American official on Oct. 11, 2011 revealed an Iranian plot to assassinate then Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir. The Iranian plan was to blow up a restaurant that Al-Jubeir was supposed to visit followed by the bombing of the Saudi embassy building.
The would-be perpetrators confessed to the plot, which the American FBI called Operation Red Coalition. Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri were arrested and charged by the federal court in New York with plotting to assassinate Al-Jubeir.
A few days ago, plots to assassinate Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Awad Assiri and Saudi Ambassador to Iraq Thamer Al-Sabhan were revealed. Iraq’s government went as far as being alert when it asked Al-Sabhan to leave the country. Such a behavior reflects the extent of Iranian interference in Iraq’s internal matter.
Let us briefly look at the history of Iran’s targeting of embassies. In November 1979, the US embassy was attacked and occupied in Tehran, and 52 Americans were held hostage for 444 days. In June 1980, the first secretary at Kuwait’s embassy in India, Mustafa Al-Marzouq, was assassinated. In Sept. 1982, Kuwaiti diplomat in Madrid Najib Al-Refai was assassinated. In April 1983, the US Embassy in Beirut was blown up.
In December 1983, a bomb was detonated targeting the French Embassy in Kuwait. In December 1983, a truck was blown up targeting the US Embassy in Kuwait, killing 17 people. In August 1987, the Saudi Embassy in Tehran was attacked and 275 diplomats were detained. In February 1990, Saudi diplomats were killed in Thailand. In Feb. 2011, Saudi diplomat Hassan Al-Qahtani was killed in Pakistan.
These are the most significant events that could be easily listed. There are many others. Iran has tried to intimidate diplomats who make rare efforts to communicate with the different spectra of societies where they work.
Saudi embassies in Lebanon and Iraq are trying to communicate with people belonging to different segments of society and who espouse different political views. Al-Sabhan managed to enter Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish homes, and break the political monotony in Iraq that depends on supporting one faction with pure Iranian characteristics.
Responding to Iranian verbal attacks made through Iraqi officials, Al-Sabhan said: “Saudi Arabia’s policy is steady… Saudi Arabia won’t give up on the Arabism of Iraq.”
The main reason behind Saudi Arabia’s disagreement with Lebanon’s government was the country’s departure from Arabism. Some politicians in Iraq are doing the same. Iran does not like Al-Sabhan’s emphasis on Iraq’s Arabism. Meanwhile, Shiite politicians, including Moqtada Al-Sadr, demand a return to Arab visions, and to the Arab — not Persian — sphere of interests. Saudi diplomacy has found its way into areas of influence that Tehran could not compete with. Our ambassadors’ success put them in Iran’s firing line. Until today, Al-Jubeir, Al-Sabhan and Al-Assiri are serving their nation and Arab interest through political and diplomatic means. There is no point choosing force against diplomacy, as this would be a militant and terrorist approach.
Iran proves daily that it acts outside the context of an institutional state, and is closer to having a bloody revolutionary status as it does not recognize international conventions regarding embassies and consulates, does not hesitate to assassinate any political figure, and intervenes anywhere at any time. Iran is more a militant organization than a state — how can a state plan to assassinate an ambassador by blowing up a restaurant?
A state’s power is in its diplomats, who turn the impossible into reality and this is what the Saudi ambassadors do.
The would-be perpetrators confessed to the plot, which the American FBI called Operation Red Coalition. Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri were arrested and charged by the federal court in New York with plotting to assassinate Al-Jubeir.
A few days ago, plots to assassinate Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Awad Assiri and Saudi Ambassador to Iraq Thamer Al-Sabhan were revealed. Iraq’s government went as far as being alert when it asked Al-Sabhan to leave the country. Such a behavior reflects the extent of Iranian interference in Iraq’s internal matter.
Let us briefly look at the history of Iran’s targeting of embassies. In November 1979, the US embassy was attacked and occupied in Tehran, and 52 Americans were held hostage for 444 days. In June 1980, the first secretary at Kuwait’s embassy in India, Mustafa Al-Marzouq, was assassinated. In Sept. 1982, Kuwaiti diplomat in Madrid Najib Al-Refai was assassinated. In April 1983, the US Embassy in Beirut was blown up.
In December 1983, a bomb was detonated targeting the French Embassy in Kuwait. In December 1983, a truck was blown up targeting the US Embassy in Kuwait, killing 17 people. In August 1987, the Saudi Embassy in Tehran was attacked and 275 diplomats were detained. In February 1990, Saudi diplomats were killed in Thailand. In Feb. 2011, Saudi diplomat Hassan Al-Qahtani was killed in Pakistan.
These are the most significant events that could be easily listed. There are many others. Iran has tried to intimidate diplomats who make rare efforts to communicate with the different spectra of societies where they work.
Saudi embassies in Lebanon and Iraq are trying to communicate with people belonging to different segments of society and who espouse different political views. Al-Sabhan managed to enter Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish homes, and break the political monotony in Iraq that depends on supporting one faction with pure Iranian characteristics.
Responding to Iranian verbal attacks made through Iraqi officials, Al-Sabhan said: “Saudi Arabia’s policy is steady… Saudi Arabia won’t give up on the Arabism of Iraq.”
The main reason behind Saudi Arabia’s disagreement with Lebanon’s government was the country’s departure from Arabism. Some politicians in Iraq are doing the same. Iran does not like Al-Sabhan’s emphasis on Iraq’s Arabism. Meanwhile, Shiite politicians, including Moqtada Al-Sadr, demand a return to Arab visions, and to the Arab — not Persian — sphere of interests. Saudi diplomacy has found its way into areas of influence that Tehran could not compete with. Our ambassadors’ success put them in Iran’s firing line. Until today, Al-Jubeir, Al-Sabhan and Al-Assiri are serving their nation and Arab interest through political and diplomatic means. There is no point choosing force against diplomacy, as this would be a militant and terrorist approach.
Iran proves daily that it acts outside the context of an institutional state, and is closer to having a bloody revolutionary status as it does not recognize international conventions regarding embassies and consulates, does not hesitate to assassinate any political figure, and intervenes anywhere at any time. Iran is more a militant organization than a state — how can a state plan to assassinate an ambassador by blowing up a restaurant?
A state’s power is in its diplomats, who turn the impossible into reality and this is what the Saudi ambassadors do.
