The Turkish-Israeli reconciliation has effectively put an end to the saga of the Mavi Marmara that has come to characterize Ankara-Tel Aviv relations since 2010. While the new agreement is a turning point in the otherwise deteriorating relations, it is unlikely that the two sides will develop cozy ties like the old days of the 1990s.
Obviously, both countries have hard time to avoid the conclusion that they are better off if they restore a degree of a normal relationship. Commentators from both sides insist that the rift has outlived its usefulness. Economic as well as security interests are the drive for the new rapprochement. The June 28 terrorist attack that hit Istanbul airport shows beyond doubt that Turkey will be targeted by further attacks in months to come. For this reason, Turkey is in need for more friends including Israel. At least, this is the working assumption of Turkey’s new prime minister.
Whether Turkey or Israel is the winner of the deal is not that important. I believe that the implication of the deal is what matters at the end of the day. For instance, no one has an interest in another deadly flare-up between Israel and Hamas. Now Turkey has managed to secure a kind of partial lifting of the siege. Turkish goods can go to Gaza after being screened in an Israeli port. This should alleviate the dwindling humanitarian conditions of thousands of Gazans. Besides, Turkey will be able to build a power plant in Gaza that can allow the construction of a desalination plant for the Gazans. To be sure, Gazans are to benefit but with so many restrictions in place it is hard to talk about complete lifting of the siege. Indeed, Tel Avid has long insisted on restriction.
While Erdogan has not delivered on his promises to Hamas, the latter maintained its silence. Interestingly enough, Hamas has been vocal in its criticisms of any normalization with Israel. And yet, it is in no position to lose Erdogan’s valuable support.
Perhaps, Hamas is a pragmatic movement. Its leaders understand that Erdogan cannot get them more. On the other hand, Israel is so careful not to concede too much to Turkey lest this brings about the wrath of Egypt. To be sure, the Egyptian president loathe Hamas as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood — his bitter enemy in Egypt. Adding insult to injury, Erdogan has refused to recognize El-Sisi legitimacy. Therefore, any victory of Erdogan that could boost Hamas in Gaza will ultimately work against the Egyptian interest.
Against this backdrop, Benjamin Netanyahu was careful not to institutionalize a significant Turkish role in Gaza at the expense of his most trustworthy allies in Egypt. It is not clear yet if the Israeli government has synchronized its steps with Egypt with regards to the agreement with Turkey.
Casting aside the security imperatives of the agreement, Israel has sought to cultivate an optimal environment for its natural gas in the Mediterranean Sea. Now the deal will permit both sides to discuss the exporting of Israeli gas to Turkey, a matter that is very important for Turkey that seeks to diversify its gas imports rather than relying of Russia. The crisis with Russia shows how vulnerable Turkey is on its dependency on Russian gas. For both sides, gas is an important opportunity for cooperation.
But it is not as if the issue is strictly a bilateral matter. In fact, the US has long been urging both countries to mend fences so that Washington can better handle the tension in tumultuous region. Given the needs of both sides to the US in a region of uncertainty, they show signs of readiness to reset their relations. In a nutshell, the saga of the flotilla ends but a thriving and prosperous relations are far from certain.
Obviously, both countries have hard time to avoid the conclusion that they are better off if they restore a degree of a normal relationship. Commentators from both sides insist that the rift has outlived its usefulness. Economic as well as security interests are the drive for the new rapprochement. The June 28 terrorist attack that hit Istanbul airport shows beyond doubt that Turkey will be targeted by further attacks in months to come. For this reason, Turkey is in need for more friends including Israel. At least, this is the working assumption of Turkey’s new prime minister.
Whether Turkey or Israel is the winner of the deal is not that important. I believe that the implication of the deal is what matters at the end of the day. For instance, no one has an interest in another deadly flare-up between Israel and Hamas. Now Turkey has managed to secure a kind of partial lifting of the siege. Turkish goods can go to Gaza after being screened in an Israeli port. This should alleviate the dwindling humanitarian conditions of thousands of Gazans. Besides, Turkey will be able to build a power plant in Gaza that can allow the construction of a desalination plant for the Gazans. To be sure, Gazans are to benefit but with so many restrictions in place it is hard to talk about complete lifting of the siege. Indeed, Tel Avid has long insisted on restriction.
While Erdogan has not delivered on his promises to Hamas, the latter maintained its silence. Interestingly enough, Hamas has been vocal in its criticisms of any normalization with Israel. And yet, it is in no position to lose Erdogan’s valuable support.
Perhaps, Hamas is a pragmatic movement. Its leaders understand that Erdogan cannot get them more. On the other hand, Israel is so careful not to concede too much to Turkey lest this brings about the wrath of Egypt. To be sure, the Egyptian president loathe Hamas as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood — his bitter enemy in Egypt. Adding insult to injury, Erdogan has refused to recognize El-Sisi legitimacy. Therefore, any victory of Erdogan that could boost Hamas in Gaza will ultimately work against the Egyptian interest.
Against this backdrop, Benjamin Netanyahu was careful not to institutionalize a significant Turkish role in Gaza at the expense of his most trustworthy allies in Egypt. It is not clear yet if the Israeli government has synchronized its steps with Egypt with regards to the agreement with Turkey.
Casting aside the security imperatives of the agreement, Israel has sought to cultivate an optimal environment for its natural gas in the Mediterranean Sea. Now the deal will permit both sides to discuss the exporting of Israeli gas to Turkey, a matter that is very important for Turkey that seeks to diversify its gas imports rather than relying of Russia. The crisis with Russia shows how vulnerable Turkey is on its dependency on Russian gas. For both sides, gas is an important opportunity for cooperation.
But it is not as if the issue is strictly a bilateral matter. In fact, the US has long been urging both countries to mend fences so that Washington can better handle the tension in tumultuous region. Given the needs of both sides to the US in a region of uncertainty, they show signs of readiness to reset their relations. In a nutshell, the saga of the flotilla ends but a thriving and prosperous relations are far from certain.
