By all accounts, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Tehran last Monday was a carefully choreographed piece of politico-diplomatic ballet to serve three precise objectives. The first of these was to show that Russia recognizes the “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei as the ultimate decision-maker in Iran.
Western leaders often blame Iran’s “unelected officials,” meaning the “Supreme Guide”, for its adventurism on the international stage. They delude themselves by thinking they could obtain better deals from “elected officials,” meaning the president. Based on that analysis, western leaders, notably successive US presidents tried to strike deals with a string of men who served as president in the Khomeinist regime- from the hapless Abol-Hassan Banisadr to the enigmatic Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and passing by the crafty Hashemi Rafsanjani. Their current hopes are pinned on President Hassan Rouhani, a protégé of Rafsanjani.
The western analysis is wrong because of two reasons at least. The first is that the words elected and unelected don’t mean the same thing in Iran as they do in western democracies. This is because only those authorized by the regime are allowed to be candidates. Even then, the pre-selected candidates of the regime cannot hope to win unless a 12-man body of mullahs endorses their “victory.”
Thus to suggest that Rouhani is the “elected” president of Iran requires a certain sense of humor. As a veteran of the Soviet system, Putin understands that perfectly.
Unlike leaders of western democracies, Putin has no difficulty understanding the Khomeinist system. This is why he went out of his way to pay respect to Khamenei. To start with he agreed to ride in a bulletproof Mercedes sent for him by Khamenei to the airport (Putin had brought his own bullet-proof Zyl, but didn’t use it). He drove directly to Khamenei’s palace, ignoring the welcoming ceremony prepared by the rudderless Rouhani. He spent almost eight hours in Tehran of which one and a half was devoted to the “Supreme Guide”.
Again, contrary to protocol, Putin brought a gift for Khamenei, a 300-year old copy of the Qur’an. (Gifts are exchanged by heads of states only on state visits; this was not one of them). He showered praise on Khamenei and made it clear it was only with him that Moscow would deal with on all key issues of international and bilateral relations.
That Khamenei was seduced by Putin’s show is clear from a long editorial in Kayhan, the daily that reflects the views of the “Supreme Guide.” “Putin’s intelligent move has provoked wonder and consternation in European and American circles,” it said. By paying homage to Khamenei, the Russian leader wanted to show that an alliance with Iran was a top priority of Russia’s new global strategy.
It was obvious that Putin’s decision to put all his chips on Khamenei had disturbed the rival faction led by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, with President Hassan Rouhani as its current public face. Rouhani’s spokesman Baqer Nobakht telephoned the Tehran media to inform them that during a visit to Moscow, Rouhani, too, had received a “special gift” from Putin. The trouble was that Putin’s “gift” to Rouhani turned out to be a 17th century Persian shield captured by the Russians in one of their numerous wars against Iran.
During the ” summit”, Putin agreed to let Iran open a branch of its Free Islamic University in Moscow and to set up a religious seminary in Russia’s only Shiite majority city Darband, Dagestan. More importantly, Putin at least pretended that as far as Syria was concerned, it was the “Supreme Guide” who would lead the dance. If he wanted Bashar Assad to remain, the Syrian despot would stay; if not he would get the boot. According to Kayhan, the “Supreme leader” expressed satisfaction with Putin’s policies, “especially in the past year and a half.”
Putin’s second objective was to throw a monkey wrench in what he thinks is the American game plan for Iran over the next five years. In a few hours, Putin virtually destroyed President Barack Obama’s hope that the supposedly pro-American faction, led by Rafsanjani with Rouhani as its current field-man, might marginalize Khamenei and lead Iran in a different direction.
Finally, Putin wanted to send a message to others in the region and beyond that while alliance with the United States, a fickle friend, leads only to disappointment and grief, cultivating Russian friendship is a wiser strategy. On the surface, Putin achieved all three objectives in Tehran. However, only time will show whether those objectives were even worth reaching for.
