India is increasingly tilting toward Japan, but the question is whether New Delhi is being strategically correct when there is a huge China factor involved.
In other words, the question is whether India can afford to increase its strategic proximity with Japan at the expense of China?
A complex interplay of geopolitics is being played among Asia’s top three economies — China, Japan and India, in that order. This triangular relationship came to the fore when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited India just a few days ago.
In less than past one decade, Japan has emerged as India’s greatest friend. Well, the much bandied about terminology “strategic partnership” would be an understatement to describe the India-Japan friendship.
Almost a decade ago, the Japanese had told the Indians how much they abhor the term “strategic partnership” and told the Indians that the conservative Japanese society believes in truly transforming relations with a friendly foreign country like India but does not believe in the term “strategic partnership.” That’s why the two sides described the Indo-Japanese ties as “strategic and global partnership.”
The “global partnership” bit was in full flow when Abe and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi made it known that their partnership was truly global and they referred to China’s soft underbelly, the South China Sea, in direct and unambiguous terms.
For example, the joint statement after the Abe-Modi summit in New Delhi on Dec. 12 made several references to the South China Sea. Significantly, for the first time ever in the history of India-Japan engagement, the two sides announced that their “special strategic and global partnership” encompasses the world with a deep focus on “Indo-Pacific,” euphemism for South China Sea.
Consider the following quotable quotes from the joint statement issued after the Modi-Abe talks.
1. The two Prime Ministers reiterated their unwavering commitment to realize a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. India and Japan uphold the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; democracy, human rights and the rule of law; open global trade regime; and freedom of navigation and overflight.
2. They underscored the importance of international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and peaceful resolution of disputes without use or threat of use of force; freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in international waters. (This point is a subtle reference to China-Philippine boundary dispute in which Philippine has invoked UNCLOS.)
3. In view of critical importance of the sea lanes of communications in the South China Sea for regional energy security and trade and commerce, which underpins continued peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific, the two leaders noting the developments in the South China Sea called upon all states to avoid unilateral actions that could lead to tensions in the region. They were of the view that full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and early conclusion of the negotiations to establish a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea by consensus will contribute to peace and stability of the region. They decided to hold regular close consultations on the issues related to maritime safety and security of sea lanes of communication.
These three points in the India-Japan joint statement are enough to jolt China in a big way. And indeed that has happened.
China has cried foul. Its foreign office spokesman Hong Lei justified Beijing’s activities in SCS region and said: “We hope countries outside the region respect the efforts of regional countries in maintaining peace and stability of South China Sea, instead of doing the opposite.”
This brings us to the million-dollar question whether the Modi government is playing its cards right in its East Asia policy. While the Modi government is doing the right thing in forging a very close strategic partnership with Japan, it must keep in consideration India’s ties with China too.
While it looks good to an average Indian that India is asserting itself and taking on China in the international power matrix, it is equally essential that India’s increasing bonhomie with Japan does not come at the expense of China.
Yes, Japan’s proactive engagement in India’s growth story can bring laurels to India in general and Modi in particular, the Modi government needs to remain sensitized to what animosity with China can result into.
Or to put in other words, improving relations with Japan does not, and must not, mean that it comes at the expense of India’s relations with a contiguous and nuclear-armed neighbor like China with which it has fought a war.
