Kuwait: Assembly intends to become kingmaker

The political crisis in Kuwait has reached its peak. There are protests, clashes between protesters and the police and arrests of members of the dissolved Parliament. The political climate is in a heated stage and the political statements that bear a tone of defiance from all parties are escalating it. The crisis in Kuwait is not new, but its latest chapter recently opened against the backdrop of the recent emiri decree amending the voting mechanism in the parliamentary elections from four votes per voter, to one vote per voter.
The opposition and majority of the dissolved Parliament reject the decree because it views it as an attempt to elect a Parliament that is convenient for the government. The government considers this decree a constitutional and fair exit, and has stuck by its position to proceed with elections at the beginning of December. In fact, registration has already begun for those who wish to run. The Interior Ministry announced it would not allow protests planned by the opposition to proceed on Sunday. In response, the opposition announced its boycott of elections until the emiri decree is revoked. Furthermore, it adopted a plan to exert pressure on the government by resorting to the power of the street and the masses via popular marches and seminars.
The extent of the current crisis indicates that the political system in Kuwait is entering a new phase. This small country has traditionally based its democratic experience on the mechanism of consensus, and has stuck with it to avoid the political crises. Consensus has occurred within the ruling family, between the government and the National Assembly, and between the ruling family and the political and business figures in society. In the current crisis, there seems to be an unprecedented changing landscape; the political language has changed, leaning toward confrontation and conflict, as well as a higher ceiling of demands. Many Kuwaitis complain that the potential for consensus has narrowed, and that Kuwait is on the verge of turbulence with an ending no one can predict. That said, there is a consensus about the legitimacy of Al-Sabah family to rule; but what is required is a change in the format of the relationship with the ruling family. There are also demands to eliminate corruption, for a “constitutional monarchy” and a parliamentary government, and for preventing the use of influence to circumvent the constitution and the law. While these demands may look extensive, they have in actuality spanned half a century, but over this long period of the time, the process was stalled. Tribes, political Islam, and sects, all entered the scene as new key political players, but nonetheless, development was frozen. Kuwait transformed from “a model of democracy in the Arab world and the Gulf” to a model combining an incomplete democracy and political and development stalemate.
Is the political crisis in Kuwait caused by the ‘Arab Spring’? Not at all. It resembles the crisis of Bahrain, but with considerable differences. The Arab Spring just provided both of them with a different political framework, and perhaps it offered new momentum for both, but it did not cause any of them. In Bahrain, the roots of the crisis extend to decades before the “Arab Spring,” while in Kuwait, the freezing of the democratic experiment and the repeated crises inside lasted until the “Arab Spring” started. After half a century of stagnation, Kuwait and the region changed, as did the world. Therefore, it is time for a change in the democratic experiment to develop, but not to overthrow it. This seems to be what Kuwaitis seek.
The current crisis did not start days or weeks ago; it goes back to the year 2006, when the illness of the late Emir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad coincided with the illness of the late Crown Prince Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah. The crisis erupted after the death of the prince, and the inability of the crown prince to execute his duties as emir. A constitutional crisis came across in the form of a question: Who will rule, the crown prince or Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad, who comes after Sheikh Saad in the political hierarchy? In the case of the prince’s death and the disability of the crown prince, there was no clear constitutional text addressing such an exceptional case. There was an ongoing struggle inside and outside the family between those who believed in the eligibility of Sheikh Saad to rule despite his illness, and those who believed that his illness was a constitutional impediment, particularly based on the requirement of the health status of the crown prince as stipulated in Article VIII of the constitution.
There was what appeared to be a consensus within the national assembly on one hand, and the majority of the ruling family, especially among Al-Jaber branch about the need to avoid a repeat of the impasse that the country experienced when the emir and heir apparent were sick. Selecting Sheikh Saad, in spite of his worsening health status, would have complicated the issue. The exit in this case was either for Sheikh Saad to abdicate his right to the throne that he automatically earned, or to envoke the Article III of the inheritance law of governance in order to remove him and appoint instead Sheikh Sabah as the emir. Due to a lack in achieving consensus within the ruling family, it was not possible to activate Article III except via the National Assembly, giving the Council for the first time an important political weight in resolving the issues of ruling.
The situation itself was unprecedented, as never before was the issue of choosing the emir resolved outside the consensus of the ruling family; however, since a consensus was not achieved, that was not possible. It was also not possible because of the demographic changes within the ruling family, and a shifting balance in favor of Al-Jaber branch at the expense of Al-Salem branch, to which Sheikh Saad belongs.
In a single moment, social sensitivities, constitutional requirements, and the interests and balances within and outside the ruling family all overlapped. Ultimately, the issue required for the first time the involvement of Parliament as a direct party in the resolution of the issue of governance.
The council’s role in selecting the emir is stipulated in the constitution, but according to political traditions since the beginning of Kuwait’s constitutional experiment — for more than four decades — this role did not exceed the formal ratification of the consensus of the ruling family. These circumstances opened the way for the Council to take real responsibility in resolving the issue of appointing the emir.
Accordingly, we can say that Sheikh Sabah is the first emir of Kuwait whose rule is generated from the National Assembly and not from outside it. At the time the council appeared to be the prince maker, which granted it unprecedented political power. It is not an exaggeration to say that, since then, crises have escalated between the government and ruling family on one hand, and the National Assembly on the other, always about issues concerning the municipalities, electoral system, and the interpretation of the constitution. This reflects a hidden political struggle between the two parties: the Council is trying to build on the political gains it made in 2006, and the government and the ruling family is trying to put an end to this political ambition. There, as I pointed out, were forces pushing the political process in the direction of a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary government separate from the ruling family, and all of which was in the interest of supporting the authority of the National Assembly.
In this context, emerges the role of power and political factions: The tribe, the sects, political Islam, and the civil and liberal forces. What works in favor of the Kuwaiti forces demanding change, is that they are demanding a change within the existing political system, and are not in favor of a coup; Thus, it is essential that change takes the form of a cumulative process and not the form of a political surge that may pose a threat to all. The region is undergoing a critical stage, and needs a lot of political wisdom and intelligence. There must be a convergence between a government resisting change, and an opposition charging in the direction of change.

— Courtesy of Al-Hayat newspaper