Last week, Russia sent 200,000 tons of grain to six African states, as promised at the two-day Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in July. The forum took place after Moscow’s withdrawal from the grain deal, mediated by the UN and Turkiye, and known as the Black Sea grain initiative. Among the first receipts of Russian grain are Burkina Faso and Somalia, in addition to Zimbabwe, Mali, Eritrea, and the Central African Republic, which will receive grain shortly.

Reading the news, I remembered an anecdote from about six years ago. While on a plane I happened to run into a high representative responsible for foreign policy for one of Russia’s regions. Responding to my curiosity about his strategic foreign policies objectives, he revealed that key strategic interests lie in Africa, as the region is rich in resources. It is also an area where change — and opportunity — is constant, due to political instability, military rebellions (Niger and Mali, particularly) and bad governance. The high representative also acknowledged that there are currently only limited diplomatic initiatives toward Africa. Remembering that incident, this week I decided to try to read Russia’s mind concerning Africa, and its increasing importance on many different levels.

It is commonly known that over several years, Moscow’s influence in Africa has been conducted through the paramilitary Wagner Group, which was “making Russia even greater on every continent — and Africa even more free,” according to its former boss Yevgeny Prigozhin. The mercenary organization has been actively engaged in many states on the continent, particularly the Central African Republic and Mali.

However, with the Ukraine war, Russia’s necessity to spread its influence globally has become ever greater. For example, reportedly, the conflict has shaped most Central Asian and South Caucasus countries' attitudes, distancing themselves from Moscow while still preserving relations, and at the same time building closer dialogue with Western partners, including the EU and US. A telling example of this is that while the Russian delegation, with its leader, traveled to Kazakhstan to cement bilateral relations, the Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev closed his speech in Kazakh, instead of Russian, signaling changes in the country’s course. 

Russia has redoubled its focus on Africa’s Sahel region.

Dr. Diana Galeeva

By contrast, other regions, including Africa and the Middle East, have generally expressed their support and interest in building closer dialogue with Moscow, contrary to the West’s aim of isolating Moscow. Simultaneously, these regions have become essential to avoid global isolation. For example, in February, Paul Stronski, a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, argued that despite the war in Ukraine, Moscow has not cut back its goals in the global south. Russia has redoubled its focus on Africa’s Sahel region, which includes territories from Senegal to the Red Sea. Moscow’s growing importance there is partially linked to Western policy missteps, increasing anti-European sentiment, and long-lasting breakdowns among global and local players seeking to tackle the origin grounds of regional instability. Given the current geopolitical changes, Africa has become pivotal to many economic and political aims. 

The Russia-Africa Summit in July aimed to further develop the narrative of promoting a multipolar world order and fighting “neo-colonialism.” Russian President Vladimir Putin called for a “joint determination to counter neo-colonialism, the practice of applying illegitimate sanctions, and attempts to undermine traditional moral values.” Subsequently, representatives of 49 countries signed a joint declaration aimed at “the establishment of a more just, balanced and stable multipolar world order, firmly opposing all types of international confrontation in the African continent.” The African region is a crucial Kremlin ally for multipolarity, significantly driven by Moscow's linking to “colonialism/neo-colonialism” as part of the narrative.

Africa is a bridge to another essential region for Russia’s “multipolarity” — the Middle East and North Africa. Russia’s growing influence in Libya is a case in point, evidenced by the fact that in September, Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, met with Putin; his talks with Russian officials reportedly included renewal plans for Libya. Meetings with the Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov, who traveled to Benghazi in August, lead to discussions on the future role in the country of the Wagner Group, now assimilated into the Russian military after the attempted mutiny in June. Also, Libya is a neighbor of Algeria, which despite Western condemnations of Russia, expressed interest in deepening ties with Moscow, especially in the military sphere. This move also fits the regional dynamics, since Algeria’s rival Morocco has in recent years moved closer to the West. 

The African region is a crucial Kremlin ally for multipolarity.

Dr. Diana Galeeva

Furthermore, the active involvement in Libya of the UAE, Egypt, and Russia, also adds to the growing partnership at the bilateral level with regional actors. For example, at the diplomatic level, in 2020, Russia was “seeking out” Egypt and the UAE for successful talks on the Libyan crisis. In March, Haftar told the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that the Egyptian army had agreed to “inform” Moscow of US correspondence. These examples illustrate how at the diplomatic, military, and security levels, all these regions are interconnected, making North Africa strategically essential as a bridge into the Middle East, for Russia’s objectives.

Therefore, Russia's interest in Africa is not a “new initiative,” as was suggested by some mainstream media outlets during the Africa-Russia forum. From both an established history of involvement and my own experience, mentioned earlier, Russian representatives have found Africa appealing for many reasons and for some time. However, before the Ukraine war, Russia had applied mainly hard power sources for influence there via the Wagner Group; the heavier allocation of military resources into Europe has instead forced Moscow to pursue soft power initiatives more actively.

The region has strategic importance for Moscow’s objectives for a “multipolar” world order, in addition to its geographic strategic location, bridging with other regions, including the Middle East. Therefore, the free grain deal is just a logical continuation of Kremlin policies, if under a softer guise. Finally, these shifts are also interesting to explore, as they are evidence of wider geopolitical changes: As many traditional neighbors and allies within Russia’s sphere of influence are distancing themselves, other regions, including many African countries, are drifting close to Moscow.

• Dr. Diana Galeeva is an academic visitor to Oxford University.

X: @Dr_GaleevaDiana