Turkey and Russia’s Idlib deal offers only false hope

With all the congratulations and optimism expressed regarding the Turkish-Russian agreement to set up a “demilitarized zone” in Idlib, the fact that a “de-escalation zone” in the Syrian province was already in place seems to have been largely and conveniently forgotten. The lexicon for cease-fires in the Syrian conflict has grown yet again, and there is a reason this keeps happening: To mask failures by simply renaming them. 

The architects of the demilitarized zone were also behind the establishment of the de-escalation zone. The Turkish and Russian presidents are being hailed for averting a full-scale assault on rebel-held Idlib by the Assad regime, yet the very need for a demilitarized zone highlights the failure of their de-escalation zone.

The irony is that Moscow actively violated and undermined the de-escalation zone it helped set up, and allowed the Assad regime to do so as well. Had that not been the case, a demilitarized zone would not be necessary. As has happened since Russia’s direct involvement in the Syrian conflict began in 2015, the arsonist is being praised as a firefighter.

There are major obstacles to the establishment of the demilitarized zone by mid-October, let alone its success, but assessing the latter depends on one’s interpretation of Moscow’s motives. It is preposterous to believe that they include a sincere desire to spare Idlib’s civilian population a bloodbath and a humanitarian catastrophe. After all, Russia has played an integral role in the slaughter, displacement and subjugation of the Syrian people, both directly and by supporting the Assad regime. 

Syrian President Bashar Assad’s staunchest allies and direct participants in the conflict — Russia, Iran and Hezbollah — have openly and unflinchingly backed and advanced his repeatedly expressed goal of retaking the entire country. This vow has been reiterated since the Turkish-Russian agreement.

If the deal thwarted that goal, Moscow would not have agreed to it, and Damascus, Tehran and Hezbollah would not have welcomed it. As such, it is wishful thinking to believe that the agreement has placed Idlib out of Assad’s grasp indefinitely — it has merely delayed that goal for strategic reasons. 

Those who would describe this view as unfairly pessimistic need only look at how the Assad regime and its allies have used and flouted previous cease-fires and their myriad iterations to further their aim of total victory. 

Their acceptance of the demilitarized zone, which came as a surprise following months of increasing bellicosity and dismissals of Turkish diplomacy to avert an assault, was likely forced on them by Ankara’s recent maneuvers in Idlib. Instead of accepting a fait accompli, Turkey beefed up its military presence in the province and reportedly increased weapons supplies to rebel groups that it supports there.

Ankara’s actions may have had a sobering effect on Moscow, which would want to minimize the potential for military clashes with a country with which it has carefully cultivated a rapprochement since 2016. 

Russia accepted, as a fundamental part of its agreement with Turkey, a proposal that the latter had been floating for months with seemingly little interest from the Kremlin: The flushing out of extremist groups from Idlib. And the deal stipulates that Turkish observation posts in the province “will be fortified.” This may look like a climb down by Moscow, but it may have calculated a way to turn this to its advantage and that of its allies in Syria.

Under the agreement, Turkey is responsible for removing “all radical terrorist groups” from the demilitarized zone by Oct. 15, and for removing all heavy weaponry on the rebel side of the zone by Oct. 10. But it is unclear exactly which groups are to be removed (Russia’s definition of terrorist groups is broader than Turkey’s), where they would be sent, and whether they would be willing to cooperate. 

Whether they cooperate or are forced out will not matter to Russia — either way, it will be Ankara doing the work that Moscow and its allies in Syria would have otherwise done. The agreement has made Turkey a security subcontractor to Moscow and Damascus in Idlib, with the potential for direct conflict between Ankara-backed rebels and extremist groups, which the Assad regime and its allies would relish.

And, if Turkey is unable to fulfil these difficult tasks in such a short space of time (a little more than a fortnight from now), Moscow could claim that it gave diplomacy a chance, and that its failure has made an assault on Idlib unavoidable. By the time such an assault takes place, with powerful extremist groups dislodged, divided or at war with Turkish-backed rebels, Idlib would be a softer target for the Assad regime and its allies. 

The Syrian conflict has been a graveyard for all manner of cease-fire agreements that were celebrated at the time. There is no reason to believe that the fate of this latest one will be any different.

• Sharif Nashashibi is an award-winning journalist and commentator on Arab affairs. Twitter: @sharifnash