The Iraqi government has initiated plans to recapture the western governorate of Al-Anbar, most of which has been under Islamic State (IS) control for more than a year. Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi announced that the next mission for the army, after the liberation of Tikrit last month, will be to clear IS militants from Al-Anbar. The decision to launch the operation will be taken within the coming days or weeks. But if clearing the small city of Tikrit took more than three weeks to complete — some say it would have taken more if it were not for the US-led coalition’s air cover — the battle for Al-Anbar will prove to be more difficult and costly.
Covering an area of more than 140,000 sq. km. of sparsely populated desert that extends from the banks of the Euphrates in the east to borders with Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia in the west, northwest and southwest, Al-Anbar is known for its tough Sunni tribes. With a population of about 1.5 million, Al-Anbar represents the western gateway to Baghdad, with major highways going through it linking Iraq’s capital to Amman and Damascus.
After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Al-Anbar emerged as a major military challenge for the US army; i.e. the battle of Fallujah. After the fall of Saddam Hussein the governorate became a base for former Baathists, extremists and eventually Al-Qaeda militants and other insurgents; all opposed to foreign occupation. The bombing of Fallujah by US troops is still remembered as one of the bloodiest episodes of the US occupation of Iraq.
Between 2005 and 2008, Gen. David Petraeus created the Anbar Awakening groups from Sunni volunteers, which became a force of more than 50,000 and was instrumental in chasing out Al-Qaeda fighters from the governorate.
But when Awakenings fighters were handed over to the Iraqi government in 2008, former Prime Minister Nuri Al- Maliki was quick to disband them for fear that they would launch an insurgency against the Shiite-led rule. Later on he ignored demands and calls by Sunni chiefs that they be included in the army and have a fair share in government.
This led to mass protest in 2013, which Al-Maliki crushed using force. It is this feeling of betrayal by Baghdad that is thought to have facilitated the quick infiltration by IS militants of the governorate. Today they control more than 60 percent of Al-Anbar, including Fallujah, Hit, Qaim and Rawa, parts of Haditha and areas around Ramadi, the provincial capital.
But Sunni tribes are divided between those who support IS militants for fear of Shiite incursion and retribution and those who are willing to back the Iraqi army’s campaign to liberate the governorate.
Baghdad’s promise to arm and train Sunni volunteers remains unfulfilled. Reports speak of only 1,500 Sunni fighters who have received light weapons and few rounds of ammunition from the government. Al- Anbar officials complain that the army has been slow in responding to calls to send additional troops and heavy armor to defend Ramadi against IS attacks.
And in the wake of claims that Shiite militias had carried out atrocities against Tikrit residents after its liberation in addition to looting and burnings of shops and homes, Al- Anbar Sunnis have called on Al-Abadi not to allow so-called Popular Mobilization forces, comprised mostly of Shiites and allegedly led by Iranian officers, to participate in the battle to free the governorate.
The Iraqi Parliament has failed to approve a law to create the so-called National Guard, which is supposed to be made of local militias to support the Iraqi army. There is resistance in Baghdad to the idea of arming the Sunnis.
But freeing Al-Anbar remains a strategic goal if the army is to cut IS supply routes to Mosul. The battle for Mosul cannot begin unless Al-Anbar is cleared of IS militants first. The bitter experiences by Sunnis in liberated Tikrit and others will make it difficult for the government to get the local backing it needs. It is also hesitant to send in the Shiite militias into Al-Anbar.
Jordan is one country that is watching events in Al-Anbar with heightened anxiety. Defeating IS militants there will secure the kingdom’s eastern borders and restore links with Sunni tribes; many of its leaders have sought refuge in Jordan.
Chasing IS militants from Al-Anbar will also degrade its communication lines with eastern Syria, where they remain strong. Winning Al-Anbar is an essential link in the long fight to defeat and eradicate extremists.
But Al-Abadi must find ways to restore Sunni confidence in his government if his upcoming campaign in Al-Anbar is to succeed. Still the battle for the governorate will be difficult and could determine Iraq’s future.
