Limits of multilateralism on show at SCO summit

The summit of the eight-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organisation exposed Qingdao to the limelight. But was it the only takeaway from a venue where leaders of nearly half of the global population had gathered? Unfortunately, yes, as the conclave left much to be desired. 

Russia and China pursue contesting goals for the bloc. Moscow aspires to have the inkling of a security alliance, while Beijing fancies a geo-economic grouping. Meanwhile, SCO solidarity could not oblige India to back China’s colossal One Belt One Road Initiative. The members also lacked consensus on approving Iran’s full membership, but President Hassan Rouhani could still vent his anger against US unilateralism. And there was yet another elephant in the room: A thaw in India-Pakistan relations was nowhere to be seen.

Suffice to say that the SCO signifies Russia’s Eurasian fantasy, China’s global ambition, Pakistan’s quest for allies and India’s compulsion to contain its unpredictable rivals. While the bloc is a fait accompli for the landlocked Central Asian states, Iran fancies it as an economic firewall. 

Unlike NATO or the EU, the SCO lacks the common spirit and commitment to its all-inclusive and grand charter. Yet again, Russia has attempted to exploit the forum to trumpet its global power status, whereas China’s aspirations resonated with the bloc’s support for the One Belt One Road Initiative. India registered its opposition due to its disputes with China and Pakistan. 

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s snub didn’t impress Chinese President Xi Jinping, who told the press after the summit that all parties will continue to enhance the One Belt One Road Initiative and the “complementarity of our respective development strategies,” as well as “deepen cooperation in business, investment and finance.” Unlike New Delhi, Beijing has been consistently investing in the SCO infrastructure. This year, China announced the establishment of a 30 billion yuan ($4.7b) special lending facility within SCO’s Interbank Consortium. Russia might just be seeking geopolitical alignment of the Central Asian states and beyond; China has been repeating more tangible benefits. In the first quarter of 2018, China’s trade with other SCO members soared by 20.7 percent year-on-year, while its investment has crossed $84 billion, as per the reports of Xinhua News Agency.

Thanks to economic globalization, China has been able to manifest its soft power in its neighborhood, particularly to the west and south. Being a key proponent of the SCO, Beijing is faced with two key challenges: Whether to include Tehran as a full member and risk its stakes in the US and Europe, and how to manage relations with New Delhi and keep the bloc immune from the South Asian rivalry.

If there was one point of consensus to emerge from the Qingdao interaction, it is opposition to the US unilateralism and total support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. For Rouhani, who attended on special invitation, the support for the nuclear deal must have been consoling. But Tehran’s candidature seems to have gone on the back burner yet again, possibly for two reasons: The lack of consensus within the eight member states out of fear that the JCPOA’s snap-back clause could revive UN Security Council sanctions, and to keep the forum non-controversial in the eyes of Arab and Western trading partners. Iran’s membership has been pending since 2008 due to the SCO member states’ decision not to take in any country facing Security Council sanctions. 

On India’s opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the SCO is stuck in a quagmire. The bloc’s ambition of greater connectivity, regional harmony and pursuit of shared interests is falling prey to the 70-year old dispute between the two nuclear-armed rivals. Despite Beijing and Moscow’s back-door diplomacy, New Delhi and Islamabad could only brandish a cold, mechanized handshake. India’s brinkmanship vis-a-vis Pakistan torpedoes all external diplomatic efforts to resume bilateral talks. Indo-China territorial disputes may not be as explosive as Jammu and Kashmir, but their bearing on the SCO’s functionality cannot be overlooked.

Will Russia step up to ease India’s friction with China and Pakistan? The counter-question would be: Will India accept mediation at any level? New Delhi adamantly opposes any third party role. Thanks to its deepening ties with the US, Japan and Australia, India is cashing in on its dispute with China. The pace of Moscow and New Delhi’s diverging interests is set to increase, notwithstanding the ongoing big-ticket military hardware sales or bilateral trade. Given its past experiences, Pakistan is likely to maintain transactional relations with both the US and Russia, but neither will be as significant for her as China.

In a nutshell, any future expansion of the SCO beyond Central Asian states would limit and undermine its efficacy. On the list of aspiring members lie Syria and Egypt, alongside Iran and Israel. The Russian view of the bloc, projecting geostrategic alignment, offers less promise compared to the Chinese ambition of using it as a vehicle for economic development and connectivity.

• Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist and academic based in the GCC with a career in writing on diplomacy, security and governance. Besides other honors, he won the Jefferson Fellowship in 2000 and UNAOC Cross-Cultural Reporting Award 2010. Twitter: @naveed360