The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is back in the news, once again held hostage to the rivalry between India and Pakistan. On the eve of a visit by the Nepalese premier, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hinted at scuttling the association’s summit meeting, which is due to be hosted by Pakistan in 2018. Islamabad has reacted in a similar vein.

The last time the leaders of the member countries met was in August 2016 at the 19th SAARC ministerial summit. Even then, the gathering witnessed a clash between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Pakistan and India frowned at each other over a tribute by Nawaz Sharif, prime minister of Pakistan at the time, to the Kashmiri fighter Burhan Wani. Indian Interior Minister Rajnath Singh said: “Terrorists should not be glorified as martyrs. There is no good or bad terrorism. Terrorism is terrorism.”

Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, then the Pakistani interior minister and host of the ministerial summit, relinquished the chairman’s seat to respond to Delhi’s emissary: “We also need to look at the genesis of terrorism, and resolution of unresolved disputes is the only way ahead to address these deep fissures that have evolved over decades.” Subsequently, the Indian delegation skipped the prime minister’s receptions for his counterparts and other dignitaries attending the conference.

The hyped-up expectations, largely propelled by the United States, are disconnected with the realities on the ground. The South Asian multilateral forum was conceived with a very timid and low-profile mandate. The idea evolved after Bangladesh made a formal proposal to create a regional union in 1981. Neither of the two major regional countries responded encouragingly. On the one hand, Pakistan was overwhelmed by the Afghan issues it was dealing with, and on the other, there was Indira Gandhi’s combative posturing on the eastern front. Delhi was deeply alarmed at Islamabad’s determined pursuit of nuclear power.

Nonetheless, proposals for a regional forum came to fruition in December 1985 and SAARC — comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka — was established. While all its decisions must be taken unanimously, article X(2) of its charter specifically excluded bilateral and contentious issues from the association’s ambit.

Whoever authored SAARC charter must be an idealist to have believed the forum could survive in isolation from the ecosystem of conflict, mistrust and historical acrimony.

Though itself allergic to any direct or indirect references to disputed Jammu and Kashmir, India has talked on many occasions at SAARC gatherings against Pakistan, in the guise of condemning terrorism after 9/11. The atmosphere since has remained far from pleasant.

Afghanistan joined SAARC as its eighth member on April 3, 2007. By any measure, Kabul had little in common with South Asia. The landlocked country belongs to Central Asia, through its deep cultural, historic and ethnic bonds. Like Pakistan, it shares more with the larger Middle East than with South Asia. 

SAARC has acted as a platform for summit-level political interaction and important, but limited, technical-level multilateral interactions. Ambitious goals such as regional free trade and visa-free travel remain too far-fetched, given the deep-rooted mistrust and active sources of conflict. 

The regional grouping fell victim to an assortment of unrealistic expectations, ranging from the US fantasy of India-Afghanistan trade, to Delhi’s aggressive tone against Islamabad on Kashmir and terrorism, and the lack of any tangible benefits from the bloc for Pakistan.

Whoever authored SAARC charter must be an idealist to have believed the forum could survive in isolation from the ecosystem of conflict, mistrust and historical acrimony.

NAVEED AHMAD

Realistically speaking, SAARC has had its day and now rests among other obsolete unions, such as the Warsaw Pact, the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. At best, it can perhaps continue to survive as a seasonal forum, like the Non-Aligned Movement and the Developing-8.

India’s lack of interest in SAARC is well thought out. In 2016, India revived the previously ignored Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Originally formed in 1997, the group — comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand — aspires “to harness shared and accelerated growth through mutual cooperation in different areas of common interests by mitigating the onslaught of globalization and by utilizing regional resources and geographical advantages.”

Emulating China’s “One Road One Belt” development strategy, which focuses on connectivity and cooperation, India seeks to build logistical arteries stretching from Myanmar to Thailand for the transport of cargo by road and rail. With technical assistance from the Asian Development Bank, 30 road projects will be completed at a cost of $8 billion in the next five years, a minuscule achievement in relation to China’s investment in the same region.

Given the vast disparity in economies and tariff issues, BIMSTEC has some daunting bureaucratic mountains to climb. Meanwhile, Iran’s Chabahar port has emerged as an alternate location for India’s trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia. However, sanctions-marred Tehran has limited scope as an engine for global trade and commerce.

Since the dismemberment of East Pakistan, Islamabad has had little to look forward to in South Asia. Historically and culturally, it has more in common with central-Asian states and Middle Eastern countries than Bhutan and Nepal, or even India.

With the rise of China, Pakistan is more keen to revive its links with central Asia than with South Asia. An assertive Saudi Arabia, and its interest in Gwadar Port and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is more enticing for Islamabad than an almost four-decade-old regional bloc from which it has little to show.

For Islamabad, the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) offers the promise SAARC lacked. Through it, Beijing and Islamabad are connecting the other eight landlocked central-Asian members, including Afghanistan, to the Arabian Sea. Besides, CAREC connects Pakistan with Eurasia. Beijing has already proposed extending the CPEC to Afghanistan as well.

Given the current weak performance of SAARC, BIMSTEC and CAREC are counterweights for India and Pakistan in the truest sense of the word. However, one is marred by a dearth of development funding, the other by elusive peace in Afghanistan. 

• Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist and academic based in the GCC with a career in writing on diplomacy, security and governance. Besides other honors, he won the Jefferson Fellowship in 2000 and UNAOC Cross-Cultural Reporting Award 2010. Twitter: @naveed360