I write this week from Norway, where the annual Oslo Forum’s participants followed closely Geneva consultations on Yemen. Even before the UN announced late Friday their failure, most Oslo participants were pessimistic: Not only was the gap between the parties too wide but the terms of reference and goals of the consultations were unclear. Most seriously, Houthi representatives appeared uncompromising, if not delusional.

The UN began its Yemen mediation over three years ago, but was unable to stop its descent into the abyss, leading some Yemenis to blame the organization for the worsening crisis. Before the UN intensified its mediation efforts in 2012, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had played that role, starting in April 2011, when it adopted the GCC Initiative, in coordination with Yemen’s government and opposition groups. As such, GCC performed a role consistent with the UN Charter; Chapter Eight was dedicated to empowering regional organizations to deal with regional conflicts, instead of directly referring them to the UN Security Council.

The GCC Initiative struck a compromise that ended months of demonstrations, against which Yemen’s former strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh used excessive force, killing hundreds of unarmed demonstrators. Yemen made steady progress under the GCC Initiative. Saleh was persuaded to cede power to a transitional national-unity government headed by President Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who was elected in February 2012. Its function was to manage the National Dialogue, draft a new constitution and hold presidential and parliamentary elections.

The National Dialogue Conference lasted 10 months during which the Houthis, Saleh’s loyalists and other political forces took part. The final outcomes represented a robust and negotiated consensus on all important issues.

During that transition period, the UN took over the mediator’s role. At the start, there was close coordination with Yemen’s government and other relevant stakeholders. Later, there was less coordination, and then there was none.

Although Houthis were part of the National Dialogue, they failed to live up to its decisions. Soon after its conclusion in early 2014, they, in alliance with former President Saleh, started their violent march southward from their Saada stronghold. They overran villages and towns, committing massacres and crimes against humanity in the process, seizing civil and military government institutions and plundering their contents.

On Sept. 21, 2014, Houthis took over Sanaa, but the UN dialogue continued. Although the UNSC repeatedly censured the Houthis, UN mediators were unable to persuade them to withdraw from the capital. Instead, UN-mediated dialogue focused on Houthi demands to set up a presidential council to replace the elected president.

The so-called “Movenpick dialogue” continued even after Houthis detained President Hadi, his prime minister and top officials and put them under house arrest.

Instead of pressuring Houthis to release them and hand over the weapons they had plundered, dialogue continued on Houthi ideas about forming presidential and national councils through which they could rule Yemen.

In February 2015, it became clear that the Houthi-Saleh alliance had used dialogue to achieve narrow partisan ends and challenge the legitimate government. Although the dialogue was formally a UN process, Houthi control over the capital and the hotel where talks took place, not to mention their threats and attacks against their opponents, meant that the dialogue was run by them.

After President Hadi escaped from detention and moved to Aden, UN talks continued, ignoring the legitimate government, even as Houthis sent jet fighters to bomb the presidential compound in Aden. Dialogue finally stopped after all key political forces, except Houthis and Saleh loyalists, withdrew from it.

From Aden, Hadi called for an all-inclusive conference in Riyadh. On April 14, UNSC resolution 2216 welcomed the idea and urged all Yemeni groups to attend the moot.

Some parties sought to hold a UN-sponsored meeting before the Riyadh Conference could convene, but that did not succeed. But when the newly appointed UN Yemen envoy gave his speech at the Riyadh Conference on May 17, his focus was clearly on the Geneva talks, instead of supporting Yemen’s own efforts at the Riyadh Conference.

Houthis wanted Geneva to resurrect the Movenpick dialogue, where they set the agenda and terms of reference. The government sought to focus the talks, being UN-sponsored, on implementing the UN’s own resolutions, in particular 2216, which was adopted under Chapter 7, mandating Houthi withdrawal from all areas they occupied and release of prisoners, including some top officials.

Considering Houthi’s delusional positions and UN’s inability to persuade them otherwise, it came as no surprise that Geneva talks could not make any headway. What is most important now is for the UN to restore its own credibility by implementing its own decisions, especially UNSC Resolution 2216, instead of reengaging in endless Byzantine debates. It should take robust action against any party blocking its implementation, in particular the Houthis and Saleh.