Indian Premier Narendra Modi dropping Maldives from his four “Indian Ocean-nation” sojourn may well signal the untimely demise of his dream to restore the sanctity of South Asian bloc by rebooting a sagging intra-state relations between SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) member countries.
Though Modi’s visit was apparently “postponed on mutual agreement to give time for both governments to prepare,” there is definitely more to this decision than meets the eye. After all, it was none other than Maldives Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon, who announced Modi’s trip to the scenic Indian Ocean archipelago during her bilateral talks with Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, held in New Delhi in February. What went so drastically wrong that within a few weeks’ time the same Dunya sniped back at India’s criticism over former Maldivian President Mohammed Nasheed’s heavy-handed arrest?
Maldives will not take instructions from a foreign government on domestic issues, declared Dunya curtly. Many analysts see a surreptitious China hand in the harsh treatment meted out to an overtly pro-India Nasheed and Maldivian foreign minister’s subsequent snubbing of the Indian leadership. The way Nasheed was manhandled by law enforcers, can there be any doubt whatsoever that the present Maldivian leadership is exhibiting a unique dictatorial trait that resembles China’s very own method of muzzling public dissent?
“I call on the Maldivian public to do everything necessary to stop the arrest and harassment of myself and other politicians to save the Maldives,” appealed a shaken Nasheed while being whisked away to Dhoonidhoo prison islet after his arrest under anti-terrorism laws for allegedly ordering the detention of a senior judge in 2012 that triggered violence. Perhaps, a cornered Nasheed, severely criticized for attacking the judiciary during his tenure, alluded to a civil insurrection for dislodging the ruling Yameen regime so that he can claw his way back from a dead-end to the corridors of power.
This author understands that India may not be averse to stoking the latent insecurities and frustrations — arising from an unstable political order — existing within the Maldivian society to usher in a regime change. This, the Indian leadership believes, will help restore India’s strategic influence over the island state. Sources privy to Modi government’s strategic decision-making, vis-à-vis regional security, reveals that New Delhi manipulated the ouster of former Maldivian Defense Minister Mohammed Nazim after Indian intelligence provided a grim review of Yameen regime’s internal dynamics. Nazim, who held multiple portfolios simultaneously, called the shots amid rumors about President Yameen’s ill-health.
Besides, Nazim, having trained in Pakistan’s premier infantry school in Quetta, is reportedly allergic to India and strongly advocated militarization of Maldivian foreign policy. This influential politician wanted his country to favor China over India — despite New Delhi’s quick response to the 2014 drinking water crisis in Male — as it means a stronger Chinese military presence and huge investment opportunities for the tiny island country. Also, a section of India’s security establishment is of the firm opinion that Beijing, having lost the plot in Sri Lanka with Mahinda Rajapaksa’s resounding electoral defeat, has fixed its eyes on a strategically located Maldives. The Chinese leadership fears that New Delhi might next use Maldives to influence China’s maritime trade in the Indian Ocean region. Situated adjacent to one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, Maldives remains the centerpiece of a tug-of-war between India and China. The sea-lanes in Indian Ocean, a critical waterway for global trade and commerce, are seen as life-saving arteries of the Asian economies.
More importantly, China exclusively depends on this region to ship crude oil from Gulf and Maldives remaining in India’s strategic sphere essentially means that in conflict scenario New Delhi can easily switch-off oil flow to Chinese ports, thus neutralizing Beijing’s military advantage over India. China desperately wants to break into the formidable Indo-Maldives strategic, economic and military relationship, which got a boost after India’s military intervention in 1988 to foil a coup attempt against Maumoon Gayoom.
In fact, Beijing’s wariness stems from the fact that India is all over Maldives, having her presence in almost every aspect of Maldivian life. Moreover, Maldives is one of the largest recipients of Indian foreign aid and has effectively turned into an extended part of India’s security grid in the Indian Ocean region over the years because of informal India-Maldives-Sri Lanka-Seychelles-Mauritius maritime security cooperation. Above all, successive Maldivian governments have consciously facilitated greater anti-piracy surveillance of Indian Ocean by Indian naval ships and aircraft. These military assets of India also patrol Maldivian waters to protect its exclusive economic zone. The depth of the relationship can be gauged from the fact that security experts from India are helping Maldivian National Defense Forces with capacity building apart from imparting training to Maldivian defense personnel.
For Modi, Maldives is a complicated diplomatic challenge that needs deft handling. India’s smaller neighbors now seek to maximize their strategic leverage, as they are loath to remain as vassal states in perpetuity. With Beijing luring Maldives to participate in the ambitious maritime silk route project and Maldivian domestic political process tottering toward uncertainty, India must find the right balance to maintain regional peace, promote constitutional democracy in the neighborhood and ensure that her neighbors does not turn hostile.
