On Dec. 17, 2014, Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro made history by each taking a bold and politically brave step: They agreed to begin the process of normalizing relations.
American and Cuban negotiators met secretly on multiple occasions over a surprisingly lengthy period before Dec. 17. These talks centered on a prisoner exchange that was necessary to clear the way forward. The next step, which began today with the arrival of a State Department delegation in Havana, will feature a very different conversation, one focused on a diplomatic process and held in the glare of the public eye. The two sides will aim to define which issues are necessary for progress, and they will set an agenda and a timetable.
The path to normalized relations will be challenging, and all the more so if the two sides do not fully understand each other.
Although there are some important exceptions, the United States is generally less informed about Cuba. This knowledge gap exists for a variety of reasons, including a hangover from Monroe Doctrine attitudes, which are characterized by relatively modest interest in the entire hemisphere, as well as limitations caused by the way official intelligence has been sculpted over decades by the agenda of a vocal and politically organized anti-Castro Cuban-American community.
If there exists an asymmetrical power dynamic, where the US has supremacy in hard power, there is also an asymmetrical knowledge dynamic where the Cubans may be better prepared. This knowledge gap results in traps into which the parties, and especially the American side, must avoid falling in order to realize the historic potential of the presidents’ decisions. There are at least five such traps:
Ignorance of History: Rarely have I encountered a country where the understanding of its history is as critical to understanding its present as it is in Cuba. Virtually all Cubans, regardless of generation, will follow these developments with a collective memory of an historical pattern of US intervention in Cuban affairs. The Platt Amendment, drafted by the US Congress and written into the Cuban Constitution in 1901, gave the US the right to control and limit Cuba’s new independence, and to place military bases like Guantánamo Bay on Cuban soil. The four-year occupation of Cuba by the US military from 1898-1902 left a legacy of insult to the Cuban mambí veterans who had fought for independence against Spain. And by the 1950s, American business owned about two-thirds of the Cuban economy, including most public utilities, and upwards of 80 percent of the fertile sugar lands. The key to understanding Cuba in 2015 is not ideology, but rather the country’s nationalist narrative and the cultural context of being Cuban (la cubanía), informed by a complex and nuanced history.
Curse of preconditions: The new chapter of engagement will proceed in stages. First, the parties must reach enough of an agreement on enough issues to allow diplomatic relations to be restored, the respective embassies reopened, and ambassadors exchanged. It is not even necessary that all the issues be addressed. Once a proper diplomatic relationship has been established, a dialogue can take place, including on issues on which the two countries do not agree. But there is a common political impulse in the US to try to impose preconditions on talks with Cuba, a kind of reward thesis for “good behavior,” which could stall progress from one stage to another.
Risk of the wrong premise: There are multiple theories about why both presidents decided at this time to agree to establish a more normal relationship. One of them is that Cuba is in a weakened and vulnerable state, preparing to lose the Venezuelan oil subsidy, and that it is turning to the US in desperation. This is not the reason. The premises of engagement need to be aligned with the realities of Cuba.
Expectation gap: There is a strong current of thought in the political classes in the US that the objective of this new opening to Cuba is to accelerate regime change in Cuba in a way that the old embargo failed to do. To the degree that this narrative is perceived to be the dominant one, and that US business people are characterized as “foot soldiers of political change” in Cuba, the chances for a successful normalization diminish, as does the opportunity for US companies to do real business in Cuba.
Failure to listen: Many foreigners wanting to do things in Cuba are so focused on their own goals that they do not listen to what the Cubans tell them. The Cubans are tough-minded negotiators in defense of their interests, but they generally speak clearly in articulating their priorities, which may be something altogether different. Active listening is highly recommended.
• In partnership with The Mark News
