In Syria, there are more than 70,000 Iranian fighters and paid militiamen that Tehran has brought in from various countries in the region; other estimates put the number at double that. These forces have been fighting for months to seize Aleppo, which they have almost done after destroying the eastern part of the city, helped by Russian airstrikes that target civilians, and by Syrian regime warplanes dropping chemical bombs and chlorine gas in order to evacuate areas before occupying them.

Even if the Iranians and Syrian regime troops seize eastern Aleppo, Syria will not surrender to a regime that has been engaged in fighting for five years now. The regime would need several more years to impose its will.

This raises the question: Do Iran and Russia intend to remain in Syria in the coming years to continue their strong, on-the-ground support to keep the regime in power, rather than accept a political solution that would result in a national unity government without the regime’s current leadership?

After they seize eastern Aleppo due to crazy shelling that has displaced most of its population, what is the next potential step for the Iranians and Russians? Will they spend 2017 fighting to seize other Syrian towns, including opposition-held parts of rural Damascus? Then what?

How will the Syrian regime rule a torn state when most of its population wants revenge against it, and when its troops are vastly outnumbered by allied forces from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Does Iran plan to prolong the presence of foreign, sectarian militias in Syria for years to back the regime? This will attract more fighters from the region and the whole world, so the war will drag on. This is the dilemma that I think Tehran has discovered recently. It has realized that if it won and left Syria the regime would fall, but if it stayed the war would continue.

So why are the conquerors exaggerating their celebrations in Aleppo as if it is the end of the war? The reason is they need to raise morale in their own countries — in Iran, Russia, Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Iraq (the People of Righteousness militias [Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq]). The propaganda is directed at their own peoples and the world, which has been watching the conflict for years.

The Iranians realize better than the Russians that even if they win current battles it will not stop the war, and they will be forced to accept what they have long fought against. Moscow, which looks at Syria from a global perspective, will not hesitate to withdraw suddenly, just as they entered, without considering the losses for Damascus and Tehran.

Current Iranian policy in the region seems different than before; it is looking for quick interim wins, abandoning its fame as a country of long-term strategies. We can see this in Tehran’s insistence on engaging in regional conflicts — whether in Iraq, Syria or Yemen — though it lacks guarantees for final decisive victories.

The fighting in Syria will continue, and full peace in Iraq will not be reached because of Iran’s sectarian project. Moreover, Tehran’s Houthi allies in Yemen are too weak to achieve victory there — they are only capable of causing chaos. Perhaps the region’s other countries have not reacted to the loss of Aleppo, but they know well that the Syrian abyss is deep and that Iran will pay dearly to get out of it.

• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a veteran columnist. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya news channel and former editor in chief of Asharq Al-Awsat.

* Originally published in Asharq Al-Awsat.