Last week, the United Nations announced a 72-hour truce in Yemen, starting Thursday morning (Oct. 20). UN Special envoy announced that he had secured agreement by the government and the rebels on a cessation of hostilities that would include the immediate reactivation of the De-escalation and Coordination Committee (DCC) and unfettered access for humanitarian supplies and personnel to all parts of Yemen.
The truce ended Saturday night (Oct. 22), but it never really took hold. There was some reduction of military operations on some fronts, and limited humanitarian aid during the lull. However, from the early hours on Thursday, Houthis continued to launch missiles against Saudi Arabia and deploy snipers targeting civilians across the border, killing and injuring Saudi civilians and Yemeni refugees sheltering in Saudi Arabia.
The rebels intensified their siege and indiscriminate bombardment of Taiz neighborhoods, and turned back UN humanitarian convoys. They repeatedly fired ballistic missiles toward Marib, but were mercifully thwarted by coalition defenses.
In total, Houthis and Saleh militias committed over 1,000 violations during 72 hours of “truce,” just as they ignored the previous four cease-fires, in May 2015, July 2015, December 2015, and April 2016.
It should have been obvious that Houthis had no intention of respecting the latest cease-fire when they failed to publicly acknowledge it in the first place, leaving it to the UN special envoy to do so, unlike the government, which publicly announced its acceptance of the cease-fire.
A more telling indicator was Houthis’ intensification of arms and missile smuggling, by land and by sea, at the same time they were telling the UN that they intended to hand over their weapons and withdraw from the areas they currently occupy, starting with Sanaa, Hodeida and Taiz!
News reports this past week included detailed accounts, based on American, European and Iranian sources, of increased arms smuggling from Iran to Yemen. When Houthis attacked UAE and US ships near Bab Al-Mandab earlier this month, they used guided missiles made in Iran.
Finally, on Oct. 26, rebel leader Abdel Malek Al-Houthi openly called for intensified fighting against the government and the speedy formation of the putsch “government,” effectively aborting UN shuttle diplomacy to end the war.
Why do the rebels continue their futile war even as they continually lose territory to government forces, which now control over 70 percent of Yemen’s territory?
Why do they fail to observe every cease-fire agreement or take part in the De-escalation and Coordination Committee refereed by the UN?
Why do they still defy UN Security Council resolutions demanding that they hand over their weapons, territories they control, and government institutions they have commandeered since September 2014?
And why do they continue to impede delivery of humanitarian assistance to their fellow Yemenis?
I can think of several explanations for these seemingly irrational choices:
First, Houthis may not want peace because it means loss of the main source of their strength — arms, which they utilize to terrorize Yemenis and blackmail the international community into treating them as equals to the internationally recognized government.
Second, they are emboldened by the international community’s reluctance, thus far, to forcibly implement UNSC sanctions and resolutions, including UNSCR 2216 of April 2015, which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, meaning that it can implemented by the use of force.
Third: Houthis have differences with Saleh, their fellow coup partner, as well as difference within the Houthi camp itself, over peace terms. As such, peace could lead to infighting within the rebel camp.
Fourth: Rebels think that they could continue to stonewall, taking advantage of the political paralysis in the US and UN. On Nov. 8, Americans will choose their new president, who will take office on January 20, 2017. There is also change at the top at the UN: On Jan. 1, Antonio Gueterres will become the news Secretary-General. Taking their cue from Syria’s Assad and his supporters, Houthis are trying, without success so far, to strengthen their hand versus the government camp during these transitional times.
Fifth: Iran, the Houthis’ main patron, wants the war in Yemen to continue, even intensify, because instability makes it easier for Iran to interfere directly or through its Hezbollah proxies. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards frequently liken the situation in Yemen to that of Syria and Iraq, where Iran has succeeded in making significant breakthroughs by taking advantage of instability and heightened sectarian conflicts.
These factors may best explain the seemingly irrational conduct of Houthi and Saleh rebels: They are not interested in peace, only biding their time and hoping for some change in their favor in the international community and the battlefield.
* Abdel Aziz Abu Hamad Aluwaisheg is the Assistant Secretary General for Foreign Affairs at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
The truce ended Saturday night (Oct. 22), but it never really took hold. There was some reduction of military operations on some fronts, and limited humanitarian aid during the lull. However, from the early hours on Thursday, Houthis continued to launch missiles against Saudi Arabia and deploy snipers targeting civilians across the border, killing and injuring Saudi civilians and Yemeni refugees sheltering in Saudi Arabia.
The rebels intensified their siege and indiscriminate bombardment of Taiz neighborhoods, and turned back UN humanitarian convoys. They repeatedly fired ballistic missiles toward Marib, but were mercifully thwarted by coalition defenses.
In total, Houthis and Saleh militias committed over 1,000 violations during 72 hours of “truce,” just as they ignored the previous four cease-fires, in May 2015, July 2015, December 2015, and April 2016.
It should have been obvious that Houthis had no intention of respecting the latest cease-fire when they failed to publicly acknowledge it in the first place, leaving it to the UN special envoy to do so, unlike the government, which publicly announced its acceptance of the cease-fire.
A more telling indicator was Houthis’ intensification of arms and missile smuggling, by land and by sea, at the same time they were telling the UN that they intended to hand over their weapons and withdraw from the areas they currently occupy, starting with Sanaa, Hodeida and Taiz!
News reports this past week included detailed accounts, based on American, European and Iranian sources, of increased arms smuggling from Iran to Yemen. When Houthis attacked UAE and US ships near Bab Al-Mandab earlier this month, they used guided missiles made in Iran.
Finally, on Oct. 26, rebel leader Abdel Malek Al-Houthi openly called for intensified fighting against the government and the speedy formation of the putsch “government,” effectively aborting UN shuttle diplomacy to end the war.
Why do the rebels continue their futile war even as they continually lose territory to government forces, which now control over 70 percent of Yemen’s territory?
Why do they fail to observe every cease-fire agreement or take part in the De-escalation and Coordination Committee refereed by the UN?
Why do they still defy UN Security Council resolutions demanding that they hand over their weapons, territories they control, and government institutions they have commandeered since September 2014?
And why do they continue to impede delivery of humanitarian assistance to their fellow Yemenis?
I can think of several explanations for these seemingly irrational choices:
First, Houthis may not want peace because it means loss of the main source of their strength — arms, which they utilize to terrorize Yemenis and blackmail the international community into treating them as equals to the internationally recognized government.
Second, they are emboldened by the international community’s reluctance, thus far, to forcibly implement UNSC sanctions and resolutions, including UNSCR 2216 of April 2015, which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, meaning that it can implemented by the use of force.
Third: Houthis have differences with Saleh, their fellow coup partner, as well as difference within the Houthi camp itself, over peace terms. As such, peace could lead to infighting within the rebel camp.
Fourth: Rebels think that they could continue to stonewall, taking advantage of the political paralysis in the US and UN. On Nov. 8, Americans will choose their new president, who will take office on January 20, 2017. There is also change at the top at the UN: On Jan. 1, Antonio Gueterres will become the news Secretary-General. Taking their cue from Syria’s Assad and his supporters, Houthis are trying, without success so far, to strengthen their hand versus the government camp during these transitional times.
Fifth: Iran, the Houthis’ main patron, wants the war in Yemen to continue, even intensify, because instability makes it easier for Iran to interfere directly or through its Hezbollah proxies. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards frequently liken the situation in Yemen to that of Syria and Iraq, where Iran has succeeded in making significant breakthroughs by taking advantage of instability and heightened sectarian conflicts.
These factors may best explain the seemingly irrational conduct of Houthi and Saleh rebels: They are not interested in peace, only biding their time and hoping for some change in their favor in the international community and the battlefield.
* Abdel Aziz Abu Hamad Aluwaisheg is the Assistant Secretary General for Foreign Affairs at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
