It has become obvious that Washington has failed in brokering a deal between the Palestinians and the Israelis. For almost two years, these peace talks remained US Secretary of State John Kerry’s top priority in the Middle East. He visited the region several times but failed to get the two sides agree on a framework proposal.
Observers of the peace process argue that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are ready for a final peace agreement. For instance, Aaron David Miller, a former senior US negotiator, argues that both sides to the conflict do not have a sense of urgency. For Miller, Netanyahu is more interested in maintaining Israeli security in a tumultuous region. Hence, any genuine attempt to resolve the conflict will not be met by seriousness on the Israeli side. But Miller also blames the Palestinians for not moving on with the peace talks. In his words, Abbas “probably wants an agreement but doesn’t have the capacity to deliver one.”
Casting aside the American ineffective role in peacemaking, one should examine the dynamics of failures within the domestic political environment in both Israel and Palestine.
In Israel, for instance, politicians from across the political spectrum can hardly think of a productive peace process. For them, political survival assumes the first priority. Commenting on this particular point, Miller argues that one needs “leaders who are masters of their political houses, not prisoners of their political constituencies.” Implicit in such argument is the need for politicians to transcend the requirements for political survival for the sake of peace.
In fact, Rabin would not have been able to sign the Oslo agreement had he allowed the peace process to be held hostage to internal political developments and imperatives.
A close look at the Israeli policies reveals that Israel may lack the sense of urgency. It is in the best interest of Israel to reach a final deal with the Palestinians. As transpired, the end goal of a possible deal between Israel and the Palestinians will be to avert the scenario of a bi-national state. At this moment, the ratio of Palestinians and Jews who dwell in the area that stretches between the Mediterranean and the River Jordan is almost the same. Short of a deal with the Palestinians, Israel will then have to deal with an emerging scenario whereby Israel will be an apartheid state. The only way to preempt such a scenario is by reaching a two-state solution. This reality makes one wonder as why the Israelis do not move quickly on the peace track.
Interestingly enough, Palestinians do not feel that they have to do anything. All they can do is to wait for the United States to step in and force Israel to meet their minimum demands. Although it is easier said than done, it does not seem that the Palestinians cannot accept any deal short of a two-state solution.
Against this backdrop, it seems that the American administration is caught, to use Miller’s line, between “a two-state solution that the administration feels is simply too important to abandon and a two-state solution that simply can’t be implemented.”
But, what the American administration can do? When former Secretary of State James Baker was stuck in a similar dilemma, he withdrew from the process and told the Israeli to give him a call when they would be ready.
Of course, Kerry can just do that. He can tell the Palestinians and the Israelis to call him once they are ready for peace. But, it may be too late. All indicators show that the prospects of a two-state solution are diminishing. This new reality will pose difficult questions that neither the Israelis nor the Americans will be capable of answering. It is much easier to blame this side or that side for the failure of Kerry’s efforts in mediation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Yet, this will not benefit any party if they all lose the sense of urgency. One can imagine how a retreated America can protect its interests in the dysfunctional region if a two-state solution fail to materialize in the years to come.
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