Israel versus Iran: The shadow of the Cold War

In the previous article I discussed the stage of “distant alliance” following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, within the framework of Israeli-Iranian relationship. I stated that there had been little change in the nature of the Israeli-Iranian ties as a consequence of the Shah being overthrown and the coming of Khomeini to power in 1979. The only difference came in the form of the relationship, which shifted from “strategic partnership” to “distant alliance” as the geopolitical map in the 1980s was to the benefit of Israel. The Iran-Iraq War provided Israel with a qualitative strategic opportunity with which to dismantle the eastern front that threatened Israel. Iraq was busy with its war against Iran, and Syria had become isolated from the rest of the Arab countries due to its support for Iran. Thus, prospects of attacks from the eastern front had diminished. This article will explore and discuss the stage of “Cold War” between Israel and Iran in 1991.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the US invasion of Iraq in 1991, the geopolitical environment of the Middle East changed, and the two main reasons for the cooperation between Iran and Israel no longer existed. The Arab countries were no longer receiving Soviet support, and consequently, Israel was not in need of Iran as a buffer zone against the Soviet expansion toward the Indian Ocean in the Arabian Gulf. In addition, the second Gulf War took Iraq, the strongest Arab country, out of the regional equation, meaning it was no longer a threat to Israel; thus, the two common threats that had drawn Israel and Iran together in the 1950s had disappeared. The end of the Cold War and the fall of Iraq made Iran, by default, the most powerful country in the region after Israel. The relationship between Israel and Iran has since then been one of hostility as both countries attempt to gain regional power.
Although the geopolitical map during the 1970s had become better for both Israel and Iran. But without Iraq as a key pillar for the strategic balance with Iran, Iran would represent a threat to Israel through the triple alliance between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. This was particularly pertinent to Israel because the end of the Cold War had raised questions among the decision-makers in the US regarding the strategic benefit of Israel for the US during the Gulf War in which Kuwait was liberated and Saddam was driven out of Kuwait, and Washington began to treat Israel as a growing burden rather than a source of benefit. This was apparent in the hard-line taken by the first Bush administration with that of Yitzhak Shamir in 1992 with regard to ceasing to build more settlements in the Occupied Territories. In addition, the Madrid Conference held at the initiative of the then US President, George Bush, the first in the aftermath of the second Gulf War to put pressure on Israel to reach a settlement with the Palestinians based on the principle of “land for peace,” gave out a clear message from Washington expressing the end of its need for Israel as a bulwark against the Soviet penetration in the Middle East. As a result, the “periphery doctrine” was turned on its head, and Israel started to build close relationships with her neighboring Arab countries in an attempt to reduce friction with the United States while trying to portray Iran as a major threat in order to persuade Washington to confront Tehran. In 1992, the Labour government launched a major campaign to portray Iran and Shiite Islamic fundamentalism as a global threat through the promotion of Iran’s quest to acquire nuclear weapons and her support for Hezbollah. Likewise, the Iranian discourse of hostility toward Israel was clearly present despite the fact that, as I mentioned previously, during the 1980s Iranian discourse had been more vociferous and even more hostile, yet it was ignored because of their mutual interests. According to David Menashri, “during the 1980s, no one in Israel ever talked about the Iranian threat; indeed, the very word was not even uttered.”
All Iranian attempts to reach a settlement with the West were ignored because of Israeli pressure on both the US and the European Union to continue the isolation of Iran and to present her as a threat to Israel and the rest of the countries in the region. Therefore, the Iranian government soon began to attack Israel for fear of the pressure being put on the US to build a new regional system based on the isolation of Iran. The new reality in the region reconciled the ideology of Iran and its strategic interests motivating Tehran to turn its anti-Israel rhetoric into a policy. So, Iran began to target what it saw as the weakest part in this strategy, the Palestinian peace process. Thus, Iran raised funds for Hezbollah and provided materials to militant organizations targeting the Jewish state inside Palestine. At the same time as the Madrid Peace Conference was being held, the Iranian President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, called for a conference in support of the Palestinian Intifada, which was held in Tehran in autumn 1991. This conference hosted all the peace-opposing Palestinian factions — Hamas and other Palestinian groups — in addition to Hezbollah, in an attempt to highlight the similarity between the Iranian ideology and its strategic interests.
The final article in this series will look at the most recent stage in the complex relationship between Iran and Israel.