Turkiye refuses to fall into Israeli playbook on Syria

Israeli airstrikes at Abu Al-Duhur airbase in northern Syria on Tuesday were one of countless attacks it has carried out in the country. However, this time the strike crossed a significant threshold in Turkish-Israeli tensions over Syria, as it came after a Turkish delegation visited the site, just 70 km from the Turkish border.
The pretext used by Israel for the attack was the same it has used for others across the region: to eliminate a threat to its security. In a statement, Tel Aviv said Syria “was on the verge of breaching” the security status quo, accusing Damascus of allowing Turkish troops to deploy to the airbase.
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani said he had made clear to Israel that there were no plans to establish a Turkish military base at Abu Al-Duhur, adding that Turkish military officers had visited the base as part of “ongoing military cooperation in the areas of training and the exchange of expertise.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that his intention was clear with the attack, but that “they didn’t quite understand the message.” I think Turkiye quite well understands what Netanyahu is trying to achieve with these actions — and that is precisely why it has avoided falling into the Israeli playbook.
Ankara calmly downplayed the Israeli provocation by framing it as an election stunt by Netanyahu. Israel is approaching an election, and the Netanyahu government is deliberately escalating regional tensions for political purposes. Escalation has become a campaign tool, allowing the Israeli leader to create new fronts in the region, and rally domestic support. Ankara appears well aware of this strategy.
Since the fall of the Assad regime, Israel has emerged as one of the key threats confronting the new leadership and the country’s unity. Israel is naturally concerned because, for years, it has enjoyed considerable freedom to operate in Syrian airspace and carry out military interventions with limited constraints. It does not want to give that up. So, Ankara’s determined support for Damascus has become a major issue for Israel, which increasingly sees Syria as a potential flashpoint for confrontation with Ankara. Turkiye has maintained a military presence in Syria for years. The question is: Why is Israel now viewing it as a “threat”? 

Ankara downplayed the Israeli provocation.

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Turkish-Israeli tensions over Syria are rooted in their competing visions for the country. Both have fundamentally different ambitions.
Turkiye wants to see a strong, centralized authority in Damascus that is capable of addressing the country’s political, economic, and security issues. It also wants to see a functioning Syrian army.
From Ankara’s perspective, Syria requires a regular, capable military able to counter threats to its territorial integrity and internal stability. Achieving this, however, has necessitated joint training arrangements between Turkish and Syrian forces. In August 2025, Ankara and Damascus signed a new defense pact, which involves training the army. Turkish-Syrian military cooperation is entirely legal. So why does it bother Israel?
Simply because Israel does not want to see Syria develop a strong military capability. Tel Aviv has also done everything in its power to prevent Turkiye from establishing an airbase in Syria, previously bombing some locations considered potential sites, for example.
Turkiye also supports the integration of Syria into regional economic connectivity plans, and views the country as an important hub in broader regional trade and infrastructure networks. Therefore, restoring Syria’s infrastructure is one of the main goals. Israel, however, is concerned that Syria could become a regional connectivity hub, particularly if these networks develop in ways that bypass Israel.
Turkiye, along with Saudi Arabia, used its influence in Washington to support the lifting of sanctions on Syria and facilitate the country’s economic reintegration. Israel, meanwhile, has been using its influence in the US to argue that the Syrian government is not yet a sufficiently trustworthy partner.
Ankara also wants Syria to become part of a broader regional framework in which neighboring and Gulf states coordinate their efforts to support the country’s recovery. Israel, on the other hand, appears to be working to promote divisions among the Gulf states and prevent the emergence of a unified regional approach toward Syria. From a regional perspective, Turkish-Gulf cooperation — particularly with Saudi Arabia through the Mecca Agreement — concerns Israel. More importantly, the future joint capabilities of these countries represent Tel Aviv’s real concern.
Turkiye supported Damascus in the integration of Kurds into Syria’s domestic political and institutional framework. Israel, by contrast, has sought to prevent such an integration by playing the Kurdish card. However, this proved unsuccessful. Rather than aligning with Israel’s regional agenda, the Kurds in Syria decided to reach an agreement with the central government in Damascus. This was a huge win for both Damascus and Ankara, and a major loss for Israel, as it consolidated the government’s control over the northeast of the country and eliminated possible tensions in the future.
The gap between Turkish and Israeli visions for Syria is wide, and appears to be growing wider, with the two countries involved in a cold war over the issue. Nevertheless, a conventional conflict between the two is seen unlikely because, even though Israel is governed by irrational people, attacking a NATO member is out of the question.
However, the absence of a conventional war does not rule out accidental incidents or unintended escalation. This is precisely the issue Washington is currently trying to address through the establishment of a de-escalation mechanism. This brings to mind the Astana peace process, through which Iran, Russia, and Turkiye developed mechanisms to manage their conflicting interests in Syria.
Therefore, a mechanism is needed to contain Israel’s increasingly destructive policy in Syria, and Washington has a critical role to play in this regard. Damascus and Ankara, for their part, appear determined to continue working toward a stronger and more stable Syria.

• Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East.
X: @SinemCngz