It is quite rare that a country changes its national map, which shows its location and geographic boundaries on the globe, in the heat of domestic or regional politics. Quite unexpectedly, just a day before the first anniversary of India’s dissolution of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan issued a new map that now includes the Indian-administered or “occupied” part of the disputed state. Pakistan has persistently argued that it has no quarrel with India, but it seeks resolution of this long standing issue which is widely viewed as the unfinished agenda of Partition. The two South Asian countries have fought two major wars and several localized battles to assert their claim over the former princely state. Even today, their armies are face-to-face with each other along the Line of Control and Working Boundary, sniping at each other and taking down innocent villagers on both sides. How does the changing of map factor into the strategic calculus of the two oldest South Asian rivals? 

Before explaining the reason why Pakistan has taken the step now and what benefit can it realistically expect from it, let me point out that the country’s map included the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir in the first few decades of its history. After the Shimla Agreement of July 1972, however, the national map was only confined to Azad Kashmir, the territory of the disputed Himalayan state that is under Pakistan’s control. There are three reasons for this extraordinary step that Pakistan has taken but which is not likely to change anything on the ground.

First, the Indian decision on August 5, 2019, to dissolve the state of Jammu and Kashmir and divide it into two union territories that would be directly administered by the Union Government upended the historical character of the state. No matter how strong the internal insurgency in the Vale of Kashmir was, and no matter how bad the relations of India with Pakistan were in the past, no government in New Delhi thought of abrogating Article 370 of the Indian constitution that granted a special status to the state. Only Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his ultranationalist Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party has done it. This power play sent shockwaves through the entire Muslim population of Kashmir on both sides of the border and deep into Pakistan’s political circles. In a single move, the Indian government attempted to make Pakistan irrelevant to the dispute by changing the constitutional and historical status of the disputed state. Even before this, the India diplomatic position was that what happens or happened in Jammu and Kashmir was nothing but India’s internal matter. This is an argument that all states make while confronting counter-territorial claims or resistance. The fact is that various Indian governments have held negotiations with Pakistan to settle this dispute, and it was even claimed that the two countries came close to its resolution in 2007.

There are compelling domestic reasons for the present government to draw a new map. The religious and nationalist constituencies of Pakistan have wanted a more assertive and aggressive position than the peace overtures Prime Minister Imran Khan had earlier made by calling for a dialogue with India to peacefully resolve all problems. In the middle of his tenure and caught in economic problems and governance issues, Khan wants to mobilize the same constituency now

Rasul Bakhsh Rais 

Second, by staking claim over the Indian part of the former Kashmir state at least on paper, Pakistan wishes to draw international attention to the problem. Will the world powers, caught in the pandemic and busy drafting plans to revive their own economies, take interest in the India-Pakistan duels are yet to be seen. Signs are that they may notice the move, but will perhaps continue with their more pressing respective agendas. 

Third, it may also be argued that Pakistan wants to show solidarity with the people of Kashmir who have remained in a state of lockdown for more than a year now. While the Muslim majority population in the valley appears to be up in arms, including leaders like Farooq Abdullah who supported the annexation of the state with India, Pakistan has not done much except for making statements, eulogizing the spirit of freedom and resistance among Kashmiris, and condemning Indian atrocities against them. There are some nationalist Kashmiris who may not like the map showing their state as part of Pakistan, but there are others who have conventionally struggled to join Pakistan. On that count either, I do not see much gain for Pakistan, except for bringing in new debate and raising controversy, hoping to see the Kashmir issue on the agenda of the United Nations and other world forums. 

There are compelling domestic reasons for the present government to draw a new map. The religious and nationalist constituencies of Pakistan have wanted a more assertive and aggressive position than the peace overtures Prime Minister Imran Khan had earlier made by calling for a dialogue with India to peacefully resolve all problems and promote religious harmony by opening up Sikh and Hindu religious shrines in Pakistan. In the middle of his tenure and caught in economic problems and governance issues, Khan wants to mobilize the conservative constituency. It is a symbolic move, and symbolism matters in politics everywhere, especially among the emotional populations of developing democracies.

*Rasul Bakhsh Rais is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, LUMS, Lahore. His latest book is “Islam, Ethnicity and Power Politics: Constructing Pakistan’s National Identity” (Oxford University Press, 2017).

Twitter: @RasulRais