What Palmyra attack means for Syria’s security apparatus

I recently engaged in a conversation with a journalist who has visited Syria multiple times since the fall of former President Bashar Assad’s regime and spent an extended period there. He shared his observations, particularly regarding armed fighters — especially foreign ones — the behavior of armed groups aligned with the new government and the efforts of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense to bring these groups under a unified central authority and prevent security lapses or legal violations.

The friend, instinctively assessing the situation through a journalist’s lens, voiced concern over a profound ideological issue within the armed groups, long shaped by closed religious discourses, rigid extremism and deep suspicion of those who disagree with them, often escalating to the exclusion or elimination of others through violence.

These extremist ideas within disparate armed groups were amplified by the fall of Assad rather than contained, as some might have anticipated, driven by a heightened sense of power. This was clearly reflected in the events on the Syrian coast involving Alawite communities and in Sweida with the Kurds, where armed groups aligned with the new regime — some of them part of its structure — carried out violent acts against civilians, thus deepening the crisis.

This does not imply that the coastal region and Sweida were free of armed groups opposed to the state that violated the law and fueled sectarian and regional tensions; such groups are equally part of the problem and contribute to the complexity of the situation.

Extremist ideas within armed groups were amplified by the fall of Assad rather than contained, as some might have anticipated

Hassan Al-Mustafa

For its part, the Syrian government, as reflected in speeches by President Ahmad Al-Sharaa, appears to be moving toward laying the foundations of a more moderate state and distancing itself from the violent legacy of the former ruling political class. This shift, however, has proven difficult for some of Al-Sharaa’s supporters and former armed allies to accept.

The task entrusted to the Syrian president is immense and highly perilous, yet he appears determined to pursue it. A closer look at his policies, foreign visits and rhetoric in international forums shows that he is navigating a complex political minefield — despite growing regional and international backing, the path ahead remains arduous. He faces opposition not only from terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh, but also from former allies who once fought alongside him.

From this perspective, the shooting near Palmyra on Saturday was not a passing security incident but a revealing moment that exposed a structural weakness within the security apparatus — one that must be urgently addressed to prevent it from jeopardizing any future security cooperation between Damascus and Washington.

The terrorist operation resulted in the deaths of three Americans and the wounding of Syrian personnel, underscoring not only the continued threat posed by extremist ideology within armed factions but also raising a fundamental question about how such thinking can be dismantled. It further calls into question the commitment of leaders below the presidency to advancing the principles of a civil state. These are deep-rooted challenges that cannot be resolved in the near future.

The gravity of the operation is amplified by its occurrence within the context of counterterrorism efforts against Daesh, which is a critical point of convergence between Syrian and American interests. Targeting American military personnel thus goes beyond inflicting casualties and strikes at the core of the institutional trust upon which any lasting security cooperation depends.

Such coordination is not built on situational necessity but on disciplined, cohesive institutions operating under a clear professional doctrine and exercising effective control over their forces before confronting an adversary. The Palmyra operation revealed that these conditions have yet to be fully met within the Syrian security apparatus.

In a telegram addressed to US President Donald Trump, Al-Sharaa strongly condemned the incident and reaffirmed the commitment of Damascus to safeguarding security and stability in Syria and across the region.

The task entrusted to the Syrian president is immense and highly perilous, yet he appears determined to pursue it

Hassan Al-Mustafa

For his part, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani told his American counterpart, Marco Rubio, during a phone call that the Palmyra attack was intended to destabilize bilateral relations. Rubio, meanwhile, described the attack as a renewed challenge in the fight against terrorism and stressed the importance of cooperation with Syria to reinforce counterterrorism efforts.

Trump, who vowed “serious retaliation” on Daesh, reaffirmed his support for his Syrian counterpart, stating that his trust remains intact. This endorsement grants the Syrian government a pivotal opportunity — one that must be fully leveraged to rebuild credible security institutions founded on a national civilian-military doctrine and clearly detached from extremist religious affiliations.

Meeting this challenge will require a clear strategic vision, the integration of foreign expertise, lessons drawn from the counterextremism experiences of allied Arab states and the forging of a renewed national identity for the army and security forces.

Although the challenges facing the Syrian government may seem natural and even expected, they remain serious and deeply complex. It is therefore in the interest of Syria and its neighbors to pursue swift, coordinated and practical solutions.

These challenges are further aggravated by the presence of extremist elements and foreign fighters who infiltrated pro-government formations during Syria’s civil war. The absence of a clear legal framework to address their status — whether through rehabilitation, reintegration, accountability or expulsion — has turned them into a persistent vulnerability within the security apparatus.

At the same time, critical gaps in specialized expertise, particularly in preventive security, intelligence analysis and VIP protection, have limited the state’s capacity to anticipate and neutralize threats, leaving security agencies largely reactive. This structural weakness cannot be overlooked and addressing it will require sustained effort and considerable time.

• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse, and the relationship between Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran. X: @Halmustafa