The outcome of the battle to recapture Mosul from Daesh, which appears to have started already, will trigger a number of variables that will eventually impact the future of Iraq as a country, the fate of Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran’s influence over the Baghdad government and Sunni-Shiite showdown.
The successful retaking of the strategic base of Qayyara, 70 kilometers south of Mosul, will give the Iraqi Army and coalition forces an important foothold from which to manage the difficult task of conquering Iraq’s second largest city with a population of more than two million.
But there are already fears and accusations surrounding the role of the Kurdish Peshmerga; a pivotal force in fighting Daesh militants, and how far will they be allowed to occupy contested territory. The Peshmerga has successfully driven Daesh out of several villages north and east of Mosul. The government of Haidar Al- Abadi has warned Kurdish forces from entering the city. So did commanders in the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), a mainly Shiite force notorious for punishing Sunni residents of liberated towns and villages, most recently Fallujah in Al-Anbar province.
Al-Abadi’s support for the PMU is unshakeable even as Sunni leaders in Baghdad complain of their crimes and atrocities. They are joined by controversial Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, who has become an important player in opposing the ethno-confessional system of government that was established by the US.
The battle for Mosul will be a difficult and bloody one even as the US claims that Daesh fighters are demoralized and are estimated to be 15,000 to 30,000 strong only. Being their largest and last remaining base in Iraq, Daesh will put up a big fight. It had plenty of time to prepare for it since it took the city swiftly in 2014. The size of destruction in Fallujah and Ramadi is a stark reminder of what awaits Mosul. The UN estimates that at least one million residents will flee toward Iraqi Kurdistan once the fighting begins. The humanitarian toll on those who remain will be enormous.
The fall of the city will be celebrated as a major victory against Daesh by Baghdad, the US coalition, the Kurds and Tehran. But no sooner the city is liberated than schisms will begin. Sunni residents of so-called liberated towns in Al-Anbar and Salahuddin remain displaced and many have been prevented from returning.
There are allegations that Iran is carrying out schemes to repopulate Sunni towns in a bid to create a new demographic reality that is sectarian in nature.
The Kurds will be unwilling to withdraw from villages and territory that they recently occupied and there are reports that the Peshmerga has dug out a 3-meter-wide, 19-kilometer-long trench, marking the new front line after recapturing the village of Qarqashah earlier this month. Driving them back to earlier positions will not be easy.
And then there is the PMU and their role in the upcoming battle. The US is weary of these forces entering the city and so are the local Sunni tribes in the region. But who will stop them from doing so? Iran has defended the PMU’s right in fighting Daesh in Mosul and reports speak of the arrival of Iranian Gen. Qassem Suliemani south of Mosul to lead these forces. A local force, called National Mobilization (NM), made up of volunteers from the region has vowed to fight PMU as fiercely as it would fight Daesh. They accuse the PMU of planning to occupy the city and hand it over to Iran.
The liberation of Mosul will lead to political, sectarian and military aftershocks that will be felt in Irbil, Tehran and Baghdad. For the US, whose strategy in Iraq has been focused on fighting Daesh and not influencing local politics, the liberation of Mosul will end its role in Iraq, leaving the country to face turmoil and possible partition.
For Iran the fall of the city will give it more power to implement a sinister policy of demographic reshuffle that falls within a grand scheme of weakening the Sunni component’s presence and influence over the political process.
For the Kurds the defeat of Daesh will bring to the forefront the issue of ceding from Iraq and setting up their independent state over new territory — equivalent to about 50 percent of the size of their recognized autonomous zone — that they believe they had rightly won. For the majority of Kurds who support independence the opportunity cannot be missed.
But for the Sunni tribes of Ninawa the lessons of what happened to their brethren in Al-Anabar and Salahuddin will not be forgotten and they will resist attempts to change the ethnic and sectarian make up of their city. Their confrontation with the PMU is inevitable. One thing is for sure and that is the outcome of the battle of Mosul will open a Pandora’s box that will take Iraq into the unknown.
The successful retaking of the strategic base of Qayyara, 70 kilometers south of Mosul, will give the Iraqi Army and coalition forces an important foothold from which to manage the difficult task of conquering Iraq’s second largest city with a population of more than two million.
But there are already fears and accusations surrounding the role of the Kurdish Peshmerga; a pivotal force in fighting Daesh militants, and how far will they be allowed to occupy contested territory. The Peshmerga has successfully driven Daesh out of several villages north and east of Mosul. The government of Haidar Al- Abadi has warned Kurdish forces from entering the city. So did commanders in the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), a mainly Shiite force notorious for punishing Sunni residents of liberated towns and villages, most recently Fallujah in Al-Anbar province.
Al-Abadi’s support for the PMU is unshakeable even as Sunni leaders in Baghdad complain of their crimes and atrocities. They are joined by controversial Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, who has become an important player in opposing the ethno-confessional system of government that was established by the US.
The battle for Mosul will be a difficult and bloody one even as the US claims that Daesh fighters are demoralized and are estimated to be 15,000 to 30,000 strong only. Being their largest and last remaining base in Iraq, Daesh will put up a big fight. It had plenty of time to prepare for it since it took the city swiftly in 2014. The size of destruction in Fallujah and Ramadi is a stark reminder of what awaits Mosul. The UN estimates that at least one million residents will flee toward Iraqi Kurdistan once the fighting begins. The humanitarian toll on those who remain will be enormous.
The fall of the city will be celebrated as a major victory against Daesh by Baghdad, the US coalition, the Kurds and Tehran. But no sooner the city is liberated than schisms will begin. Sunni residents of so-called liberated towns in Al-Anbar and Salahuddin remain displaced and many have been prevented from returning.
There are allegations that Iran is carrying out schemes to repopulate Sunni towns in a bid to create a new demographic reality that is sectarian in nature.
The Kurds will be unwilling to withdraw from villages and territory that they recently occupied and there are reports that the Peshmerga has dug out a 3-meter-wide, 19-kilometer-long trench, marking the new front line after recapturing the village of Qarqashah earlier this month. Driving them back to earlier positions will not be easy.
And then there is the PMU and their role in the upcoming battle. The US is weary of these forces entering the city and so are the local Sunni tribes in the region. But who will stop them from doing so? Iran has defended the PMU’s right in fighting Daesh in Mosul and reports speak of the arrival of Iranian Gen. Qassem Suliemani south of Mosul to lead these forces. A local force, called National Mobilization (NM), made up of volunteers from the region has vowed to fight PMU as fiercely as it would fight Daesh. They accuse the PMU of planning to occupy the city and hand it over to Iran.
The liberation of Mosul will lead to political, sectarian and military aftershocks that will be felt in Irbil, Tehran and Baghdad. For the US, whose strategy in Iraq has been focused on fighting Daesh and not influencing local politics, the liberation of Mosul will end its role in Iraq, leaving the country to face turmoil and possible partition.
For Iran the fall of the city will give it more power to implement a sinister policy of demographic reshuffle that falls within a grand scheme of weakening the Sunni component’s presence and influence over the political process.
For the Kurds the defeat of Daesh will bring to the forefront the issue of ceding from Iraq and setting up their independent state over new territory — equivalent to about 50 percent of the size of their recognized autonomous zone — that they believe they had rightly won. For the majority of Kurds who support independence the opportunity cannot be missed.
But for the Sunni tribes of Ninawa the lessons of what happened to their brethren in Al-Anabar and Salahuddin will not be forgotten and they will resist attempts to change the ethnic and sectarian make up of their city. Their confrontation with the PMU is inevitable. One thing is for sure and that is the outcome of the battle of Mosul will open a Pandora’s box that will take Iraq into the unknown.
