Some quarters are calling for reconciliation with Syrian President Bashar Assad while Iran and its allies are militarily supporting him. On the other hand, it is no secret that Iran is leading the fight in Tikrit and Saladin province of Iraq against the militants of the so-called Islamic State (IS).
I completely disagree with those calling for reconciliation with Assad. This option might have been acceptable at the beginning of the Syrian crisis. At present, it would be the worst option any Arab — especially Gulf — government could possibly consider.
The problem is not with Assad as an individual but with his legacy, his pairing with Iran and the amount of blood he has shed. The previous promise to give him a safe exit, to protect him from retribution, and to turn a new page with some of the regime’s leaders and establish a transitional phase that unites all Syrians, was sincere.
One cannot view the war in Syria as a domestic problem, or without understanding the regional power balance and the struggle with Iran. Accepting a solution allowing Assad to remain in power would mean handing over Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to Iran, which would inevitably result in an Iranian domination of the Gulf region.
The notion that Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood and IS constitute a worry is true, but it is no reason to hand over Syria and Iraq to Iran. We are in an era in which several wars are being orchestrated in parallel and threats vary, but the Iranian threat is the greatest, especially as a nuclear deal is close to being reached. Iran will translate such a deal into an indirect attack against its Gulf rivals.
We cannot put our faith in the Americans, no matter how much they insist that they will not let Iran harm its neighbors. US regional influence has decreased. Therefore, supporting the moderate Syrian opposition politically and militarily has become absolutely necessary for Gulf Arab states in order to prevent Iran from controlling Syria.
Saudi Arabia cannot give up on 20 million Syrians no matter what the reasons are, and it cannot overlook the threat of Iranian expansion in Mesopotamia. We should not accept the possibility of reconciling with Assad, as this has no place in the Gulf’s supreme calculations.
It is impossible for Saudi Arabia to reconcile with Assad, who has killed a quarter of a million people, in order to fight IS. How can we convince the 10 million displaced people — victims of Assad’s war machine — that we are giving up on them?
As for Turkey, the problem lies with its president. Other than protecting and evacuating the remains of Suleyman Shah — the grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire, who has been dead for hundreds of years — the government has done nothing to protect Turkey’s vital interests in Syria.
When the time comes to discuss Assad’s fate, no one will care about the concept of vengeance. The focus today is on two parallel solutions: Supporting the armed moderate opposition — the Free Syrian Army (FSA) — and supporting any peaceful solution based on the reconciliation of the entire Syrian people and on the maintenance of the regime without its senior leaders. A political solution cannot be fairly imposed without supporting the FSA.
