turkey is doing today upon finding that its interest is in getting rid of the Brotherhood and reconciling with the current Egyptian government.
The Brotherhood’s only option in Egypt is to review its mistakes, political ideology and transformation. It should aim for political participation that believes in the other, without exploiting religion in politics.
Then came President Hosni Mubarak, who granted the Brotherhood a fair amount of freedom, allowing it to perform political, social and economic activities. In turn, it accepted to work within the agreed political framework, and was able to get 88 seats in the Parliament. The Brotherhood did not get involved at the start of Egypt’s 2011 revolution; it participated in it after making sure Mubarak was out of the picture.
It took hold of the revolution and won elections, but lost power because it rushed to control state institutions, especially the judiciary and media. It tried to draft the constitution according to its vision. During that year in power, it lost its allies, including the Nasserists and leftists. Its desire to expand its powers intimidated the army, which took the initiative to overthrow the group, taking advantage of people suffering from poor services and insecurity.
Turkey’s decision to abandon the Brotherhood means it is unlikely to be able to return to politics for a long time. Even worse than the Brotherhood’s domestic management was its provocative foreign policy. It quickly became close to Iran, which pushed away Arab countries that are at odds with Tehran, such as the Gulf states.
For instance, Saudi Arabia — despite its concerns regarding the Brotherhood — financially supported President Mursi’s government as a token of good faith. However, Riyadh was rewarded with Iranian delegations flooding Cairo at a time when Saudi-Iranian relations were very tense. Relations between Riyadh and the Brotherhood deteriorated further when Mursi invited Iran’s then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to visit him.
Thus, when angry demonstrations erupted on July 3, 2013, exceeding those of the Jan. 25 revolution, the army considered it a mandate to intervene. The intervention was a relief for neighboring capitals. The Brotherhood did not stop making mistakes; instead of understanding the new situation after its departure and dealing with it realistically, it fought a losing battle.
According to a close associate of the group, it accepted to take part in regional battles to get safe havens, and needed support in order to topple the new government in Egypt. The Brotherhood’s belief in this illogical strategy shows they had nothing to lose after losing the presidency.
Western governments kept talking of Mursi’s legitimacy and the illegality of what it called a coup, taking punitive measures against Cairo. However, any expert in international relations knows that countries change positions according to their interests. Western governments did so, and this is what Turkey is doing today upon finding that its interest is in getting rid of the Brotherhood and reconciling with the current Egyptian government.
The Brotherhood’s only option in Egypt is to review its mistakes, political ideology and transformation. It should aim for political participation that believes in the other, without exploiting religion in politics.
