Sino-Indian entente likely to be a false dawn

The informal summit was billed as a milestone between China and India. Not just the two governments, but many of the analysts on either side also seemed to suggest that the meeting was a key step toward cooling off the tensions that had crept into bilateral ties in recent years. They also predicted it to be a turning point in Sino-Indian relations, allowing the countries to collaborate rather than compete.

Yes, the meeting was much-needed and indeed much-delayed. After the extremely high-profile visit by Xi to India soon after Modi became prime minister four years ago, and a return visit shortly afterwards, expectations were that these leaders would perhaps be able to give a new direction to relations between the two Asian giants. Ties had been tenuous over a number of issues, ranging from territorial claims, China’s consistent support to Pakistan and its use of Iran as a bulwark against India, and of course the spreading Chinese influence in areas that India considered to be its backyard and hence a natural sphere of influence. 

The Chinese were hopeful of expanding their commercial presence in India and being involved in some of the ambitious infrastructure development projects that the Indian government had unveiled, including a network of high-speed trains across the subcontinent. But the Chinese had also been unhappy with the way India was getting drawn into a tighter relationship with the United States.

Since those initial meetings, the relationship has only suffered, with a number of issues that have either cropped up or come back to derail plans to develop a friendly, cooperative atmosphere between Beijing and New Delhi.

The biggest irritant between India and China is related to the two nations’ ties with third countries. India has always disliked and distrusted China’s decisive and open tilt toward Pakistan. China is not only one of the biggest providers of defense aid, but also the biggest supporter of Pakistan at all major global forums, besides being Islamabad’s largest source of foreign investments and financial assistance. China has also been a key supporter of the development of Pakistan’s defense capabilities, including its air force, navy and, most crucially, its nuclear weapons capability, all of which are directly and uniquely aimed at India.

China, for its part, views with suspicion the recent drift in Indian foreign policy toward the US and other Western nations. In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, India began developing closer ties with Western nations, including making large-ticket defense purchases from the US. But, under Modi, India’s foreign policy has taken a decisive shift toward the US, with the two countries signing an agreement to share the use of military bases as well as more intensive joint military exercises, often involving the forces of other “friendly” countries like France, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore.

China sees these moves as an extension of the stated American policy to “contain” the Red Dragon and it has tried to counter them by developing its own relationships with and presence in countries around India, notably Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal — a move that India sees as a threat in the form of a string of pearls in the Indian Ocean, India’s natural zone of influence.

India also opposes the One Belt One Road initiative of Xi as it sees it as part of a Chinese strategy to undermine Indian influence in its own neighborhood. This apprehension has led India to opt out of the initiative and watch its rapid development across the world with alarm. India is also upset about China blocking its entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and less than warm response to India’s quest for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.

The divergence between the two nations also extends to the commercial and business world. The balance of trade between the two nations is heavily loaded against India, which, in 2016-17, exported only about $16.4 billion of goods and services to China, as against Chinese exports of over $67 billion to India. Despite the large-scale presence of players like Huawei, India is also suspicious of letting Chinese companies into sensitive industries like telecoms for fear of espionage.

The two countries are also in disagreement over the sharing of river waters, notably the Brahmaputra, which originates in Tibet and is crucial for northeastern India, but on which the Chinese have been building several large dams, curtailing the flow of water. Similar is the situation in the western Himalayas, from where all the rivers feeding the northern Indian subcontinent originate and where India is already in disagreement with Pakistan over the sharing of waters.

The two sides have also spent the last few years building up their military presence close to the border areas. China has built an extensive network of all-weather roads in Tibet, literally up to the border, allowing great flexibility in the mobility of its defense forces. India has tried to beef up its own road connectivity in the border areas, but China is way ahead as it has also built railways and airstrips all along the border. 

Often, the armies of the two countries enter tense stand-offs in the border areas during construction of infrastructure by the opposite side. One such situation that threatened to get out of hand and become a violent incident happened last year at the Doklam plateau, which lies at the junction of India, Bhutan and China. Indian forces physically stopped Chinese workers and troops from carrying on construction work at the plateau on the grounds that Bhutan had alleged that the Chinese army had intruded on its territory and was carrying out the works on its soil. The stand-off lasted several weeks before calmer heads prevailed and the two sides reached an agreement to withdraw.

Though border incidents are not unusual, Doklam was by far the most serious and it is perhaps this incident that forced both India and China to the negotiating table. However, as the underlying factors that led to Doklam and feed the mistrust in this relationship will be around for a long time to come, China and India will remain competitors rather than collaborators. 

For the two sides to develop a trusting relationship, a major reorientation is needed in both Beijing and New Delhi. China ought to stop using Pakistan as a thorn in India’s side and India needs to realize that its best interests lie in building a secure and stable relationship in its neighborhood, rather than following diktats from Washington or elsewhere. It also needs to understand that competing with China in all spheres is not only impossible, but does not serve its interests either.