US today lacks meaningful leverage in Afghanistan

The fifth anniversary of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan falls on Saturday. Yet, in Washington, one could be forgiven for barely noticing the occasion. Hindsight offers clarity and foreign policy should be no exception. The decision to withdraw all US forces from Afghanistan, and the way it was carried out, looks worse today than it did at the time.

Perhaps this explains why few in Washington want to revisit it. Afghanistan was a bipartisan debacle. During his first term, President Donald Trump was determined to end America’s “forever wars.” His administration negotiated directly with the Taliban and signed the February 2020 Doha agreement, under which foreign forces were to leave Afghanistan by May 2021. When President Joe Biden entered office, he postponed the deadline by a few months but otherwise continued down the path set by his predecessor. Dislike of the Afghan mission was perhaps the one thing that united Trump and Biden.

Biden had long opposed a large US presence there. During the Obama administration’s 2009 Afghanistan review, then-Vice President Biden argued for a smaller mission focused on counterterrorism. Meanwhile, others such as then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Mike Mullen instead supported a surge-style approach like the strategy that had proved effective in Iraq.

When Biden entered the White House in January 2021, only 2,500 US troops remained in Afghanistan. America continued to provide critical funding and support to Afghan security forces, including air support. American casualties during this period were minimal, while the financial burden of the military mission, in relative terms, was near its lowest level in almost two decades. The irony is that Biden inherited something close to the limited footprint he had advocated for years earlier. Yet he chose complete withdrawal.

The departure from Bagram Airfield in early July 2021 served as the beginning of the disaster soon to unfold

Luke Coffey

Biden later argued that his hands were tied by Trump’s agreement with the Taliban. That was never convincing. His administration reversed or discarded many Trump-era policies. It could have changed course in Afghanistan as well. It chose not to.

The fall of Kabul in the summer of 2021 was not inevitable. No one should pretend that 2,500 American troops, allied forces and continued financial support were enough to bring every corner of Afghanistan under Kabul’s control. But their presence did prevent the Taliban from taking over the whole country, as it later did.

The departure from Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night in early July 2021 served as the beginning of the disaster soon to unfold. But it did not have to be this way. And the Taliban takeover was not guaranteed that summer. Despite years of offensives and almost two decades of fighting, the Taliban had never been able to seize and hold a single provincial capital for any extended period. After the US departure from Bagram, however, the Taliban began capturing provincial capitals in rapid succession. Zaranj, the first provincial capital to fall, was captured on Aug. 6. Kabul fell on Aug. 15. Within weeks, a 20-year Western effort had collapsed.

The consequences did not end at Afghanistan’s borders. In August 2021, the world watched desperate Afghans cling to departing aircraft as the US scrambled to evacuate Kabul. Only six months later, Russian tanks crossed into Ukraine. America’s adversaries saw disorder and indecision. Allies questioned American resolve. Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade had many causes, but the perception of US weakness almost certainly informed his timing. The road to Kyiv, in that sense, first passed through Kabul.

Afghanistan has also again become a concern for transnational terrorism. UN reporting warns about the presence of Al-Qaeda, Daesh, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and other Central Asian extremist organizations operating from Afghanistan. Whatever the Taliban claim about preventing Afghan territory from threatening other countries, the concentration of such groups should concern the region.

Russia, China and regional powers have expanded their engagement while Washington’s influence has diminished

Luke Coffey

Taliban rule has also contributed to worsening relations with Pakistan. Islamabad accuses the Taliban authorities of harboring Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan militants responsible for attacks against Pakistani security forces and government targets. Against the backdrop of the Pakistan-India rivalry — and New Delhi’s growing engagement with the Taliban — the potential for wider regional instability should not be dismissed.

The greatest tragedy, however, is borne by ordinary Afghans. Humanitarian needs remain enormous. Taliban restrictions have complicated international assistance. Natural disasters, economic isolation and declining donor attention have compounded the suffering. Girls remain barred from secondary and higher education, women face sweeping restrictions on public life, and religious and ethnic minorities continue to live under pressure.

The US, after investing lives, treasure and two decades of effort in Afghanistan, now lacks meaningful leverage inside the country. Many Afghans who worked alongside Americans remain displaced or uncertain about their futures. Terrorist networks remain active. Russia, China and regional powers have expanded their engagement while Washington’s influence has diminished.

Five years later, policymakers should acknowledge what went wrong. Afghanistan before 2021 was deeply flawed. There were serious problems with corruption in the government. The security situation remained stable but fragile. And no one on either side could credibly claim victory. But it is equally difficult to argue that today’s Afghanistan better serves American interests.

Next month, the US will mark the 25th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, which were planned by Al-Qaeda from its sanctuary provided by the Taliban. A quarter of a century later, the Taliban controls more of Afghanistan than it did on Sept. 11, 2001. That fact alone should force reflection.

Leaving Afghanistan in the manner the US did was a strategic mistake. It weakened America’s position, abandoned hard-earned leverage, emboldened adversaries and exposed Afghans to a brutal regime. This could all have been avoided.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

X: @LukeDCoffey