Muslim Brothers, Sinai and Iranian experiment
THE marriage of the Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the Egyptian princess Fawzia, sister of King Farouk, did not last more than a year. He divorced her in 1949. This was the condition of the relationship between Cairo and Tehran in hundred years fluctuating between love and hostility. There are people who believe that the long love affair between the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and the Iranian revolution still exists. They say that this love has not yet culminated in a political relationship, but it will finally breed a special relationship with Muhammad Mursi coming to presidency.
No one denies the existence of the special relationship of the Muslim Brothers in general and the movement of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in particular with the Iranian regime.
Reviewing the literary works of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt would reveal their admiration of the Iranian Islamic experiment. My fears are that this admiration might be the guiding tool in their new experiment of rule in Egypt, because it will definitely take them toward a deep slope. The best experiment for any Islamic political party to get guidance from is the Islamic experiment of Turkey, because it is more successful and harmonizes with the aspiration of the Egyptian revolution for freedom and multiplicity.
It is too early to know the Muslim Brothers’ project of rule in Egypt if they have any project at all. No doubt, they have legitimately won the elections and so they have the right to rule Egypt in any style they deem suitable. It is equally wrong to simplify the differences between Egypt and Iran and between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Khomeini movement.
Maybe the most important thing that happened since Mursi was elected president was his success in dissolving the ruling military council and the marginalizing of the forces of the Tahrir Square. This seems similar to what had happened in Iran after Khomeini's revolution, which was supported by various national powers and was not objected to by the strong military command. Khomeini was able to break up his allies and control power all by himself under electoral but undemocratic slogans. He was able to minimize the military establishment through the war against Iraq. He also invented substitute military and security establishments, which he created during the eight-year-long war.
Do we see a similarity here to what the Egyptian Muslim Brothers have done when they broke up the deeply rooted military establishment in Egypt with President Mursi sending Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, the military ruler, home decorated with the Nile Medal?
Undoubtedly, we have all witnessed the weak performance of Tantawi and his colleagues in the military council during a year of their rule succeeding the ousted President Hosni Mubarak. It was obvious that the council had no clear-cut political project. The council flatly failed to drive the political train after the revolution.
Now we see much exaggeration in the issue of Sinai, which was pictured as an Egyptian military failure while in fact it was the excessiveness of extremist religious groups. Instead of the Muslim Brothers paying the price of the Sinai issue, the price was paid by the victim — the military — when the extremist religious group attacked a military outpost killing 16 soldiers. The issue almost led to a confrontation with Israel.
The beating of drums in Sinai echoed the beating of the war drums against Iraq by Khomeini's regime at the beginning of his revolution. Khomeini used war to reinforce his grip on power under the pretext of defending the homeland. After Khomeini had agreed to stop the war, Iran was entirely under the rule of a single totalitarian religious team. Similarly, the use of the Israeli scarecrow would benefit the Muslim Brothers to consolidate their rule internally. This scarecrow was also useful to the Israeli rightists under Prime Minister Netanyahu, ensuring him with more power and more American support.
If the directory of the Khomeini experiment is also the guide to the Muslim Brothers, it means they are unable to see, as we do, its chronic failure in all its declared objectives including exporting the revolution to the outside world and turning Iran into a recognizable regional power. The Iranian revolution is an example of failure. It is a lesson for every country to avoid copying. Iran looks more like North Korea. It is successful in the military field by coming close to producing nuclear weapons but a complete failure in other areas. Moreover, Iran is finally destined to fall. Egypt is not like Iran. The Egyptian revolution of 2011 is not like the Iranian revolution of 1979. This is in addition to the large differences between the Khomeinis and the Muslim Brothers. The former had great popularity in Iran emanating from its Shiite roots. The Khomeini movement looks more like Catholicism in Christianity with the Pope as the final reference. The Muslim Brothers of Egypt have a Sunni background. They do not believe in a single religious authority nor in the sanctity of their leader, who has no religious or civil value in the lives of the Egyptian citizens.
