North Korea’s recent announcement that it will not allow any foreign tourists to cross its borders, in order to protect itself from Ebola, evoked chuckles around the world.
“The Ebola virus should know better than to visit that place,” observers quipped. Even as global developments unfold at a dizzying pace, North Korea seems to plod along rather consistently in a sort of Stalinist netherworld. But that netherworld’s growing nuclear arsenal is no laughing matter. North Korea’s apparent immutability makes any unexpected development seem like a sign that something major is afoot. When a month passed without new footage of the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un, international observers eagerly speculated about his health, personal security and hold on power. After all, they reasoned, Kim would not have missed attending important events, including a ceremony honoring his father and grandfather, Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-Sung, unless something serious had occurred.
No sooner had Kim returned to the spotlight, sporting a limp and a cane, than the regime sparked a fresh round of speculation by releasing Jeffrey Fowle, a 56-year-old American who had been detained for months for leaving a Bible in a hotel room. Having been forsaken by its few allies in recent years, North Korea, outsiders assume, feels more isolated than ever. Against this background, Fowle’s release, which apparently carried no quid pro quo, has been interpreted as a sign of the regime’s readiness to initiate a long-awaited dialogue with the US.
But any assessment of North Korea’s intentions at this point is mere guesswork, and the release of one detainee does not make for convincing evidence. What is certain is that the absence of any sustained meaningful dialogue with North Korea is a source of serious concern.
The South Korean leadership, which understands better than anyone the danger that North Korea poses, has long recognized the need for such a dialogue. Indeed, despite North Korea’s refusal to make any real concessions on human rights issues and family visits, much less its military posture, South Korea has regularly sought to establish a process for such discussions.
The challenge for the US is to support South Korea’s efforts, without wavering on its demand that the North participate in a new round of nuclear talks, based on the terms to which it previously agreed. Opponents of this approach insist that there is no place for such “preconditions” in a genuine dialogue, in which the relevant parties are simply supposed to exchange views. But the fact is that North Korea’s refusal to acknowledge its 2005 commitment to abandon its nuclear program effectively renders any prospective dialogue moot. After all, reversing the country’s nuclear buildup was a fundamental reason for launching talks in the first place.
With the two-year election clock in the US about to be reset to 2016, there is probably enough time for one more major push for substantive nuclear talks with North Korea. Given the country’s negotiating record, such an effort will depend on the triumph of hope over experience; but it is worth a try, given the lack of alternatives.
Indeed, the challenge extends far beyond convincing North Korea to participate. The US cannot hope to make any progress without support from China and others, including Russia, or without all countries bringing their leverage to bear. Russia cannot forever maintain a foreign policy based on spite. The international community, as fragmented and conflicted as it currently is, can find common ground in recognizing the threat that North Korea’s unpredictable and enigmatic regime poses, and take cooperative action to mitigate it. The first step in that process must be dialogue based on commitments already made. A dialogue with the deaf can be difficult; but a dialogue with an amnesiac can be no dialogue at all.
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© Project Syndicate
