Will Gulf states help Baghdad?

In my recently published book, “The Iranian Trap,” I have tried to explain how Iran deceived the United States when it opened talks on nuclear issue and terrorism. America, as we know, does not want Iraq to fall into the hands of a rouge state.
While Iran does not want to keep itself aloof from Iraq fearing Baghdad might act against it as it did in the past and also because it does not want the Islamic State (IS) to wield influence in Baghdad.
In fact, Iran has been thinking of annexing Iraq making it a part of the country, just like what Cyrus did in the 5th century BC. But this is not the only thing that Washington and Tehran differ on.
Iran wants Shiites to rule Iraq and exclude Sunni groups from the echelon of power, while America wants a democratic rule in Iraq with equal rights for all segments of the Iraqi population.
For this reason Americans came back to Iraq with proposals for a greater Sunni involvement in various projects like the establishment of a National Guard comprising 100,000 Sunnis. But Iran and its allies wanted to fool Sunni clans and exploit them to liberate Mosul, the same tactic they once employed to hoodwink the “Sahwa.”
Some Sunni clans were duped into helping Tehran achieve its designs.
Iran believes that a civil war in Iraq or its partition is a threat to its national security and hence it supported Al-Maliki’s government, which enabled Shiites to dominate the armed forces and non-government militias who fought Sunnis when they tried to take control of northern Iraq.
It is worthy to note that with the emergence of IS, Tehran took a U-turn. It wrapped its sectarian agenda in the colorful paper of war on terror to attract the western powers and especially get US support.
Iran in collaboration with the Syrian regime reportedly encouraged Sunni militants to launch attacks on US forces. The Americans fell prey to Iranian plot and started considering Iraqi Sunnis as enemies while Iran encouraged Shiite forces to forge alliance with the Americans to fight Sunnis and to dominate Iraqi politics so as to gain control of Iraq after US withdrawal.
Iran also began to support Shiites in Iraq in order to enable them to take control of the government. It helped Shiites form political networks and established a number of powerful Shiite militias. All these brought Iraq under Iran's control.
Such dirty tactics changed the strategic balance of power in the region in favor of Iran. In this scenario, it became difficult for Iran to retreat from Iraq or to abandon its strategic assets in the war-torn country.
When Mosul fell to IS, Iran provided military assistance to Al-Maliki forces because it wanted to maintain Shiite control over the country.
It was not out of friendship or loyalty that Iran helped Al-Maliki. It was Tehran’s vested interest in Iraq that led it to support Al- Maliki.
Iran dispatched the commander of the Qods Force in the Revolutionary Guard, Qaseem Soleimani, to Baghdad to support Al-Maliki by providing training to Shiite fighters. Iran thus gained the ability to mobilize Shiite militias in Iraq to fight IS and formed the Badr Corps.
It also helped Moqtada Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and many other smaller militias to ensure protection of Shiite shrines and to promote its agenda. The edict issued by Ayatollah Sistani to Shiite militias to join government forces to fight IS also spurred support.
A large numbers of volunteers joined the Iraqi security forces and private Shiite militias to fight the IS. One thing has become clear; Iran will never abandon its sectarian agenda and will never agree to give the Iraqi Sunnis their inalienable rights.
In such a situation, one question has become relevant: Will the Gulf states help Iraq and its Sunni population?
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The writer is head of the Middle East Centre for Strategic and Legal Studies.