Board of Peace faces a formidable task in Gaza

It would be impossible to argue credibly that US President Donald Trump is short on tricks up his sleeve or that he lacks ambition, even if his personal and national interests are intertwined. When US envoy Steve Witkoff announced on Jan. 14 the start of phase two of Trump’s plan to end the war in Gaza, with the establishment of a Palestinian technocratic governing body, there was some relief that Washington, and possibly others in the international community, had not forgotten Gaza. Yet, less than 48 hours later, when it became clear that the Trump administration had a bolder plan aimed at establishing a new international world order mechanism, a suspicion crept in that Gaza and ending the Israel-Palestinian conflict is once again not necessarily a top priority.
From the outset, the concern was that bringing phase one to an apparent end, with the intensity of the war substantially subsided, almost all the hostages returned to Israel, and the supply of humanitarian aid becoming more regular, would push accomplishing the second phase down the internationally saturated and fast-moving agenda. Since the ceasefire came into force last October, at least 466 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli attacks, which raises doubts about how genuine a ceasefire it is; the remains of one Israeli hostage still have not been returned; the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is still dire; and still the international community has been acting slowly.
Furthermore, from the outset of Trump’s 20-point peace plan announcement in September, the objectives and the role of the suggested Board of Peace mechanism were ambiguous. They left too much room for interpretation and, as a result, for delaying if not derailing it, which both the Israeli government and Hamas have shown interest in doing. Last week’s announcement  of the new US-proposed peace mechanism and instrument surprised most of us, as from one Board of Peace have emerged two, of which one is specifically for Gaza, as well as the executive committee whose aim is to implement phase two, and the other is aimed at almost rivaling the UN. With all the commotion around the more global Board of Peace, it is, for now, no more than a voluntary arrangement in the vein of the G7 or G20, whose decisions will have no standing in international law nor any power of enforcement, unless the countries that are involved in it decide to use their political and military power to impose their will without the UN Security Council sanctioning it. 

Hamas will automatically see them as rivals.

Yossi Mekelberg

However, for Gaza, the success of the Board of Peace for Gaza and the formation of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza is vital. Without it, the current and intolerable situation, especially for the Palestinians who live in Gaza, where more than half of this tiny territory is occupied by Israel and the rest controlled by Hamas, is likely to become a long-term arrangement. As such, the appointment of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, led by Ali Shaath, which is a new committee of Palestinian technocrats that will be responsible for the “rebuilding of civil institutions, and the stabilization of daily life in Gaza, while laying the foundation for long-term, self-sustaining governance” could spell good news of sincere intentions to reconstruct the enclave, although the hurdles are enormous. It is the task of both the Boards of Peace for Gaza and the Board of Peace’s Executive Committee to empower it.
As yet, beyond the names of the members of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, many of whom have an impressive record of public service for the benefit of Palestinians, their executive powers are far from clear; they have not been allocated a budget, and there is no administration to support them. The technocrats have taken on a formidable risk by agreeing to be part of it. Hamas would automatically see them as rivals for their authority, if not outright enemies, in Gaza, and would be unlikely to cooperate with them. They must also be seen by political rivals in the West Bank, as building a political base for them with the support of foreign forces, which will give them an unfair advantage in future elections. And Israel will not make it easy for them either, as their success might undermine Israeli intentions to maintain the occupation of at least parts of Gaza indefinitely.
While many in the international community were left to ponder whether it would be advisable for them to join the Board of Peace and fork out $1 billion for the privilege, it has given Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu an even greater dilemma than most. His room for opposing Trump is minimal, especially as the US president is advocating for him to receive a pardon in his corruption trial and has enough other ways of leaning on him. Hence, despite arguing in public in opposition to the inclusion of Turkiye and Qatar on the executive board for Gaza, Netanyahu was forced to accept it and also confirmed earlier this week that he would be joining the Board of Peace. This made it clear that when the US genuinely wants to stamp its authority on Israel, it can do so. For Israel and Turkiye, and to a certain extent Qatar also, this might be an opportunity to bury past feuds and recognize that it is in everyone’s interest to prevent the collapse of the ceasefire, and act first and foremost for the sake of the Palestinians in Gaza.
To be sure, there is a danger that focusing on structures and personalities rather than objectives and timelines for achieving them might leave Gaza in a dangerous limbo. Gaza, and to a very similar extent the West Bank, must see an immediate improvement in their living conditions with speed and purpose, without ignoring their political aspirations. Simultaneously, the demilitarization of Gaza, which means that its occupation by Israel must come to an end, a formula must be sought for Hamas to decommission its arms, and the International Stabilization Force must be deployed to ensure that no hostilities resume, is a prerequisite of stabilizing the situation in Gaza. Neither side should ever pose a threat to the other, and at the end of the day, the success of all the newly suggested instruments of peace will be judged if they achieve exactly that and with a sense of urgency and a political horizon.

• Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House.
X: @YMekelberg