THE Russian military intervention in Syria raises a host of questions over the real motives behind this decision. There are two aspects of this intervention. One is political — for security reasons — and the other commercial.

The aim of this article is to analyze the first aspect, which can be summarized in three main points.

First and foremost, Moscow aims to contain the emergence of Daesh in the northern Caucasus. Putin’s statements about fighting the growing threat of Daesh, therefore, cannot be ruled out as exaggeration. We cannot turn a blind eye to Daesh’s reach and active penetration in northern Caucasus i.e. Chechnya and Dagestan.

It is also a matter of great concern that numerous “Mujahedeen of the Caucasus” from Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria have reportedly pledged allegiance to Daesh.

On Oct. 12, 2015, the Russian security forces announced the arrest of a terrorist group that was allegedly planning attacks in Moscow. According to Moscow, they were trained in Daesh camps in Syria.

In an interview on CBS news channel, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that more than 2,000 militants from the former Soviet Union were fighting in Syria. A study conducted by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs shows that the Mujahedeen of the Caucasus in Syria are divided into three main groups: Jaish Al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, which is one of the most prominent fighting groups in Syria that have joined Daesh under the leadership of Abu Omar Al- Shishani; Saif Al Deen Al-Shishani, which split from Jaish Al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar and pledged allegiance to Al-Nusra Front in late 2013; and Jund Al-Sham, an organization affiliated to “Caucasus Emirate” that is made up of independent groups that militarily coordinate with Al-Nusra Front and Daesh under the leadership of Abu Waleed (known as Muslim Al-Shishani).

Therefore, Russia is concerned that these Chechen groups may, upon their return from Syria, launch terrorist attacks in Russia and cause chaos, in a repeat of what occurred following the war in Afghanistan. Secondly, the military intervention was an attempt to fill a void in the region. This has been encouraged by the indecision of Obama administration over the Syrian issue. In an article published by Foreign Policy Magazine, Julia Iffoe writes: “Russia’s game plan in Syria is simple. It is simply filling the void left behind by the US… The growth of Russian influence is directly proportional to the decline of American influence in the region.”

Thirdly, it was an attempt to limit Iran’s role. I do not believe there was Russian-Iranian coordination in the recent intervention rather there was a silent cold competition. Following the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1, semi-openness, rapprochement and mutual understanding of Iran with the US on some issues, Russian attitude toward Iran has changed and its concerns regarding Iran’s growing role in Syria and hegemony over Syria have risen.

In a recent meeting between the Russian deputy foreign minister and the Syrian ambassador, the former reportedly stated bluntly, “We are fed up with your games! Tell your boss either to be with us or with the Iranians.”

This reflects how competitive Moscow and Tehran have become with respect to Syria. Thus, Russia intervened in order to limit the growth of Iran’s Shiite militias, thereby allowing Russia to play the Syrian card to impose a political settlement that may increase its influence and serve its interests.

In addition to that, through its deployment on the Syrian coast, Russia wanted to prevent Iran from having control over the Mediterranean and this was indeed followed by immediate withdrawal of the Shiite militia from there.

Finally, there is no single dimension to perceive the international political complications and to interpret the behavior of actors in the international arena.