
The passing of King Abdullah on Jan. 23 and the seamless transfer of power to King Salman on the same day reaffirmed once again Saudi Arabia’s political agility. As expected, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman chose, on the same day, Crown Prince Muqrin as deputy prime minister.
That same morning, King Salman chose Prince Muhammed bin Naif as deputy crown prince and second deputy prime minister. The decree’s preamble cited a decision supporting this choice, taken by the Allegiance Council — a royal body established in 2006 whose membership includes sons and grandsons of King Abdul Aziz, founder of modern Saudi Arabia. The duties of this body include taking care of issues pertaining to succession to the throne.
Prince Muhammad bin Naif has become the first grandson of King Abdul Aziz to be chosen for the line of succession. In the past, only his sons were chosen. This appointment should put to rest speculations outside Saudi Arabia about an impending crisis of succession. Many articles and some books were written musing about different scenarios. Pundits’ reputations were built on presumed knowledge of this matter. The failure of those pundits to accurately predict in this case proved that old adage, “Those who know do not speak, and those who speak do not know.”
The prompt and decisive changes announced on Jan. 23 reflected King Salman’s style during his long career. About a week later, on Jan. 29 over thirty more royal decisions were announced. They included new ministerial appointments, for defense, intelligence, civil service, education, health, agriculture, social affairs, information, telecommunications, and municipal affairs, among others.
Other decrees dealt with restructuring public administration at the top. A key decree dissolved 12 high councils and committees, including:
• National Security Council
• Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs
• Supreme Economic Council
• Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals
• Supreme Committee for Administrative Organization
• Civil Service Council
• Supreme Council for Education
• Supreme Committee for Education Policy
• Council for Higher Education
• Supreme Commission for King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST)
• Supreme Council for King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy
Notice the last five organs dealt with interlaced areas of education and scientific research. Two of the councils dealt with economic issues and two with civil service reform. They were overlapping in their jurisdictions, and as each one was consulted separately it could take some issues a long time to make the rounds and reach a consensus. They had their own bureaucracies, adding to red tape, conflict and cost. What added to the delays and confusion was that those councils sometimes had shared mandates with line ministries. In a few words, we were dealing with overlap, duplication and fragmentation at the high echelons of government.
The natural result was delay and sometimes conflict and inaction. Under the new structure announced on Jan. 29, there will be only two councils and they will be integrated into the Council of Ministers’ system. They will have no separate bureaucracies; the current Cabinet secretariat will also serve both new councils.
The first of the two is the Political and Security Affairs Council, chaired by the second deputy prime minister, who is also minister of the interior. Its membership includes ministers of foreign affairs, national guard, defense, information, and Islamic affairs, and head of general intelligence. Two ministers of state also serve on the council. Its secretary is the same secretary-general of the Cabinet.
The second is the Economic and Development Affairs Council, chaired by Prince Muhammed bin Salman in his capacity as minister of state. It has in its membership 21 additional ministers dealing with almost every other aspect of government. Its secretary is the same secretary-general of the Cabinet.
The two new councils can be considered as subcommittees of the Council of Ministers. Their recommendations can automatically be referred to the Council for decision-making. The new structure is more agile and streamlined. It should lead to a tighter and faster decision-making process.
Another objective of the reforms is to restore power to the Council of Ministers, the highest legislative and executive authority after the king. The decree’s preambular language alluded to this objective by referring to the “original mandate” of the Council to write and oversee the implementation of internal, external policies, including defense, economic, finance, and education.







