
The past 10 years have seen Gulf countries’ relations with Turkey change between love, admiration and anger. However, Ankara has continued to be of significant value, especially to countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia. Despite disputes, Turkey has continued to be an active political player in the region.
We have a limited understanding of the Turkish perspective on most of the regional issues. Sometimes Ankara’s contradictions confuse us. It stood against the toppling of the Qaddafi regime in Libya, but has taken a rigid stance against the Assad regime in Syria. Although it is a NATO member, it has operated for an entire decade as a partner with Iran, despite international sanctions on the latter.
Following the Arab Spring, Turkey supported the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and hosted its headquarters and propaganda machine, acting as an alternative to Qatar. Ankara also hosted Brotherhood opposition figures from the Gulf.
On one occasion, a small number of them searched for a Turkish official to receive them. They only found a municipality chief of an Istanbul neighborhood with whom to take photos, and thereby upset the government of the Gulf country from which they hailed. However, the municipality chief, who did not understand their aim, praised the government of the opposition figures’ country and bragged that he had friendly relations with it.
Most disputes with Turkey are marginal and are not over strategic issues. Part of the blame for the disputes lies with the Turks for getting involved in Arab domestic affairs. Their support of the Brotherhood in Egypt not only failed, but is also the reason behind the new Egyptian regime’s restrictions on the Brotherhood.
Turkey would have had a great status, and a regional role capable of achieving change, if it had abandoned petty alliances and avoided poking its nose in Arab domestic affairs. A more important role awaits it as it can restore a strategic balance by building a new regional system that prevents chaos and war.
In case Tehran signs a nuclear agreement with the West, Turkey can work with major blocs to prevent Iranian regional expansion, which also threatens it. Ankara can see how Iran is rushing to control Iraq and Syria, two countries that directly affect Turkey’s security and stability.
Egypt, which has had Turkish influence for 100 years, is currently an axial country, and it is not in Ankara’s interest to be hostile toward it. During my last visit to Turkey, I heard expressions of hope that the situation with Egypt had not reached hostile levels, but unfortunately the bilateral relationship has become contaminated by trivial disputes.
If Turks were capable of altering the situation in Cairo, we would have understood the secret behind their enthusiasm toward the Brotherhood, but Ankara’s ability to achieve change in Egypt is almost nil.
The Turks are very important on the regional stage, and their influence is great within the context of the Middle Eastern relationship with Iran, and parties in support of it in Iraq and Lebanon. Ankara’s ability to achieve change in Syria is unmatched. This is why Turks have an important role, and why they must reconsider their reading of the regional situation.
Gulf countries, as well as Egypt and Jordan, have many mutual interests and aims with Ankara, but achieving those aims requires a Turkish policy free from petty disputes. These nine countries can put an end to Iranian expansion, pressure the West to achieve a fair solution for the Palestinians, end chaos in Iraq and Syria, and establish a regional system against terrorism. Turkey has important historical experiences in playing strategic roles in the Middle East, the Balkans and the southern Caucasus.







